20 years of Shangri-La Dialogue: Evolution, characteristics and prospects

The Shangri-La Dialogue is one of the largest and highest-level multilateral defense and security dialogue mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, and has been held for a full 20 sessions by 2023. The establishment of the Shangri-La Dialogue was influenced by the concept of multilateral security and the practice of multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War, and was also closely related to the rise and transformation of the second Track diplomacy and defense diplomacy after the September 11 incident. In the course of its 20 years of development, Shangri-La Dialogue has gradually formed its own unique style, such as more Western dominance, informal promotion of regional dialogue and cooperation, combination of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, and focus on Asia-Pacific security. The future development of Shangri-La Dialogue also faces some challenges, but in the foreseeable future, its unique position is difficult to be replaced, and it will continue to play an important role as an important part of the regional security architecture.

By 2023, the "Shangri-La Dialogue" is sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and “1.5 Track” Asia-Pacific multilateral defense dialogue mechanism co-sponsored by the Singapore government has held for 20 sessions, both becomes an important part of the regional security architecture.

The Shangri-La Dialogue, officially known as the Asian Security Summit, was first held at the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore in 2002, so it is often referred to as the Shangri-La Dialogue (hereinafter referred to as the "Shangri-La Dialogue"). Although accompanied by disputes and doubts, its influence is gradually expanding, and the role of "scanner" on the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly prominent. As a semi-official regional multilateral defense mechanism dominated by the West, it is undoubtedly different from other defense cooperation mechanisms in Asia in terms of agenda-setting, strategic orientation and organizational form. However, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the association, a comprehensive review and evaluation of its origin, development, characteristics and prospects will help us better understand this mechanism and provide better ideas for our participation and response.

I. The origin and development of Shangri-La Dialogue

The Shangri-La Dialogue was influenced by the concept of multilateral security and the practice of multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War, and was closely related to the rise and transformation of the second Track diplomacy and defense diplomacy after the September 11 incident.

(1)The emergence of multilateral security concepts and defense diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region

As we all know, during the Cold War, the US-led bilateral alliance formed a "hub-and-spoke" system that dominated the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Although the United States, the Soviet Union, Australia and other countries have also proposed the construction of multilateral security initiatives such as the "Pacific Treaty Program", "Asian collective security system" and "Asian Security Cooperation Conference", and the United States has also tried to establish the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Organization, but these multilateral initiatives and practices have not produced substantive results.

After the end of the Cold War, due to the changes in the international strategic environment and the development of security concepts, multilateral security cooperation mechanisms, including the Shangri-La Dialogue, came into being and achieved rapid development.

From the perspective of the international strategic environment, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a series of things that are rapidly changing the international political reality, such as economic globalization and regional integration, have fundamentally spawned the rise and continuous development of regional multilateral security cooperation. Specifically, first of all, the disintegration of the bipolar pattern prompts various forces to reassess their own interests and adjust their relationships, entering a new period of differentiation and combination. The United States tried to take the Cold War victory as an opportunity to build a unipolar pattern, but many countries did not agree, China, Russia, Japan, the European Union and other countries emphasized the trend of multi-polarization of the international pattern. Since then, the United States has been caught in the quagmire of the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, which also made it realize that unipolar demands are not feasible. Second, in the post-Cold War era of globalization, the number of non-state actors in the global system, including international organizations, religious organizations and transnational corporations, has increased dramatically and their roles have expanded significantly. Third, since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the beginning of the 21st century, with the continuous promotion of economic globalization and information technology, the international security environment has become more complex. In addition to traditional security threats, non-traditional security issues have become increasingly prominent. These non-traditional security issues are not only intertwined with traditional security issues, but also transnational and global in nature. This has made global and regional integration a common understanding of the international community and enhanced the awareness of multilateral cooperation among all countries. It is precisely based on the above changes that the post-Cold War international relations have witnessed a "global" trend and a "regional" development in international politics. The way to seek solutions to problems has also expanded from the traditional national way to the regional and global cooperation way of multilateralism, thus leading to the emergence of cooperative collective action.

From the perspective of security concept, multilateral security concept mainly includes coordinated security, collective security, collective defense, common security and cooperative security. It is the concept of common security and cooperative security that has played an important role in the establishment of multilateral security cooperation mechanism after the Cold War. The concept of common security was first put forward in the famous report "Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival" submitted by the "Palme Commission". Common security emphasizes that the security and survival of all countries are interdependent, and believes that the consideration of the "shadow of the future" in national security decisions will ultimately serve the interests of all, and the rationality of cooperation and reciprocity is the best basis for the stability of the security system. Although common security was proposed by European countries, its emphasis on common security interests among countries has gradually been accepted by countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Cooperative security, first proposed by Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1990, is a security concept formed in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War. The core features of cooperative security include the inclusiveness of participants, the breadth of topics discussed and the looseness of organizational forms. The inclusiveness of participants means that any actor, whether State or non-State, can participate regardless of his or her point of view, form of government or status in international organizations. The broad nature of the topics to be discussed means that cooperative security goes beyond traditional military security issues to include political, economic, environmental, social and even human security. The looseness of the organizational form means that it does not require the creation of a formal system or mechanism, and emphasizes gradualism and flexibility, that is, the development of multilateral mechanisms in a gradual manner acceptable to the relevant parties and the adoption of a looser organizational form to promote the habit of cultivating dialogue among members.

These concepts, especially the concept of cooperative security, have played a very important role in promoting and shaping the establishment and development of various multilateral security cooperation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War. The establishment and development of the Shangri-La Dialogue and its related institutions reflect the idea of common security and cooperative security.

In addition, the new changes in the security situation and security agenda in the Asia-Pacific region after the September 11, 2001 incident, the new development of Track II diplomacy and the rise and transformation of defense diplomacy are also important reasons for the emergence of Shangri-La Dialogue. At that time, due to major changes in the political, economic and security situation in the region, Asia-Pacific countries were faced with complex and diversified security issues. Relevant countries and regions need to take the initiative in the changing international environment, make the right decisions in line with national and regional interests and take measures to cope with them. Under this premise, various forms of "Track 2" and "Track 1 and a half" defense diplomacy continue to emerge, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, the South China Sea Potential Conflict Management seminar, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Council, and so on, and show the unique advantages of being more relaxed and flexible than the "Track 1" model. The "track-and-a-half" Shangri-La Dialogue has become a high-level platform for defense exchanges and cooperation among countries in the Asia-Pacific region because it organically links security research, security dialogue and security decision-making.

(2) The Shangri-La Dialogue has gradually become a major defense and security dialogue mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region

As mentioned above, before and after the end of the Cold War, Asia-Pacific countries established some "Track I" and "Track II" multilateral security cooperation mechanisms or arrangements based on the concept of common security and cooperative security, but before the establishment of "Shangri-La Dialogue", the Asia-Pacific region still lacked a fixed mechanism that could bring together leaders of defense departments of various countries. In 1996, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and Thai Defense Minister Chawari Yong Chaiyu proposed separate initiatives to convene Asian defense ministers for talks, but neither came to fruition. Officially, the only multilateral security forum in Asia at the time was the ASEAN Regional Forum, established in 1994, but it was dominated by foreign ministries, and the region desperately needed a defense diplomacy platform that would allow defense ministers to interact.

Based on this, in 2001, John Chipman, president and CEO of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, proposed the idea of establishing an Asian security Conference. During the 36th Munich Security Conference, Chipman noted that Asian officials had been snubbed, reinforcing the idea that Asia needed its own defense minister-level defense dialogue. Initially, the Shangri-La Dialogue was modeled on the Munich Security Conference, but the II-SS was not satisfied with this, and instead sought to establish a "track one" mechanism that would allow defense ministers to meet under a multilateral framework. ISS first specifically invited the defence ministers of the ARF member states in order to make the mechanism a true regional security mechanism. In February 2001, Chipman formally proposed the idea of an Asian security conference to then-Singaporean President Nathan R. Nathan, who agreed to let Singapore's Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) provide support until the ISS could host the conference on its own. The proposal was then submitted to Singapore's cabinet for discussion and supported by Singapore's Ministry of Defence. Since then, the development of Shangri-La Dialogue has generally experienced three main stages.

The first stage is the first three meetings, which is the start-up and exploration stage. The first meeting, in 2002, was attended by defense ministers or senior officials from about a dozen countries, including U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. The informal nature of the meeting is emphasized, and defense ministers or senior defense officials can meet "privately" in bilateral or multilateral formats. In 2003, the organizers expanded the scope of the invitation to include defense officials such as chiefs of staff, service commanders, and permanent secretaries of defense ministries of some countries. In addition to the general Assembly, two closed-door sub-sessions were added. At its third session in 2004, the Shangri-La Dialogue established an Asia office in Singapore and began to organize the dialogue independently, but still with the support of the Singapore Government. In addition to defense ministers and military leaders, intelligence, police or national security officials from several countries, as well as prominent defense experts and academics, have also been invited to the conference, while the number of closed-door breakout sessions has increased from two to three.

The second stage was from 2005 to 2009, with the gradual increase in the number of countries and officials participating in the conference, the influence of Shangri-La Dialogue was expanding. By 2006, 23 countries were represented, including 17 defense ministers and three deputy defense ministers. The number of topics and meetings is also expanding. In 2008, the number of plenary meetings increased from five to six, and the number of breakout meetings increased from three to six. In 2009, for the first time, the conference set up an opening dinner speech, inviting heads of state or government to deliver keynote speeches. Since then, the conference has become an influential multilateral defense forum in the Asia-Pacific region, and the only regional multilateral dialogue mechanism at the defense ministerial level at that time. As Chipman said in his opening speech at the 2009 Conference, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become an important forum for people to discuss defense and foreign affairs in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as an important mechanism for cross-regional security dialogue. In his keynote speech, then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also pointed out that the Shangri-La Dialogue has firmly established itself as a prominent defense and security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region in just seven years.

The third stage is from 2010, the development of Shangri-La Dialogue into the fast track. Not only are the topics of the meeting more extensive, but more countries have joined the dialogue process, including more European countries and even some countries in the Middle East and Latin America. ISS, the conference organizer, has also been innovating in the organizational form of the conference in order to enhance the effect of the dialogue and enhance the attention. In 2012, ISS signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Singapore's Ministry of Defence to expand and enhance the role of the Shangri-La Dialogue. According to the memorandum, Hong Kong will add three new elements: First, ISS will appoint two senior fellows in its Asia office in Singapore to conduct policy research related to Asian security, while also assisting ISS in developing closer exchanges with defense institutions in the region. Second, ISS is launching a new journal to enhance independent analysis of defence and security issues of interest to the participating countries. Thirdly, a seminar of Asia-Pacific defense and security experts will be organized between the two sessions. Since the seminar was held at the Fullerton Hotel in Singapore, it was later known as the Fullerton Forum, also known as the Sherpa Conference, which was the precursor to the Synod. The "Fullerton Forum" has been held since 2013, generally held in January every year, and the topics discussed or suggestions made by defense experts at the meeting often become an important reference for determining the issues of the year. In 2016, the Convention also established the "Southeast Asia Young Leaders Program", which has since been held annually during the convention with the aim of providing an opportunity for a new generation of Southeast Asian strategists to discuss regional and global security issues, as well as to build connections among young leaders.

At this point, the overall structure, mode and operation of the Shangri-La Dialogue have basically taken shape and been fixed. Despite the establishment of "Track one" defense cooperation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, the Hong Kong Meeting has always occupied a place in the regional security architecture because of its unique role and influence. As ISS concluded in its report on the 2014 conference: "The Shangri-La Dialogue has itself become a key component of the emerging regional security architecture and will maintain its status as the most important and inclusive meeting mechanism among Asia-Pacific's most senior defense officials."

(3)  China's participation in the Shangri-La Dialogue

At the beginning of the Shangri-La Dialogue, due to its Western-led background, China sent only lower-level officials to participate. In 2007, China sent its first high-level military delegation to the conference. Zhang Qinsheng, then Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, led a delegation to attend and delivered a speech entitled "Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation to Maintain Peace and Prosperity". Since then, from 2008 to 2010, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian has led delegations to the conference three times to elaborate China's views on the regional security situation and introduce China's policies and propositions on participating in international security cooperation. In 2011, for the first time, China sent its defense minister to attend the conference. Minister Liang Guanglie delivered a keynote speech on the theme of China's International Security Cooperation. This is the first time in ten years that the conference has set up a special agenda for China.

In 2012, China lowered the level of its participation in the conference and sent a delegation headed by the vice president of the Academy of Military Sciences. The organizers did not give the Chinese side a chance to speak at the conference. In 2013, China resumed the practice of having a delegation led by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army attend the meeting. From 2014 to 2016, the Chinese military sent a deputy-general level delegation to the conference for three consecutive years. Some scholars believe that China continues to send delegations to the Shangri-La Dialogue, indicating that as a world power, China is actively participating in international processes and making its voice heard on multilateral occasions, highlighting that China is shifting from passive to active in foreign affairs. In 2017 and 2018, China downgraded its participation. But in 2019, China once again raised its participation to the level of Minister of Defense. The 2020 and 2021 events will be suspended due to the epidemic. In 2022 and 2023, Chinese defense ministers attended the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Overall, China's participation has not been interrupted since the military delegation was sent to the summit, although the level of participation has changed slightly. The speech of the Chinese delegation at the meeting mainly focused on explaining China's national defense policy concepts and propositions, introducing China's efforts to maintain regional and international peace and stability, and advocating regional peace and cooperation. China is increasingly aware that the conference is an important defense and diplomatic platform. Speaking out on this platform can not only respond to the outside world's misunderstandings, accusations and even attacks on China and enhance its international voice, but also explain China's security and defense policies to neighboring countries and the world to a certain extent. Through dialogue, communication and exchanges, we can increase trust and dispel misgigiousness with all parties and promote practical cooperation. The spokesperson of China's Ministry of National Defense once said that China's defense departments and armed forces have always attached importance to the positive role played by various multilateral platforms, including the Shangri-La Dialogue, in promoting dialogue and exchanges and enhancing understanding and trust. China hopes that the meeting will help promote dialogue, strengthen exchanges, enhance understanding and expand trust.

II.The main features of the Shangri-La Dialogue

In the course of its 20 years of development, the Shangri-La Dialogue has gradually formed its own unique style and played a role that cannot be ignored in the regional security architecture.

(1)The color of Western dominance has always been relatively strong

Compared with other major multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, the Forum is not dominated by ASEAN, but has a deeper Western background. The dialogue stems from the European concept and practice of defense diplomacy. The host II SS was deeply influenced by the Munich Security Conference, and was strongly supported by Western powers such as the United States, Japan, Britain, France and Germany, which sent defense ministers to the conference almost every year. The United States has even sent several senior military officials, including the defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command (formerly known as Pacific Command), to the meeting. And the organizers also reciprocated by giving the United States "special treatment", that is, the US Defense Secretary spoke first on the first day of the conference every year, and spoke significantly more time than the relevant countries. In the speech, the US Defense Secretary will generally elaborate the US Asia-Pacific policy and military strategy, express his views on regional security issues, criticize and attack relevant countries, and try to control the dominance of public opinion and the right to speak. In contrast, since China sent a high-level military delegation to attend the meeting, although it has attracted much attention, the meeting speech is often in the morning of the second day, when the issues raised by the United States and its Allies, especially unfavorable public opinion against China has been fermented, and China can only be forced to "take the move" to respond.

It also receives annual commercial sponsorship from large Western civil and military companies, such as Airbus, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and others. Other Western companies or media also provided support for the conference, such as Microsoft, Japan's Asahi Shimbun, Italian defense group Leonardo, Macsa Technology, Britain's Babcock International Group, and so on.

(2)Promoting regional dialogue and cooperation in an informal manner

The organizer of the festival, ISS, is an academic institution and does not have a strong official color. Therefore, unlike formal official mechanisms, the convention was originally set up to "provide an opportunity for regional defense ministers to meet in a relaxed setting like an academic conference." This informality facilitates frank exchanges and makes up for the shortcomings of official meetings. The Conference also invited non-official senior experts and scholars, not only ensuring that the plenary and sub-sessions were held to a high standard, but also that the open debate at the conference helped to promote and strengthen substantive cooperation on important security issues. Because of this informality, defense ministers and senior defense officials see the Dialogue as an important platform, where they are willing to put forward new initiatives as a sounding board for a kind of "proof of concept," with some initiatives adopted and others shelved or abandoned. For example, at the 2018 summit, the British and French defense ministers both stressed their enduring interests in "freedom of navigation" in the South China Sea and said they would send more naval vessels to the South China Sea. At the meeting, Singapore's Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen announced a series of initiatives that Singapore plans to promote as the rotating chair of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, including ASEAN and China will hold joint maritime exercises, strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing under the framework of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus, and recommend that the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus member states accept the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea.

Moreover, because of this informality, incense is of unique value in addressing some of the toughest and most sensitive regional defense issues. Traditional security issues that cannot be discussed in depth in formal official mechanisms, such as the North Korean nuclear issue, the South China Sea dispute, the arms race, the development of submarines in the Asia-Pacific region, and military transparency, can all be discussed at the meeting. Teo Chee Hean, then Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, said of the Shangri-La Dialogue: "Although the Shangri-La Dialogue is an unofficial platform for Track one and a half, important countries and people will participate in the dialogue, and scholars and other experienced people will also come here to share their views. There, countries can have a full and frank exchange of views and have greater freedom to explore new ways to strengthen regional security. Initiatives such as Eye in the Air were first proposed at the Shangri-La Dialogue."

(3)Combining multilateral diplomacy with bilateral, trilateral and other small-scale defense diplomacy

Since its inception, the Shangri-La Dialogue has not only been committed to the multilateral process, but also set up a platform for the defense departments of various countries to engage in bilateral, trilateral and other small-scale contacts. Some scholars even believe that the biggest benefit of the conference so far for national defense departments has come from the multiple bilateral meetings held on the sidelines of the conference. Holding bilateral or trilateral meetings in the same location, in a short period of time, at a high density will undoubtedly increase efficiency, and the confidentiality of these meetings ensured by the organizers will also increase their appeal to policy makers in the defense sector. Chipman pointed out that the meeting "provides a platform for the parties to openly exchange views on defense issues, and also creates opportunities for participating countries to develop new bilateral relations, while promoting the multilateral cooperation process." Small-scale interactions within a multilateral framework have enhanced the value of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Delegations to the conference are increasingly using it as an occasion to hold private bilateral or trilateral consultations with their counterparts. The meetings usually last for three days, and delegations usually spend a day or so holding 15-20 bilateral consultations with countries. The content of these consultations is generally not public, but some countries will issue statements after the meetings, making their main points public.

Due to the US-Western dominated background of the Conference, the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada and other European countries such as the United Kingdom and France were deeply involved in the conference, and carried out bilateral or small multilateral diplomacy during the conference started relatively early. At the bilateral level, the U.S. Secretary of Defense attends almost every year and holds bilateral meetings with many defense ministers. Japan also often takes advantage of the opportunity to carry out a number of small-scale defense diplomacy activities. For example, during the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue in 2022, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi held bilateral meetings with Canada, Singapore, New Zealand, China, Australia and Fiji, and Japan also held bilateral meetings with the Czech Republic and Lithuania at the level of deputy defense ministers. In 2023, according to the ISS, 121 official bilateral meetings were held during the event. For example, Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada met with his counterparts from Australia, China, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand during the meeting, and signed an agreement with Singapore on the transfer of defense equipment and technology. As the host country, Singapore also held bilateral meetings with defence ministers from China, the United States, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.

At the trilateral or small multilateral level, the US, Japan and the ROK have held trilateral meetings on the sidelines of the Hong Kong Summit since 2004 and issued joint statements on regional hotspot issues, sending out deterrence signals to the outside world. This practice has continued to this day. On June 3, 2023, the United States, Japan and South Korea once again held trilateral talks on the sidelines of the meeting, and in a joint statement to the media after the meeting, the three parties said that they discussed the increasing nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, and will strengthen trilateral joint military exercises to address common security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. In recent years, more and more countries have been interacting on the sidelines of the festival. The three border chiefs meeting of the United States, Japan and Australia during the conference has become a regular occurrence, and the "five-country Joint Defense Organization" and "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" have also begun to meet on the sidelines of the conference. The U.S. and ASEAN defense ministers have met twice in a row since 2022. In addition, it is worth noting that in June 2023, the United States, Japan, Australia and the Philippines held a meeting of four border chiefs for the first time during the Hong Kong Convention, and it is not ruled out that the four countries will institutionalize this meeting in the future.

(4)The agenda focuses on core security hotspots in the Asia-Pacific and is broad, guiding and forward-looking

The Shangri-La Dialogue attaches great importance to the topic setting, because the topic is the heart and soul of a multilateral dialogue or forum. The breadth and depth of the agenda determines the cutting-edge and profound nature of the speeches and discussions of the Dialogue. The reason why the conference is called the "scanner" of the annual regional security picture has a lot to do with its agenda setting. In this regard, the main practices and features of the Association include:

A)Make sure the topic is broad

Although the Convention is a defense dialogue mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region, which determines the regionality of its topics, the Convention has always pursued a broad agenda due to the wide geographical scope of the Asia-Pacific region, the diversity of security challenges, the large number of participating countries, and the diverse interests of all parties. Over the years, the agenda of the summit has not avoided the long-standing, highly sensitive and intractable hotspot issues and traditional security issues in the region, such as the Korean nuclear issue, the South China Sea issue and conflict resolution, but also touched on many less sensitive non-traditional security issues, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-terrorism and climate change, which have become increasingly prominent in recent years. Of course, as a multilateral defense forum, the forum will also highlight the military nature and discuss military-related issues such as regional defense cooperation, changes in the form of war, military modernization, military transparency, arms race, and strategic stability.

B)Focus on leading the topic

The annual summit will not have a single theme, but will ensure that the main topics reflect the most important regional security challenges of the year that have received widespread attention. For example, on the eve of the 2012 Summit, the confrontation between China and the Philippines on the Huangyan Island drew the attention of the international community. The theme of the second plenary meeting of the summit was "safeguarding freedom of navigation", which was actually intended to discuss the situation in the South China Sea. In 2018, US-DPRK relations showed signs of easing, and US President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il were to hold a summit in Singapore after the Incense meeting, so one of the topics set by the Congress was "easing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula", which obviously grasped the hot topic at that time, and also coincided with the attention of the conference on the peninsula issue.

It is worth noting that the organizers often set some guiding topics according to the security situation of the year, in order to trigger debate and exchanges, enhance the topic, and attract the attention of international public opinion. For example, since the situation in the South China Sea heated up in 2009, maritime security has been one of the important topics of the conference, and it has been reflected in the General Assembly or parallel sub-topics almost every year. For example, "Responding to new maritime security threats," "Maintaining freedom of navigation," "Challenges in maintaining and managing high seas security," "Challenges in Maritime intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance," "Managing tensions in the South China Sea," "Practical measures to avoid Maritime conflicts," "Enhancing Maritime Security: Code of Conduct and confidence-building Measures," "Mechanisms to enhance Maritime Security," "Maritime Security: From codes of conduct to crisis communications." In 2011 and 2012, when the South China Sea issue was on the rise, maritime issues were continuously on the agenda of the plenary meetings.

The topic of the fifth plenary meeting in 2011 was "Addressing new maritime security threats" and the speakers were the defence ministers of Malaysia, Viet Nam and the Philippines, which are parties to the South China Sea issue. The second plenary meeting in 2012 was on the topic of "Safeguarding freedom of navigation", and the speakers were the defense ministers of India and Japan, non-regional countries that have stepped up their involvement in the South China Sea issue in recent years, and the defense minister of Indonesia, which has disputes with China in the South China Sea. In 2023, "Asia's Evolving Maritime Security Order" will again be the subject of a plenary session. Judging from these agenda Settings and the selection of speakers, the Association intends to guide the South China Sea issue in a tendentious manner.

In recent years, due to the intensification of strategic competition between China and the United States, and the launch of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" by various countries, topics related to these two topics have become important content of the conference. In 2018, the concept of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" has become one of the focuses of the conference. Indian Prime Minister Modi clarified India's "Indo-Pacific strategy" in his keynote speech that year, and the topic of "Competition and cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region" was also set up in the parallel group discussion. In 2019, discussions on the "Indo-Pacific strategy" were more prominent. As the report concluded: "There are two main issues of concern: the need to manage U.S.-China competition to maintain strategic stability, and the related discussion of a 'rules-based' regional and global order, including a 'free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.'" The US Department of Defense released the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report on the day of the first plenary meeting of the conference, and the speech of US Acting Defense Secretary Shanahan at the conference cooperated with the publication of the report, clarifying the "vision of the United States for Indo-Pacific security." The defense ministers of other countries, such as Japan, Australia and France, also expounded their views on the Indo-Pacific Strategy in their speeches. In 2022, the topic of "Indo-Pacific strategy" continued, although the Russia-Ukraine conflict became a hot spot of the meeting, but the US Defense Secretary Austin's speech still focused on the "follow-up steps of the US Indo-Pacific strategy", trying to show that it will not relax its attention to the Indo-Pacific because of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. For the Sino-US competition, although the meeting has not set a direct agenda, relevant topics have emerged many times since 2017, such as "supporting the rules-based regional order", "preventing conflict in competing fields", "managing competition in regional security cooperation", "strategic interests and competition in the South Pacific", and so on, reflecting the concern about Sino-US competition from multiple angles.

C)Make the issue more forward-looking

Shangri-la Dialogue is also highly concerned about emerging threats that have not yet become major challenges, but may have an important impact on defense and security in the future, and strives to seek solutions to these threats and challenges through forward-looking discussions. For example, as early as 2010, the Conference focused on the security implications of climate change and space and cyber as emerging warfare domains, and set two related topics in the breakout session - "Reassessing the security challenges posed by climate Change" and "New Dimensions of Conflict: Space and Cyber Warfare." Since then, these two issues have appeared many times in the Incense conference topics, such as in 2014, one of the sub-topics is "climate change, humanitarian aid and disaster relief and security in the Asia-Pacific", and in 2022, climate change is combined with the new concept of green national defense, as one of the topics. The discussion of cyber security has successively appeared in parallel sub-topics in 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2023, and has shifted from a more macro discussion such as "Asian security in cyberspace" to a more specific issue such as "Cyber capability development: implications for national defense". In addition, the conference also discussed the impact of emerging technologies on the military and national defense several times, setting up topics such as "New military Technologies and Regulations", "Military capability Development: Emerging Technologies, Limited budgets and difficult choices", "the impact of emerging Technologies on defense", "New strategic Technologies and Future conflicts" and other topics.

(5)Increasingly becoming a platform for countries to declare their own defense policies

The U.S. Secretary of Defense has repeatedly expounded the United States' vision and military policy in the region. For example, US Defense Secretary Panetta clarified the Obama administration's "Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy" in military measures at the 2012 conference, announcing that the US Navy will deploy 60% of its ships to the Asia-Pacific region. In 2019, U.S. Acting Defense Secretary Shanahan elaborated on the United States' "Indo-Pacific Strategy" at the meeting. In 2022, US Defense Secretary Austin made a speech on the Next Steps of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, declaring the determination of the United States to continue to promote the Indo-Pacific Strategy. In 2023, Austin again gave a speech at the Congress, emphasizing the need for the United States to maintain leadership in the Indo-Pacific. Japan has also repeatedly put forward its own ideas on regional security and security architecture and clarified its own security policy at the meeting. In May 2014, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promoted what he called "active pacifism" at the Shanghai Summit, declaring that Japan would play a more important and active role in promoting peace and security in Asia. In his keynote speech at the 2022 conference, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida fully elaborated on the "Kishida Vision for Peace" and expressed his willingness to enhance Japan's "diplomatic and security role" in the region. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed the idea of building an Asia-Pacific community as early as 2009, but it did not receive much attention.

In recent years, not only big countries, but also small and medium-sized countries have increased their voice in the forum, and countries have taken the opportunity to put forward ideas on regional security, trying to influence the competition between major powers and the direction of regional security. For example, Vietnam's Deputy Defense Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh suggested at the 2013 conference that Asian defense ministers might consider signing a "no first use of force" agreement to avoid a confrontation in the event of escalating tensions in the South China Sea. As the competition between China and the United States intensifies, the concerns of small and medium-sized countries in the region are increasing, and they are unwilling to "choose sides" between major powers. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen have repeatedly expressed concern about the competition between China and the United States in recent years. Summarizing the 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue, Huang said that Southeast Asian countries were reassured by the fact that the Chinese and US defense ministers could meet face to face, and that although a meeting could not fundamentally change the positions of the two sides, "it is a dialogue, it is a journey." He also pointed out that the core issue in Asia is not the so-called "confrontation between democracy and autocracy", the interdependence between regional countries is closer, more productive and more mutually beneficial than that between Russia and Europe, and strengthening engagement, emphasizing inclusiveness and multilateralism is the way to security in Asia. At the 2022 Conference, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo called for an "Asian way" to manage regional differences in his speech, and Fiji's defense Minister used the opportunity of the conference to remind people that climate change, not geopolitical rivalry, is the biggest security threat facing Fiji and other Pacific island countries, which was also widely concerned and appreciated.

(6)The game and confrontation between China and the United States have become a major focus of attention

Since the United States holds the main say in the conference, and the growing China is increasingly showing its own pursuit and voice in Asia-Pacific security affairs, since the first Chinese military delegation to attend the conference in 2007, the interaction between China and the United States at the conference and even "mutual confrontation" have become the biggest focus of the conference and the focus of media coverage. Both China and the United States use the platform to put forward their ideas on the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, and also transmit policy signals to the region to win support from regional countries.

The clash of views between China and the United States has always existed, but it has attracted more attention since 2010. As the South China Sea issue and the East China Sea issue gradually heat up, and the United States is increasingly playing the "Taiwan card" to hinder China's development, the struggle between China and the United States on the above hotspot issues is becoming increasingly fierce. For example, at the 2015 Beijing Summit, US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter singled out China in his speech, saying that "the scale and pace of China's land reclamation is unprecedented, exceeding that of all other claimants combined," and that China's actions in the South China Sea are not "in step" with international norms and norms. In the face of the US Defense Secretary's provocation, Sun Jianguo, head of the Chinese delegation and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, delivered a speech entitled "Working Together to Protect Peace and Build a Secure Asia-Pacific" at the conference the next day, which not only elaborated on China's foreign and defense policies, concepts, practices and initiatives, but also expressed China's position and principles on the South China Sea issue. That is to say, China's construction on some islands and reefs in the South China Sea is mainly aimed at improving the relevant functions of the islands and reefs, improving the working and living conditions of the personnel stationed there, meeting necessary military defense needs, and better fulfilling relevant international responsibilities and obligations. China's construction within its sovereignty is lawful, reasonable and reasonable, and does not impede freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

Since 2018, the escalation of trade frictions between China and the United States and the apparent trend of strategic game in the Western Pacific have given a more complex background to China-Us exchanges and aroused strong interest from the outside world to observe China-Us interactions. Even if the reunion is restarted after two years of suspension due to the epidemic, the biggest attraction of the 2022 reunion is the Sino-US "sword debate". Under the influence of the COVID-19 epidemic and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the game between China and the US has been further intensified. For example, the US has made frequent moves to hollow out the One-China policy and substantively support "Taiwan independence", and the struggle between China and the US over the Taiwan issue has been heating up. In addition, the Biden administration stepped up the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", strengthened the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" (QUAD) between the United States, Japan, India and Australia, built the "Trilateral Security Partnership" (AUKUS) between the United States and Britain, launched the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" (IPEF), and strengthened the Indo-Pacific military deployment with "integrated deterrence" as the impetus, making the strategic competition between China and the United States more severe. At the meeting, the two defense ministers delivered speeches on "China's vision for regional order" and "the next steps of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy" respectively, and expounded their respective positions on issues such as the Taiwan Strait and the "Indo-Pacific Strategy". Since 2023, Sino-US relations have experienced a series of new twists and turns, and the outside world is widely concerned about whether the two defense ministers can once again use this platform to hold face-to-face talks. However, the two defence ministers were unable to hold a bilateral meeting in Singapore. Ahead of the meeting, a spokesman for China's defence ministry said the US had "disregarded China's concerns and created obstacles to seriously undermine mutual trust between the two militaries". At the meeting, the defense ministers of China and the United States once again clashed. In their respective speeches, they expounded their views on regional order and hotspot issues, defended their national positions, but also indicated the importance of maintaining dialogue and communication.

III.Challenges for the Shangri-La Dialogue

Although the Shangri-La Dialogue continues to expand its influence, it also faces some challenges. It is mainly reflected in:

(1)The impact of overlapping effects of mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus

One of the salient challenges facing the Conference is the impact of other similar mechanisms in the region, particularly the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+). ISS, the organizer of the conference, once hoped to develop the conference into a formal official mechanism, but ASEAN's establishment of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus in 2010 failed to develop the conference into a "track one" dialogue and cooperation channel. ADMM+ is positioned as "the highest-level ministerial defense and security consultation and cooperation mechanism on regional security between ASEAN member states and eight partner countries", and adheres to ASEAN as the center, adhering to ASEAN's cooperation principles such as non-interference in internal affairs and consensus. As the highest-level defense mechanism in the region, ADMM+ at the beginning of its creation, many people worried that it "constituted a zero-sum competitive relationship with the Shangri-La Dialogue", and the competitive interaction made the Shangri-La Dialogue need to adjust its positioning and institutional structure to maintain the resource investment of major powers. Although from the practice of recent years, the development of ADMM+ has not posed a fundamental challenge to Hong Kong, and the two sides have formed complementary relations in some aspects, but because ASEAN occupies a central position in the ADMM+ mechanism, it is more inclined to support and use this mechanism, and ADMM+ has indeed played a leading role in promoting regional practical defense cooperation. For example, the joint exercises under the framework have been gradually advanced, and the establishment of working groups in key areas has further facilitated the promotion of practical cooperation. At the 2022 meeting, France and Canada have expressed their willingness to join ADMM+, and its role may become more prominent if ADMM+ expands further. In contrast, the summit may only serve as a platform for defense dialogue and put forward some initiatives or ideas, which is difficult to play a direct role in promoting practical defense cooperation.

In addition, in addition to the Xiangshan Conference, other countries in the region have established some defense conference mechanisms, such as China's "Beijing Xiangshan Forum", South Korea's "Seoul Defense Dialogue", India's "Risina Dialogue", Indonesia's "Jakarta International Defense Dialogue", and so on, and have a certain influence, but also pose challenges to the Xiangshan Conference. As countries struggle to cope with increasingly complex and diverse regional and global security challenges, the SYnod, along with ADMM+ and other defense dialogue mechanisms in the region, have to compete for the attention and energy of national defense ministries.

On a deeper level, while some degree of overlap with mechanisms such as ADMM+ may be inevitable, as it reflects the inherent diversity of the Asia-Pacific region, the phenomenon actually reflects growing competition, especially among the great powers. In recent years, great powers have increasingly tended to project their presence in the region through the mechanisms with which they feel most comfortable and most influential, and attitudes toward different mechanisms have diverges, and this dilemma is also evident in defense diplomacy. For example, the United States, Japan, Australia and other countries use the Shangri-La Dialogue to strengthen their agenda setting and public opinion guidance advantages, while China and some ASEAN countries are more inclined to ADMM+ process. The consequence of this is that it will make real, region-wide defense cooperation increasingly difficult.

(2)The tension between different views on order, security and defense cooperation models has damaged the atmosphere of the meeting

For a long time, there has been a contest between different concepts of order and security in the Asia-Pacific region. On one side is the concept of collective security based on the alliance system led by the United States, and on the other side is the concept of comprehensive and common security advocated by China, ASEAN and other countries. In terms of defense cooperation models in the region, there are the US-led Asia-Pacific military alliance system, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other organizations based on the principle of non-alignment and openness to the outside world, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, as well as the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Western Pacific Naval Forum, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum and other mechanisms. Due to differences in concepts and models, it is inevitable that there will be "different tones" on the same issue, and the association does not shy away from sensitive issues, and the differences in views of different countries will be more prominent. For example, in recent years, the United States and the West have used the concepts of the "Indo-Pacific strategy", "rules-based order" and "freedom of navigation" to criticize China's practices in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and even internal affairs. China has to respond and defend its own interests. These tensions have been exacerbated by geopolitical tensions over the Ukraine crisis. "The exchange of words between China and the West has always been a trademark of the conference to some extent, but the situation in recent years reflects a further deterioration of the situation and growing mistrust between the major powers," said one scholar.

These reflect the dramatic changes in regional power balance and geostrategic environment. The "worry" about China has prompted the United States and the West to regulate China's development in the name of maintaining existing rules and order. The problem is that various parties have different understandings of the existing security rules in the region, and the rules are not perfect, and some unreasonable or outdated rules can be modified, supplemented and improved over time. As Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said in his keynote speech at the 2019 Conference, "China wants to have a say in these changes, and that is a reasonable request." "Because the existing rules were written in the past, China was not involved."

The purpose of the conference is to use dialogue to promote confidence-building and practical cooperation. Moderate exchanges and disputes help countries to understand other countries' policies, positions and concepts, so as to avoid misunderstandings and misjudgments. However, if the confrontation between countries is intensified due to geostrategic factors, using the event as a platform to attack and accuse each other, or even to join forces against opponents, will undermine the atmosphere of dialogue, because "effective dialogue helps build trust and confidence, but open criticism and quarrels will harm the above-mentioned efforts."

In addition, although the conference provides a platform for countries to elaborate their own security concepts and policy positions, due to its Western-dominated color, the voice of small and medium-sized countries such as ASEAN is often not fully paid attention to. The United States, Japan, Australia and other countries still regard the conference as an important place to compete for the right to speak in the field of defense and security. For example, on the surface, they say that they respect the central position of ASEAN in regional cooperation, but they increasingly emphasize the importance of exclusive defense cooperation mechanisms such as bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral, which intensifies the trend of camp in regional security. At the 2022 and 2023 meetings, US Secretary of Defense Austin talked about the strategic role of alliance partnership, and defense officials from Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom and other countries also emphasized the role of small multilateral mechanisms such as QUAD and AUKUS. In contrast, China and some other countries in the region have advocated strengthening multilateral security cooperation in the region, reaffirming that regional mechanisms should embody the principles of openness and inclusiveness, and strive to achieve mutual trust, cooperation and win-win results.

Due to the differences in interest demands and the depth of contradictions, the collision between different security and order concepts will continue to exist for a long time to come, and affect the shaping process of the entire regional security architecture and regional security order.

(3)Challenges to the development of the game situation between China and the United States

In the past ten years, the collision between Chinese and American participants has been the focus of great attention. It is normal for China and the United States to have differences due to their different national interests and goals, but the continuous development of the game situation between China and the United States has increasingly negative effects on the exchanges between the two countries in Hong Kong. At first, the main conflict between China and the United States focused on maritime security, especially in the South China Sea. However, since the Trump administration took office, the United States, guided by the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", has gradually guided the Sino-US game to a larger scope and all-round contest, and the contradictions and differences between the two sides have expanded from the sea to many fields such as economy, trade, science and technology, and military. After the Biden administration took office, it is even more united with Allies and partners to expand containment and containment of China.

As a regional defense forum dominated by the United States and the West, the Hong Kong Conference reflects the above-mentioned competitive situation to a large extent. This is reflected in several aspects: First, the positions and statements of China and the United States at the meeting have changed from cooperative and inclusive at the beginning to increasingly confrontational, and the two sides have fallen into a situation of different rhetoric, making it difficult to have substantive communication. Second, China was "besieged" by the United States and its Allies at the meeting, and its willingness to participate in the meeting was affected. China already has doubts about the Western background of the conference, and if the Sino-US game situation causes China to become the target of repeated accusations and attacks at the conference, China's enthusiasm to participate may be reduced. For example, in 2017, China lowered its participation level, which some scholars believe is due to China's response to too many issues targeted at China in the previous year; China's lack of influence over the forum's unfriendly or hostile agenda has led to a growing sense among some elites that the event is little more than an international forum to highlight China's "rule-breaking behavior" in the region. At the 2022 conference, the Chinese representative mentioned that some people in China believe that the conference serves the interests of the United States and its Allies, and the issue is also "pointing to differences more than cooperation," and asked the Singapore Defense Minister how these views are viewed, indicating that China still has doubts about the conference. Third, the intensification of the game situation between China and the United States has made many small and medium-sized countries in trouble. A Southeast Asian scholar pointed out that "the light of cooperative security is gradually dimmed by the shadow of mutual distrust, arms race and military maneuvering." It is more important than ever for Southeast Asian countries to maintain a middle ground between peace and power, but it is also more difficult."

IV.The Future of the Shangri-La Dialogue: Can it be replaced?

Despite the challenges, the Shangri-La Dialogue is difficult to replace in the short term, and has even gained further attention in recent years. As ISS said in its 2018 report on the Shangri-La Conference, "It is striking that governments have maintained and in many cases intensified their engagement in the Shangri-La Dialogue." The summit has become highly institutionalized and a recurring item on the schedules of Asia-Pacific defense ministers and other senior officials."

There are several reasons why the Hong Kong Council has been able to maintain its competitiveness in various regional defense cooperation mechanisms or forums.

First, the current global and Asia-Pacific security environment is undergoing drastic changes, and the risks and challenges facing all countries are becoming more diverse and complex. The Ukraine crisis has intensified the game competition among major powers, and shows that traditional war is not far away, and the intensity of traditional and non-traditional security threats is increasing, and the impact on all countries in the world and even the whole mankind is beyond imagination. All this makes the need for multilateral defence forums stronger, not less. In 2023, when the conference entered its 20th session, Singapore President Halimah said that when US-China relations were increasingly tense and the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea was heating up, as an important international platform for all parties to communicate on military and security issues, the role of the Conference was undoubtedly more critical. Ng Eng Hen, Singapore's defence Minister, also pointed out that the current situation is wise and worthwhile compared with the practice of setting up the forum 20 years ago.

Second, Xiangwill and ADMM+ realize the division of labor to a certain extent, avoiding the overlap of functions. The conference focuses on providing Western countries with the right to speak and institutional power. It mainly puts forward new suggestions on regional institutional structure and defense cooperation, and reforms the existing system. Besides inviting defense ministers to attend the conference every year, it also guides regional security discourse through various means such as literature and seminars, seeking to shape regional cooperation at the level of security concept and discourse. For example, the Hong Kong Council releases its annual Security Assessment report on the Asia-Pacific Region during its annual meeting. On the occasion of the 2023 Conference, ISS held an online publication and seminar for the assessment report, allowing more experts and scholars from around the world to participate, further expanding the impact of the report. In contrast, ADMM+ focuses more on practical cooperation between militaries in the field of defense, such as the establishment of expert working groups in key areas such as maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and military medicine, and the promotion of joint exercises. Therefore, in the context of various multilateral mechanisms competing with each other, there is still room for development of the Association.

Third, although the summit also focuses on non-traditional security issues, its greater value is that it is one of the few multilateral mechanisms in the region where traditional security challenges and cooperation - such as military alliances, arms competition, territorial disputes, military modernization, and military transparency - can be regularly discussed, giving it a distinct advantage over other mechanisms. As some scholars have said, discussions on traditional security issues such as territorial disputes under the ASEAN platform have encountered obstacles in the "ASEAN way", and the "Shangri-La Dialogue" has provided different "public goods", and even some small countries in the region have used this platform to pressure China on territorial security issues. Although the forum does not have any real binding force, the public statements of the military representatives of various countries act as a hint of some informal international commitment, which can reduce irrational behavior.

Fourth, in the Asian context, multilateral institutions tend to persist due to "institutional stickiness" and thus are less likely to disintegrate. Moreover, considering that the Conference is one of ISS's initiatives to increase its global influence, the Institute has also created other defense dialogue mechanisms outside the conference, such as the Manama Dialogue, so ISS is also inclined to retain this important mechanism.

However, it should also be noted that the Hong Kong Conference is the product of the security think tanks or think tanks of the United States and the United Kingdom that pay high attention to the security of Asia in the 21st century. Although the concept of defense diplomacy it promotes is affecting some security think tanks and defense departments in Asia, it is only one of the modes of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Asian countries are still actively exploring non-aligned and open defense cooperation structures and modes suitable for the region, such as a series of ASEAN-led defense cooperation mechanisms and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Hong Kong Forum cannot dominate the overall trend of defense and security cooperation in the whole region. On the contrary, it must adapt and follow the direction of the regional security situation, and coordinate with other mechanisms in order to be effective.

V.Conclusion

After 20 years of development, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a track-and-half multilateral defense mechanism that has attracted much attention in the Asia-Pacific region. In October 2023, Bastian Gingerich will succeed Chipman, who has been at the helm of ISS for many years, as the new president and CEO of the institute, which marks the end of one phase and the beginning of a new one. The summit has provided a platform for dialogue between defense ministers and senior officials in the Asia-Pacific region, and played a certain role in discussing the regional security architecture and promoting regional defense dialogue and exchanges. But it also tries to leverage its advantages in "soft" rules such as agenda-setting, topic selection, and dialogue forms to provide institutional power to Western countries. Its Western-dominated background puts it in some competition with other regional multilateral defense and security mechanisms dominated by ASEAN. The changes in the Asia-Pacific geostrategic environment, especially the intensification of the game between China and the United States and the rise of small regional multilateral mechanisms brought about by it, also make some countries in the region have doubts about Shangri-La Dialogue. In the foreseeable future, the role of Shangri-La Dialogue as an important regional defense dialogue platform is difficult to be completely replaced, but its future development needs to continue to improve its own mechanism, agenda setting, etc., while prudently dealing with the increasingly complex geostrategic environment. (Author: Liu Lin, Researcher, Institute of War Studies, Academy of Military Sciences)