“The Greater BRICS ” and “the Global South”: Cooperation, Governance, and Change

Actively respond to changes in India's perception of the BRICS cooperation mechanism

At the beginning of 2024, BRICS officially expanded its membership. In view of the century-old changes, the large-scale expansion of BRICS cooperation mechanism is of great strategic significance. This enlargement has basically incorporated the major developing countries within the G20 into the BRICS cooperation mechanism, prompting many major developing countries to shift the focus of multilateral cooperation from the G20 to BRICS cooperation. Moreover, the BRICS cooperation mechanism has brought in many regional powers with international influence at the same time, further enhancing its appeal and influence in the global South.

India is one of the most important members of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, second only to China in terms of economic size. India has played a very positive role in promoting the development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism in the past. However, with the fundamental changes in India's foreign affairs and internal affairs in recent years, India has gradually become a negative factor and hindering force in the BRICS cooperation mechanism, which has also led to the rise of differences and contradictions within the BRICS cooperation mechanism. At the same time, the discord in bilateral relations between China and India has been brought into the BRICS cooperation mechanism, casting a shadow on the future development of BRICS.

To explain India's policy change towards the BRICS cooperation mechanism, it is necessary to understand the "original intention" of India's participation in the BRICS cooperation mechanism. In April 2009, the four BRICS countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, which launched the cooperation mechanism among BRICS countries. In September, the G20 held the third Leaders' summit in Pittsburgh, the United States, during which Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sighed: We are finally sitting at the main table. On the one hand, this sentence truly reflects India's long-held great power ambitions, on the other hand, it also shows India's dissatisfaction with the long-term limitations of the Western-dominated international system, and India has a strong political will to amend and change the current unfair and unreasonable international system. Therefore, India naturally supports the establishment of the BRICS cooperation mechanism and the collective effort to promote the reform of the international system.

At the same time, there was still a strong anti-Western, anti-Western, anti-Western and anti-Western feeling in India. The signing of a civil nuclear energy agreement between India and the United States in 2008 triggered serious political debate and internal unrest in India, and left forces such as the Communist Party of India, which is ruling in coalition with the Congress Party, firmly opposed the Indian government's "pro-American" policy. At that time, the United States engaged in quantitative easing policies, which caused turbulence in the domestic financial markets of developing countries such as India. On issues such as climate change, the West, led by the United States, has put more pressure on major developing countries such as China and India, which has stimulated the BRICS countries to recognize their common interests in facing the West.

Equally important, the establishment of the BRICS cooperation mechanism is tantamount to recognizing India as a major power with global influence and the only "hegemon" in South Asia. In the past, the South Asia policies of the major powers always linked India and Pakistan. In the BRICS cooperation mechanism, there is only India but no Pakistan, so that India finally got rid of the dual relationship between India and Pakistan, indirectly recognizing India as the most powerful emerging power in South Asia.

Because of this background, India actively promoted the construction of the BRICS cooperation mechanism at the beginning of its establishment. At the New Delhi Summit in 2012, India proposed the idea of a multilateral financial institution among BRICS countries, which directly facilitated the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014 and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Facility (CRA) in 2016. In terms of strategic concept, India also agrees with the goal of pursuing multi-polarization, so it pursues the BRICS cooperation to balance the dominant position of the West in the global system, so that the major developing countries can collectively gain greater global bargaining power. In terms of international development policies, China has also actively promoted efforts to help developing countries finance infrastructure construction, and supported initiatives such as the China-led establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Understanding the background and original intention of India's participation in the BRICS cooperation mechanism, we can understand the reasons why India has adopted a negative attitude towards the BRICS cooperation mechanism. After more than a decade of development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, major changes have taken place in the international environment and China-India relations. The contradictions between India and other countries on the direction of the BRICS cooperation mechanism are expanding, not the other way around.

The most direct manifestation is that India has strongly opposed the expansion of the BRICS cooperation mechanism in recent years, believing that the BRICS cooperation mechanism can only be a "club" and a symbol of identity enjoyed by developing countries, and cannot be easily expanded to other countries. Moreover, India is worried that once the expansion process of the BRICS cooperation mechanism is launched, India will inevitably face the possibility of Pakistan joining.

The root cause of India's negative attitude toward the BRICS cooperation mechanism is the great changes that have taken place in India's internal affairs. Since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Modi came to power in 2014, the left and center-left political forces in India have been gradually marginalized, forming a political situation in which the right wing dominates. As a result, the balance force in India's domestic and foreign policies has ceased to exist. Based on its traditional ideological preferences, the BJP has adopted a pro-American and pro-Western foreign policy. In May 2019, after taking office, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar clearly positioned India as a "South Westem Power", and in actual policies, more emphasis was placed on the common position and interests of India and the West, downplaying the common interests of India and the BRICS countries. To this end, India has focused its multilateral diplomacy on the Group of 30 and increased interaction with the Group of Seven and even NATO, while downplaying India's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS cooperation mechanisms.

On the basis of changes in India's internal affairs, India's policy towards China has also undergone fundamental changes. After the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the United States further adopted a policy of suppression and containment against China. India cooperated with the United States in suppressing and containing China, and at the same time, with the outbreak of the Galavan conflict on the China-India border, it greatly adjusted its policy toward China, so that it adopted the practice of "antagonizing" China to some extent on international multilateral platforms, and even once threatened to "confront" China in the SCO and BRICS cooperation mechanisms.

India has adopted a competitive and confrontation-led approach in its China policy, which is also reflected in BRICS cooperation. India believes that China is advancing its strategy to dominate Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative, so it is trying to balance the expansion of China's influence with the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, Japan and other countries, and is trying to promote the multi-polarization of Asia aimed at balancing China, and India is also trying to block the possibility of China's "control" of the mechanism in BRICS cooperation. The 50/50 governance structure adopted by the BRICS New Development Bank is considered by India as a mechanism design that can balance China's influence and should be generally applied to all aspects of the future BRICS cooperation mechanism.

The current negative perceptions and policies of India towards BRICS cooperation will affect the future development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism. Given that India's domestic and foreign affairs are less likely to change in the short term, it is necessary to look at the Indian factor from a longer-term perspective, focusing on diluting or eliminating the negative impact that India may have. In terms of actual policies, we should not place too high expectations on India's return to the "original aspiration" of BRICS cooperation. Although the goal of the BRICS cooperation mechanism is not anti-American and Western, it naturally tends to revise the international system dominated by the United States and the West because it pays more attention to the common interests and overall interests of developing countries. India under the Bharatiya Janata Party has changed its past policy preferences and is now more willing to become the "leading party" of the West in the global South, focusing more on the "global South" to bring India closer to the United States and the Western world as a whole, rather than speaking for the interests of developing countries.

At the same time, we still have to work hard to overcome the impact of China-India bilateral relations on the BRICS cooperation mechanism. It is natural for China and India to have widening differences on BRICS cooperation, as China and India are at different stages of development and international status, and it is not surprising that there are differences in various aspects. On the other hand, China and India should try their best to seek common ground while reserving differences and not bring bilateral conflicts and problems to the multilateral platform.

Finally, the BRICS cooperation mechanism should be adjusted and amended based on the current situation of China-India relations and with a long-term view. For example, the member countries of the BRICS cooperation have a mechanism to enter the cooperation mechanism, but there is no decision-making mechanism to exit the cooperation mechanism. Moreover, the BRICS countries have previously followed the principle of consensus decision-making. In the future, as the number of member states increases, there may be more and more differences, and whether to consider the mechanism of majority decision-making is an issue that needs to be considered. (Author: Lin Minwang, Researcher, School of International Studies, Fudan University)

Cooperation path of the "Global South" from the perspective of Brazil

The rise of the global South is due to the interaction of multiple factors, one of which is the successive G20 presidencies of emerging powers in recent years. Combined with the deepening of BRICS cooperation and its high attention to global issues, the Global South's worldview and global governance outlook have received unprecedented attention from international public opinion, and continue to exert pressure on the reform of the traditional global governance paradigm dominated by the global North. It is obvious that the orientation of global South cooperation has undergone a subtle shift from "strengthening oneself through unity" to "promoting reform through coordination".

When discussing how to advance global South cooperation, we need to objectively understand the realistic challenges that global South cooperation faces from three dimensions: institution building, community leadership and collective consensus.

The first is the fragmentation and fragmentation of the global South. First of all, the current cooperation mechanisms of the Southern countries are mainly characterized by regionalization, and there are basically different integration cooperation mechanisms with different natures and emphases in every region of the world. By contrast, ASEAN is more integrated than other regions. Second, some emerging powers have established a "1+N" dialogue and cooperation mechanism targeting the regions where developing countries are located. For example, China has promoted the establishment of cross-regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the China-CELAC Forum and the China-Arab Forum. Brazil has also established the South America-Africa Forum and the South America-Arab Forum based on South America. Third, small multilateral mechanisms jointly formed by a number of large developing countries, such as the India-Brazil-South Africa trilateral Forum and the BRICS (especially the latter), have become representative multilateral mechanisms for connecting the global South. In addition, on a global scale, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 + China have played an important role in different historical periods, but in the face of a century of changes in the world, these mechanisms need to explore new ways of cooperation. It can be seen that the fragmentation and fragmentation of the global South cooperation mechanism are in sharp contrast to the cohesion and systematization of the global North cooperation mechanism, and the institution building is an urgent step that the global South needs to effectively promote.

Second, global South cooperation needs to be driven by multiple factors. In the interaction and cooperation of the global South, China has the greatest influence. On the one hand, China has the scale advantage in comprehensive strength, and on the other hand, China has achieved practical results in building a discourse system representing the interests of the global South. For example, the "Three major initiatives" are very consistent with the global South's outlook on world and global governance. However, it must be recognized that the global South is a huge group of countries with huge differences in political system, economic and social development level, cultural values and traditions, and has long been in a semi-marginal and marginal zone in the traditional global governance decision-making system. Therefore, in order to achieve a more effective linkage of the global South, multi-engine driving may be the direction of future discussion. And this is also in line with the reality of multi-dimensional differences in the global South. In fact, the single-engine drive is not only difficult, but also faces the great risk of falling into the "discourse trap" (both externally imposed and internally generated), and the global Northern cooperation actually shows a multi-driven development trend.

The third is uncertainty about the cohesion of the global South. First, from the historical experience, the national identity of the South has a certain volatility. A country's political values, economic and social development level, cultural tradition, religious belief and other factors in different order, its national identity will also be different, and then affect the stability of its foreign policy orientation. Brazil, for example, has undergone several adjustments to its national identity in the more than three decades since the end of the Cold War, with the Kolor government (1990-1992) and the Bolsonaro government (2019-2022) emphasizing Brazil's "developed" and "Western" attributes, respectively. The governments led by the left-wing Labor Party pay more attention to the status of "developing countries" and "southern countries", and under the influence of this, Brazil's foreign policy has presented completely different preferences and choices in different periods. Second, the South's diplomacy is generally characterized by a lack of autonomy and is susceptible to interference by external factors, which will also bring uncertainty to the cohesion and political consensus of the global South.

Brazil is an important founding member of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, the rotating presidency of the G20 in 2024, and an active promoter of the concept of the Global South. For example, Brazil has established two academic journals, Global South and Global South Studies, in 2020 and 2021, respectively, in an effort to build an academic discourse system with the characteristics of the Global South. In addition, the global South is also the key word repeatedly emphasized by the Brazilian government in various diplomatic occasions at this stage. It can be seen that Brazil not only has a clear identity for the Global South, but also puts the cooperation of the Global South in the priority position of its diplomacy. It is foreseeable that Brazil will use the G20 Summit in 2024 to enhance its representation in the global South on the one hand, and show its understanding and consideration of global South cooperation on the other hand.

On the whole, as an important member of the Global South, Brazil's policy propositions on promoting the cooperation of the Global South not only conform to the general position of the Global South, but also reflect the characteristics of Brazil's "active and confident" international strategy. The author believes that Brazil mainly projects the global South cooperation at the level of reform of the global governance system, and attaches particular importance to the following three cooperation paths with distinct levels.

Firstly, the reform of the United Nations is at the heart of Brazil's bid for a positive response from the global South. Since returning to power in 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has interacted directly with almost all regional and global powers, and UN reform has been at the heart of Brazil's dialogue with them. In addition, in the process of interacting with the community of developing countries, the reform of the United Nations is also a key issue for Brazil to enlist the positive response of the global South. Regarding the reform of the United Nations, the Brazilian government at this stage mainly emphasizes two points: the urgency of reform and the representativeness of reform. The former mainly focuses on the "efficiency deficit" of the United Nations, especially emphasizing the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the United Nations in solving issues such as the crisis in Haiti, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the conflict between Palestine and Israel. "Putting the reform of the United Nations on the agenda as soon as possible" has become a leading issue constantly raised by the Brazilian government at this stage. The latter emphasizes that the reform of the UN Security Council should be based on a broader principle of representation, and the co-opted permanent or non-permanent members should not only be for the military powers in the traditional sense, but also for the economic, agricultural and cultural powers. In addition, Brazil also emphasizes that most of the issues addressed by the Security Council concern developing countries, which have better knowledge and experience in dealing with these issues, and that the opening of the Security Council to large developing countries will enhance the authority, legitimacy and effectiveness of its resolutions. To sum up, the issue of UN reform is the core issue for Brazil to win a positive response from the global South, and the emphasis on Brazil's multiple representation is a diplomatic narrative that Brazil creates globally (especially in the global South) that is more in line with its own interests.

Secondly, reform of the global economic governance system is a priority issue for Brazil to promote global South cooperation. Since returning to power, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has repeatedly talked about "de-dollarization", "local currency settlement", "common currency", "new payment system" and other issues, which belong to the scope of global economic governance. Looking at Brazil's global multilateral participation process, it attaches more importance to international multilateral economic organizations (such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), and the participation is more active and the benefits are also more obvious. Regarding the reform of the global economic governance system as the priority issue of the Global South cooperation, Brazil's consideration is mainly based on two aspects: First, to safeguard the sovereignty of development, the Global South should take the initiative to participate in the discussion of global economic governance, and dare to promote the issues close to the interests and concerns of the global South, so that the weak "South plan" can be more widely shared. For example, the global South should strengthen policy coordination and linkage in opposing the trade protectionism of developed countries, irresponsible monetary policies, and "green colonialism". Second, promote the reform of the decision-making system of global economic governance and increase the participation of the global South in decision-making. This is based both on Brazil's own experience in participating in global economic governance and on the basic principle that the economic base determines the superstructure of the global governance system. For example, the efforts of the BRICS countries to promote the reform of quotas and voting rights in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund belong to the collective effort at the level of the decision-making system of global economic governance. From the perspective of practical results, the global South cooperation is a necessary and effective way to realize the reform of the global economic governance system.

Thirdly, Brazil believes that global security governance is an important breakthrough for global South cooperation. In the era of globalization, the occurrence, direction and solution of global geopolitical conflicts are basically dominated by the global north. From the perspective of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at this stage, the global South and the global North show a sharp difference in position, the fundamental reason lies in two different security concepts. Especially with the gradual evolution of the international power system, the global South dares to say "no" to the selfish and narrow security concept of the global North, and even affects the trend of global public opinion to some extent. For example, after the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, South Africa sued the Israeli government in the International Court of Justice, Bolivia announced the severing of diplomatic relations with Israel, and Chile, Honduras, Colombia and other countries recalled their ambassadors to Israel, all of which show that quite a number of countries in the South hold very different security views from those in the north. Speaking for the Global South has been an important part of Brazilian diplomacy for nearly four decades. In view of this, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's security stance on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is different from that of the global North, calling for the establishment of a peace club and characterizing the Israeli government's military actions in the Gaza Strip as "genocide". These propositions actually have connotations that echo those of the global South. To change the unequal international power system, the key lies in political and security governance. Therefore, on the one hand, Brazil further actively participates in global security governance, on the other hand, it also attaches importance to the echo of positions within the global South, promotes a wider range of global South security consensus, and then changes the traditional paradigm of global security governance monopolized by the global North. (Author: Zhou Zhiwei Deputy Director of the Department of International Relations, Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Executive Director and Researcher of the Center for Brazilian Studies)

Russia's "BRICS Year" and its cooperation with the "Global South"

The 2024 BRICS Summit will attract worldwide attention for four reasons: First, 2024 is the first year of BRICS cooperation; Second, Russia, which is Mired in geopolitical conflicts, has become the rotating chair, which is the first time for Russia to host a major international multilateral conference in its own country after the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Third, the international community is highly concerned about whether the expanded BRICS will become a camp to compete with the West or take on an anti-Western color. Fourth, the cooperation trend between Russia and the global South after the expansion of BRICS membership.

1.Russia regards the BRICS cooperation mechanism as its geopolitical tool to build a multipolar world order

First, the Global South is one of the strategic directions of Russia's diplomatic breakthrough. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia has been isolated and suppressed by the Western world, which divides the outside world into friendly countries and unfriendly countries. The friendly countries are the majority of developing countries, that is, the countries of the global South. Unfriendly countries are Western countries, including the United States and Europe, which have imposed severe economic sanctions on Russia. Judging from Russia's principle of determining friendly and unfriendly countries, the global South, including the BRICS countries, has hardly followed the West in sanctioning Russia. Russia is increasingly aware that its confrontation with the United States and the West will continue for a long time, so it is paying more attention to the global South, including the BRICS countries. Most of the developing countries in the global South share common views with Russia in seeking a fair and just international order, opposing hegemony, and hoping to gain more say in international affairs. It is particularly important to point out that the Global South is the object and focus of Russia's diplomatic breakthrough in an attempt to regain strategic initiative.

Second, the formation of a new geopolitical power mix by the "Big BRICS" countries objectively reduces the influence of the West, thus further realizing the multi-polarization advocated by Russia. After the expansion in 2024, the BRICS members basically represent the majority of developing countries. Russia believes that the world is made up of many civilizations and is therefore multipolar. From the perspective of civilization, there are representatives of Asian, Islamic, Russian, African and Latin American civilizations among the BRICS countries. At the same time, the BRICS countries are an important part of a multipolar world.

Finally, the BRICS 'economic growth potential will inevitably translate into geopolitical influence, contributing to a new, more just, equitable, and democratic international order. Brics countries account for a large proportion of the world in terms of land area, population and economic aggregate, and their combined GDP has exceeded that of the United States and the European Union.

2.Russia's demands for the BRICS cooperation mechanism

Brics is a cooperative collective of emerging economies and developing countries without the participation of Western developed countries, and it is not an international organization constructed according to the concept of geographical scope and cultural identity. As a cooperation mechanism, BRICS has unique characteristics. Russia not only sees the BRICS as a platform for building multipolarity, but also highlights its diplomatic and economic functions.

Russia has emphasized four tasks on the BRICS platform. First, continuously strengthen solidarity and cooperation among the BRICS countries, stressing the need to further strengthen the strategic partnership among the BRICS countries on the basis of the principles of openness, solidarity, equality and mutual understanding, inclusiveness and mutually beneficial cooperation, jointly address emerging challenges, ensure peace and security of the member States, promote their development in a sustainable manner and eradicate poverty, inequality and unemployment, It will benefit people of all countries and the international community. Second, we should advocate multilateralism and cooperation, safeguard the central role of the UN in global affairs, advocate reform of the UN, encourage developing countries to play a greater role, respect and uphold international law based on the UN Charter and abide by universally recognized principles of international law. Third, we stress that development and security are inseparable and the key to sustainable peace. We hope to gain more support and consensus on major international issues. Fourth, strengthen financial and economic cooperation, support the establishment and promotion of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, provide financing for infrastructure investment and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other developing countries, promote the possibility of using national currencies in BRICS transactions, and strengthen close cooperation with financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. At the same time, we will strengthen economic cooperation among BRICS countries and promote cooperation in trade and investment, manufacturing and mineral processing, energy, agriculture, science, technology and innovation, finance, information and communication technology, as well as in poverty reduction and anti-corruption.

Russia will hold the rotating presidency of the BRICS in 2024, and the 16th BRICS Summit will be held in Kazan in October. The theme of the summit is "Strengthening multilateralism for equitable global development and security", for which more than 200 meetings and forums will be held in 15 Russian cities. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of BRICS affairs Ryabkov said that the core idea of the 2024 Russian BRICS summit is to maintain the inheritance of the BRICS cooperation mechanism and consolidate the BRICS countries as a multi-polar pole in the changing world order. At the summit, Russia will actively promote the following issues.

First, in order to ensure the smooth progress of multilateral trade and cope with SWIFT sanctions, Russia will actively promote the construction of the BRICS payment system. In 2023, Russia's trade with the BRICS countries reached a record, with China reaching $240 billion, South Africa reaching $22 billion, India surpassing $65 billion, and Brazil reaching $11 billion. In the future, the trade potential between Russia and BRICS members is greater, and there is still great room for improvement in fertilizer and diesel trade between Brazil and Russia, food and energy cooperation between Russia and South Africa, and energy cooperation between Russia and India. The new members also have a lot of room to trade with Russia in areas such as energy. There is no doubt that the BRICS cooperation mechanism provides Russia with new opportunities for foreign cooperation, which is conducive to Russia's expansion of vast new markets and increase the number of trading partners. At present, the biggest bottleneck in the development of trade relations between Russia and the BRICS countries and the vast number of developing countries is the sanctions on the international settlement system. In response to sanctions and to enable multilateral trade to proceed smoothly, in February 2024 Russia proposed at the meeting of BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors the creation of an independent financial system free from political interference in order to provide guarantees for commercial transactions. The settlement payment system will be based on new rules, first of all digital rules, blockchain rules. 

Second, in order to achieve the goal of multi-polarization, Russia may once again propose BRICS expansion. At the BRICS Summit in South Africa in 2023, Putin pointed out that BRICS is already an authoritative cooperation mechanism, its influence in world affairs is increasing, and it has a unified strategic approach focusing on the future, which is in line with the aspirations of the main body of the international community (the global South).

3.Cooperation between Russia and the Global South

After the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia's foreign policy has undergone a major adjustment. In March 2023, a new version of its foreign policy concept was launched, emphasizing the active promotion of Russia's foreign policy to "look east" and "look south", and seeking friendly cooperation in these two directions. In the Russian discourse system, the eastern and southern countries are called the "world majority", and Russia believes that the concept of the global South and North originates from the West and has Cold War colors. In Russia's foreign policy, the term "global South" has also been used to refer to the "world majority."

First, Russia has a basis for cooperation with the countries of the global South. For Russia, the global South is one pole of the multipolar spectrum. The BRICS mechanism is a platform for cooperation among the countries of the global South, and its glue is the concept of multipolarity and opposition to unipolar hegemony. The attraction of BRICS is that its organizational form is flexible, open and inclusive.

Second, Russia has rich experience in cooperating with countries of the global South. Russia has emphasized its initiative in cooperation with the global South, and the 2024 BRICS summit will propose to promote the integration of member states with their regional integration organizations. For example, we should promote synergy and cooperation between the BRICS mechanism and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, explore new economic growth areas, and improve the governance of developing countries.

Finally, Russia's cooperation with the global South also faces challenges. The countries of the global South have great differences in economic development, and their political and economic interests do not fully coincide with Russia's. Although they seek to establish a just political and economic order, they only want to use their own resources and markets to seek political and economic space belonging to developing countries under the conditions of multipolarization, and have no intention to confront developed countries. Relations with the United States, in particular, are also a priority for some countries of the global South. In this regard, the cantonization of Russia's foreign policy will test the future development of Russia's relations with the countries of the global South. (Author: Li Yonghui, Director and Researcher of the Department of Multilateral and Regional Cooperation, Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

“The Greater Brics Cooperation ”from an African Perspective

The BRICS countries are representatives of major developing countries, and Africa is the continent with the largest concentration of developing countries. The rapid economic growth of the two countries together constitutes the collective rise of the "global South" since the 21st century. The two expansions of the BRICS summit mechanism took Africa as an important direction, and the "BRICS Plus", "Friends of BRICS" and New Development Bank mechanisms are also committed to building a broader partnership with African countries. After the expansion of BRICS membership, the African members and partners participating in BRICS cooperation have become more diverse, and the ability of "greater BRICS cooperation" to boost Africa's long-term economic growth has also been further enhanced.

1.Africa's growth is part of the rise of the Global South

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Global South, represented by the BRICS countries of China, India, Russia and Brazil, emerged as a major engine for global economic growth and the transformation of the international order. At the same time, Africa is also showing strong economic growth. Between 2000 and 2008, Africa's real GDP grew by 5% a year, more than twice as fast as in the 1980s and 1990s. Based on this, The Economist magazine proposed "Africa Rising" in 2011, considering African economic growth as part of the collective rise of the "global South".

Similar to the BRICS countries, Africa also has basic endowments such as a large population and rich natural resources. The population of Africa in 1914 was 124 million; As of 2023, Africa's total population is about 1.45 billion, a more than tenfold increase, and this number is set to grow further in the coming decades. Africa's demographic revolution has led to an expansion of the continent's urbanization, labor force, and middle class consumer base, which are the engines of Africa's economic growth. In addition, Africa is rich in natural resources, especially key minerals such as manganese and cobalt, which are related to industrial transformation. As the global economy continues to demand critical minerals and other commodities, Africa's participation in the global supply chain will also increase, thus forming another pillar of African economic growth.

Of course, population size and resource endowments do not account for all of Africa's growth. Research by the McKinsey Global Institute shows that natural resources and related government spending accounted for only 24% of Africa's GDP growth between 2000 and 2008, with equally significant growth in sectors such as wholesale and retail, transportation, telecommunications, and manufacturing. In terms of institutional construction, African countries have generally made significant progress in governance and business environment, with Cote d 'Ivoire and Rwanda among the countries with the most business regulatory reforms in the world. In 2018, 44 African countries signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA), which aims to connect 1.5 billion African people into a single market, providing unprecedented opportunities for intra-African trade and investment.

In recent years, the internal and external environment facing African economy has become more complicated. Externally, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the African region has faced systemic challenges such as food shortages, soaring energy prices, increasing debt repayment pressure and shrinking global trade. The International Monetary Fund expects sub-Saharan Africa's economic growth rate to fall from 4.0% in 2022 to 3.3% in 2023, leaving little hope of achieving total poverty eradication by 2030. Internally, South Africa has been Mired in a long-term economic downturn since the 2008 international financial crisis, and some African countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia have not been optimistic about governance problems, political corruption, military coups and ethnic conflicts and other chronic diseases. However, as the basic endowment that supports Africa's long-term economic growth has not changed, African countries still have a large economic potential, and BRICS membership expansion is expected to become a new opportunity for Africa's development and transformation.

2.Africa has always been an important direction for BRICS membership expansion

Since the first BRICS leaders' meeting in 2009, the BRICS cooperation mechanism has been formally expanded twice, each time involving Africa. The first BRICS expansion took place at the third BRICS Summit held in Sanya, China in 2011, when BRICS leaders agreed to admit South Africa as a new member, and the group was renamed "BRICS". Although the economic scale is not as big as other BRICS members, South Africa is a regional power in Africa, with relatively mature industrial and financial markets, and has the ability to become the gateway and frontier of BRICS cooperation with Africa. Brics also provides a platform for South Africa to demonstrate international leadership. By building a bridge between BRICS and Africa's development, South Africa is able to speak more effectively for its own interests and those of the continent.

The second expansion of the BRICS cooperation mechanism took place at the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2023. At this summit, Egypt, Ethiopia and other African countries were invited to join. Egypt is located at the border of the Middle East and North Africa and has always been the focus of contention among great powers. Egypt's active participation in and promotion of the Non-Aligned Movement, together with other countries of the "Global South" to resist interference by major powers, has enhanced its appeal in the international community. Ethiopia is one of the origins of African civilization and the only country in Africa that did not experience colonial rule. At present, Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and is also the headquarters of the African Union, and its regional influence cannot be ignored. With the accession of Egypt and Ethiopia, the number of African members of BRICS has increased to three, further increasing Africa's representation and voice in BRICS cooperation.

During the BRICS summit, the rotating presidency of the year usually holds informal meeting mechanisms such as "BRICS 4" and "Friends of BRICS" to increase dialogue and cooperation between BRICS members and other countries of the global South. For example, South Africa, as the BRICS chair in 2023, invited BRICS members and candidates to the "Friends of BRICS" meeting, which resulted in the second BRICS expansion. At the same time, South Africa also held the "BRICs-Africa" meeting and the "BRICS Plus" dialogue, inviting all African heads of state, as well as 20 leaders of international and regional organizations, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, to attend, creating the largest BRICS summit. In addition, supporting activities such as the BRICS Business Forum and the BRICS Think Tank Meeting also adopted different forms of "BRICS Plus" cooperation, and participants held in-depth discussions on topics such as promoting African economic growth, which fully embodies the BRICS spirit of openness, inclusiveness and win-win cooperation.

It is worth noting that the New Development Bank is a relatively independent institutional framework, and its membership expansion process does not fully overlap with the BRICS cooperation mechanism. South Africa is a founding member of the New Development Bank and is home to the bank's regional center for Africa. Egypt officially joined the New Development Bank in March 2023 and was invited to become a full member of BRICS in August of the same year. Ethiopia is already a member of BRICS but has not joined the New Development Bank. The New Development Bank provides a flexible and inclusive institutional framework for BRICS countries to participate in Africa's development, deepening bilateral economic cooperation between China, India and Africa over the past decades, and expanding BRICS partnerships on poverty reduction, food security, innovative development, infrastructure and industrialization.

3.The greater BRICS cooperation has contributed to Africa's sustained growth

Affected by populism, protectionism and other ideological trends, economic, trade, investment and development cooperation between developed countries, BRICS countries and African countries have come to a standstill. On the contrary, South-South economic cooperation between BRICS countries such as China and India and Africa has been significantly strengthened. After the expansion, Africa will provide diversified investment and trade opportunities for other BRICS members, and the ability of "greater BRICS cooperation" to promote Africa's sustained growth will also be enhanced.

First, we should speed up the integration of mechanisms to enable new African members to deeply participate in BRICS cooperation. Over the years, the BRICS countries have concluded the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy 2025, the BRICS Digital Economy Partnership Framework, the BRICS Food Security Cooperation Strategy, the BRICS Energy Cooperation Roadmap, the BRICS Initiative to Strengthen Supply Chain Cooperation and many other initiatives. New member states can be gradually promoted to join the above-mentioned initiative documents, or existing documents can be upgraded, especially for African member States to reduce tariff barriers, simplify trade procedures, and enhance the export competitiveness and added value of these countries. After the official expansion of BRICS membership, the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the BRICS Financial Think Tank Network and other mechanisms are also facing a new round of expansion. At present, the expansion of the BRICS financial think tank network is relatively flexible, and the New Development Bank and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement need to conduct qualification negotiations with new members such as Ethiopia in a timely manner, so that they can integrate into BRICS practical cooperation as soon as possible.

Second, we can rely on the New Development Bank to carry out more extensive development cooperation with Africa. The New Development Bank has established an operating mechanism with streamlined institutions, efficient decision-making and flexible responses, and formed a development finance model that combines policy banks and commercial banks, and indirect and direct financing. With the addition of well-capitalized new members such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the paid-up capital of the New Development Bank will be further increased, and its lending capacity for developing regions such as Africa will also be enhanced. In addition to increasing investment in infrastructure, green development, epidemic prevention and control, the New Development Bank should also actively promote the building of the BRICS New Industrial Revolution partnership, support more African countries to participate in the China-BRICS New Industrial Revolution Partnership demonstration zone and other relevant mechanisms, and actively foster an open, fair and non-discriminatory environment for technological development. Narrowing the development gap between the North and the South.

Finally, we need to strengthen position coordination and increase Africa's representation and voice in global governance. There are no African countries among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, South Africa is the only African country in the G20, and Africa has a very limited voice in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The BRICS countries are committed to building a more balanced and just international order, and actively enhance the voice of the "global South" countries, including African countries. After the expansion, the BRICS cooperation mechanism has expanded its diversity and representation, and its overall weight and influence in global governance have further increased, which is more conducive to promoting an equal and orderly world multi-polarization. Since the BRICS countries have a relatively high voice in global governance, African countries can use the "Greater BRICS cooperation" to integrate more African aspirations into the "BRICS voice" and "BRICS position", so that traditionally marginalized countries and regions can come to the center of the international stage, thus creating a more favorable international environment for Africa's long-term growth. (Author: Shen Chen, Associate Researcher, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)