Geopolitics and Beyond borders: An analysis based on Russian think Tanks' perceptions of the Ukraine Crisis

Abstract: The cognition of Russian think tanks on the Ukraine crisis is mainly based on the realistic analysis paradigm, and behind it is a clear geopolitical logic. Unique geographical features and diplomatic practices with European countries since the 18th century have made geopolitical thought often play an underlying logical role in Russia. In order to explain the country's geopolitical code to the public and the international community, the Russian academic community has put forward the concept of "borderless domain" to reconstruct Russia-Ukraine relations from a geographical perspective. In their view, Russia and its post-Soviet space neighbors are integral Spaces without borders, given the traditional balance of forces, lack of natural borders, and centuries of shared historical experience; Russia's national interests can only be ensured if the territory of neighboring countries is not used by powers unfriendly to Russia. The Ukraine crisis will have a significant impact on Russia's diplomacy, geopolitical environment, economy and politics, and Russia should rethink and position its foreign policy and international relations theory. Russian scholars believe that the development of Sino-Russian relations will help Russia get out of the crisis, but Russia should rely on its own strength. How Russia will establish itself in the world is the main concern of Russian scholars.

Ⅰ on the origins of the Ukraine crisis

Russian scholars mainly analyze the causes of the Ukrainian crisis from two levels of structural realism, system and unit, within the framework of US-Soviet confrontation and post-Cold War. The former focuses on the competition between the European security system and the two regional integration schemes between Russia and Europe, as well as the interaction between Russia and the United States, while the latter focuses on Russia's own factors, with special emphasis on Russia's positioning and cognition of Ukraine.

(1) Systemic pressure and the new phase of Russia's "constructive destruction" of Western diplomacy

Russian scholars believe that the eastward expansion of NATO promoted by the United States is the continuation of the Cold War at the system level, which is the decisive variable of the confrontation between Russia and the United States. Within the framework of Cold War studies, Russian scholars focus on the geopolitical containment of Russia by the United States and NATO and the transformation of Russia's foreign policy.

a.Continuation of the Cold War at the system level: the decisive variable of the Ukraine crisis

First, the pressing of the United States and NATO in the post-Soviet space is the root cause of the crisis in Ukraine. After the end of the Cold War, the United States and its Allies established a regional security architecture in Europe with NATO as the military and political core, and Russia was excluded from the edge of the European security architecture. The United States and Western countries continue the Cold War mentality, violate NATO's commitment not to expand eastward at the time of German reunification, ignore Russia's security interests, and promote multiple rounds of eastward expansion. The honorary chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Council of Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy, Xie Karaganov, believes that NATO launched the first round of eastward expansion 25 years ago, which laid the groundwork for today's Ukraine crisis. Russia was weak, and Yeltsin's objections were ignored by NATO and the United States. Since then, Russia has entertained the illusion of an equal relationship with the collective West, acquiescing to successive rounds of NATO enlargement, until it sought to bring Ukraine into the alliance. Under the background of the continuous promotion of NATO eastward expansion by the United States, the conflict between Russia and the United States is inevitable.

Second, NATO's eastward expansion into Ukraine, which Russia sees as an external security threat. The deputy director of the Valdai International Debate Club Program, Yi Timofiev, suggested that the crisis in Ukraine should be analyzed in the context of Russia's attempts to rethink the post-Cold War security order in Europe. Since the mid-1990s, the transformation of the European security order has increasingly worried Russia, especially the eastward expansion of NATO. Russia sees NATO membership for Ukraine and other post-Soviet space states as a red line. If Ukraine joins NATO, Russia will face the realistic pressure of direct confrontation with NATO and the direct military threat from Ukraine, NATO will deploy a modern hypersonic missile system in Ukraine, from the launch of the United States hypersonic missile can reach Moscow in 5 minutes, and conventional ballistic missiles will take 7 to 10 minutes. Ukraine retains a large network of airfields capable of taking off and landing all types of aircraft, making it easy for NATO air forces to assemble in Ukraine, either secretly or on a large scale. With 250,000 troops, Ukraine would be the largest army of any European member state, posing a powerful strategic threat to Russia.

Third, conflict between Russia and the collective West over Ukraine is inevitable, and Russia should take the initiative. Karaganov believes that NATO will not stop the process of eastward expansion, let alone listen to Russia's views. If Russia continues to live in the security architecture created by the United States and NATO, a major war is inevitable. Ukraine can build a modern state only on an anti-Russian basis, and Russia will face a hostile neighbour that will join the Russo-hating camp. From the beginning of the new Cold War in 2004-2008, such a future was destined. Russia's "acceptance" of Crimea, rather than its determination to truly support eastern Ukraine, prevented 2014 from being a turning point year. In the years that followed, Ukraine was used by NATO as a tool to exert military and political pressure on Russia. Ukraine has taken a series of steps towards de-Russification, which, if left unchecked, will be unpredictable. This is all the result of Russia's lack of strategic resolve, and given the inevitability of conflict with the West, Russia needs to learn the lessons of the past.

b. Unit level: Domestic political factors and the opening of a new stage of "constructive destruction" in the relations between Russia and the West At the unit level, the change of Russia's domestic political factors is an important independent variable for the change of Russia's foreign policy.

First, NATO's eastward expansion has made Russia realize that it is a loser in the Cold War, and Russia is dissatisfied with its status as a loser and hopes to take its rightful place in the international order. Fay Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Council of Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy, believes that Russia's military action against Ukraine marks the end of an era. Russia's current action is to learn from the actions of the United States and its Allies, and to compete with the United States and its Allies for hegemony. Moscow's Carnegie Center, Ya Baunov, points out that Russia's fierce confrontation with the West over Ukraine is a paradoxical way out of its Cold War loser status. This is logical in itself: you are not a loser if you can create a crisis on the scale of the US-Soviet stand-off. In an unpleasant reminder of the failure of the previous round, Russia wants to reclaim its territory, which was once its own.

Second, Russia's growing power and growing influence in post-Soviet space offer hope for change. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the comprehensive strength of the Russian state has been continuously rising, the Russian leader Putin has the dream of great power, the Russian elite group is relatively united, and President Putin has been highly supported by the public. De Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, believes that Putin has taken on the mission of cleaning up Russia's external environment, and he hopes to hand over a geographically superior Russia to his successor. Putin's extension of the presidential term, on the one hand, to stabilize the domestic political considerations, but also to actively promote the post-Soviet space integration. At the same time, since the outbreak of COVID-19, economic ties between Russia and neighboring countries have been restored. By helping Belarus cope with its election crisis and Kazakhstan with its limited use of force to quell unrest, Russia's prestige as a safe public good in the post-Soviet space is growing.

Third, the Western-centric international system is on the verge of collapse. Karaganov argues that the West's loss of military superiority, the exhaustion of the potential of the existing capitalist model, including the natural environment, climate, epidemics, increasing social inequality, increasingly acute global problems such as migration, and the rise of the "non-West" are the root causes of the collapse of the current international system. The US and Europe face their own internal contradictions, such as populism and social fragmentation. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan shows that the US is paying less attention to the region. The West's decline comes at a time when Russia is regaining influence.

Fourth, political legitimacy is also an important consideration for Russia to initiate special military operations. According to the director of the Center for European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics of Russia, due to the improvement of Ukraine's military capabilities and the military cooperation between the United States and Ukraine, Russia can only "liberate" the eastern Ukrainian region through direct military intervention. If Russia were to abandon Donbass, it would lead to domestic political instability.

As a result of these factors, Russia abandoned the illusion of integration into the European security architecture and changed its foreign policy. Trenin proposed that before 2020, Russia's foreign policy should in principle inherit some of Gorbachev's ideas, that is, reach mutual understanding with the United States and Europe, and realize integration with the Western world. Until 2021, Putin still spent a lot of time in interviews with American television, trying to convince the American people that Russia's interests are not contradictory with the United States, and that the United States and Russia can jointly address global challenges. From the beginning of 2021, relations between Russia and the West have entered a new stage of "constructive destruction". Russia has established the "Russian State 2.0" with the Russian-speaking regions as its geographical scope, focusing on the Eurasian direction, and embedding the relations between Russia and the West into the greater Eurasian framework.

(2) Borderless territory: Ukraine is not Russia's ordinary near neighbor

In addition to the geopolitical game between Russia and the United States in the post-Soviet space, Russian experts point to the special significance of Ukraine for Russia, arguing that Ukraine is not an ordinary country in Russia's near abroad. Since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Ukraine has been described in the Russian discourse as a vital neighbor. Some Russian scholars argue that Ukraine is a central part of Russia's national history and that Kiev is Russia's "mother city." Ukraine is strategically important in the confrontation between Russia and NATO. Ukraine has enormous demographic, economic, scientific, and cultural potential. If it could be merged with Russia, Russia would become a center of world power. A split between Ukraine and Russia would mean the destruction of national unity and the unity of Orthodox civilization. Ukraine would become a convenient springboard for enemies to attack Russia from the southwest, and Russia would lose the opportunity to become the center of gravity of the world economy.

Before Russia launched its special military operation against Ukraine, think tanks such as the Valdai International Debating Club, the Russian Council for International Affairs, and the Higher School of Economics, Russia's national research university, had already moved to prepare theories for a more active Russian policy toward Ukraine. On the one hand, these think tanks coordinate the positions of the Russian elite, on the other hand, they act as a bridge between the government and society. The Valdai International Debate Club's report, "Space Without Borders: Russia and Its Neighbors," proposes the concept of an "unbounded realm," arguing that Russia and its post-Soviet space neighbors should be viewed as a single, unbounded realm due to shared historical ties forged over centuries, the lack of physical geographic boundaries, and traditional power contrasts. The development and foreign policy choices of post-Soviet space neighbors directly affect Russia's national interests, especially its security interests. In order to safeguard its national security, Russia should intervene in the development of its neighbors and ensure that they can make their own diplomatic decisions independently and not be used against Russia by NATO. The Valdai International Debate Club's "Growing Romance" report argues that the experience of the 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union has shown that newly independent states can hardly defend their sovereignty on their own, and that Russia should pursue a more active policy toward its neighbors.

Some Russian scholars take a different view. According to the Moscow Institute of International Relations (Moscow Institute of International Relations), the Crisis in Ukraine: International Competition and the Boundaries of National Power, Russian academics used to tend to believe that the cultural and civilizational similarities between Russia and Ukraine were close enough for the two countries to understand each other, which was a mistake made by Russia and a factor in the current crisis in Russia-Ukraine relations. Trenin believes that Russia should change its thinking, and the concept of Ukraine as an ordinary neighbor of the "Russian world" should be reconsidered in the direction of Ukraine. For Russia, what matters is the realization of the most important national interests in the areas of national identity, integration, security, economic development, and Russia does not need Ukraine. Ann Kortunov, executive chairman of the Russian Council for International Affairs, pointed out that it was the former Soviet republics that had been trying to join the Euro-Atlantic security structure for years, and the West was forced to respond to this pressure in one way or another. Therefore, Russia should focus on finding alternative mechanisms to ensure the national security of the "common neighborhood" and reduce the desire of neighboring countries to join NATO at all costs. Russia needs to develop an effective model of economic and social development that its neighbors can learn from. Sooner or later, establishing constructive, if not friendly, relations with its immediate neighbors will become a priority of Russian foreign policy.

To sum up, regarding the origin of the Ukraine crisis, the logical chain of Russian think tanks is: At the system level, the United States and NATO continue the Cold War mentality and constantly squeeze Russia's geopolitical buffer space, and the conflict between Russia and the West is inevitable. Ukraine will not only take anti-Russia as the foundation of national construction, but also join the Russia-hating camp. In 2014, due to the lack of strategic determination by Russia, Ukraine will gradually step away from the anti-Russian road. Ukraine and Russia are "borderless domains", and Russia will never allow other countries to infiltrate into Ukraine. With the increase of Russia's national strength and the decline of the West as the center of the international system, Russia takes the initiative to respond to the pressure of the system in a destructive way to avoid Ukraine becoming a "dagger" inserted into the heart of Russia by NATO.

Ⅱ the impact of the Ukraine crisis on Russia and its response

Russian scholars have made a qualitative analysis of the possible consequences of the Ukraine crisis on Russia's international environment and diplomatic, political and economic development, and put forward their own thoughts on how Russia should respond.

(1) Impact on Russia

a.Influence on Russian diplomacy

In terms of diplomatic and geopolitical influence, Kortunov pointedly pointed out that Russia has once again seized the role of "international villain" and "Western adversary", and Russia will be subjected to Western economic sanctions for a long time and gradually separated from the new global technological system. Russia has few Allies in the West and even sympathetic onlookers. Russia will face a long and costly arms race. Ann Chigankov pointed out that Russia has lost the opportunity to cooperate with the West, the Ukrainian refugees and military conflict has damaged Russia's reputation, Russia has to survive mainly outside the Western world, but the conditions for cooperation with the non-Western world are not favorable, because Russia is currently very weak and lacks the flexibility to conduct diplomatic operations between the East and the West.

In view of the frozen state of cooperation between Russia and the West, non-Western regions, especially the southern hemisphere countries, will be an important field of fierce competition between Russia and the West. In order to ultimately turn Russia into a "rogue state," Kortunov argues, the West needs to intensify its public opinion war in non-Western regions, isolating Russia as much as possible by portraying it as a country that challenges basic norms of international law and undermines the foundations of European and global security. Putin's Russia has never faced a challenge of this magnitude. Lukyanov believes that if properly arranged, relations with Asian countries can help improve the severe international environment Russia faces, but Asian countries are often in a state of competition or even conflict with each other, Russia lacks experience in dealing with eastern countries, and may be too dependent on China.

As for the prospect of this crisis, Ann Sushentsov, director of the Department of International Relations of the Moscow Institute of International Relations, believes that the current may be at the starting point of the development of the crisis, far from resolving the crisis. There are three possible scenarios: first, the Ukrainian government and Russia conclude agreements that the West recognizes as part of European security, and the Ukraine crisis is replaced by a Cold War-like military and political confrontation between Russia and the West; The second is that depending on the military situation, either a balance is reached, or one side has the upper hand, the West may not recognize the results of the Russia-Ukraine deal, and a new Ukrainian government may emerge. The third is the escalation of confrontation between Russia and the West, which does not rule out the spread of the crisis to NATO countries, or the escalation of sanctions against Russia, which will shake the foundation of the Russian regime and may trigger a nuclear confrontation.

b. Influence on Russian economy and domestic politics

The crisis in Ukraine will have a profound negative impact on the Russian economy. Timofiev believes that the medium - and long-term impact of the crisis on the Russian economy will be huge. The collapse of the ruble, inflation, higher import prices and tighter export controls have all been expected. Once the policy of "squeezing Russia out of the market for raw materials" is effective, it will certainly affect the Russian budget revenue. The arms race with the West will lead to an increase in Russian defense spending, as well as resources for post-war reconstruction in Ukraine, and a number of economic factors will reduce the incomes of Russian citizens. Kashin believes that Russia will continue its protracted military and political confrontation in Europe while undergoing a painful restructuring of its economic model. Such restructuring may be in line with Russia's long-term development goals, but the external conditions for reform will be extremely difficult.

The crisis in Ukraine could have a negative impact on Russian domestic politics. In theory, Dimovyev argues, the decline in the well-being of Russian citizens could exacerbate domestic political tensions. In reality, given that Russia has accumulated huge reserves and sanctions have a delayed effect, it is unlikely that Russia's domestic political contradictions will intensify in the short term, but in the medium term, it cannot be ruled out that the accumulation of resistance and some incentive will trigger the release of negative emotions. Russia's domestic protests are an important variable in western strategic assessments.

(2) Russia's response

First of all, Russia needs to find the national ideological foundation again, based on which to construct Russia's international relations theory, guide Russia's diplomatic practice, and establish the direction of national development. Chigankov argues that no matter how the military campaign ends, it is essential to re-establish Russia's diplomatic orientation and national thinking. Russian national ideology should not be based on force and confrontation; The core of Russian thought should not be conservative values or national interests, but concepts of social justice, prosperity, and freedom. Trenin proposed that the Russian state needs to find the foundation of state-building values and worldviews; Russia is a "civilizational power," with many elements of Russian civilization originating in Europe, but with its roots in Byzantine Orthodoxy and political culture and openness to Asia; Russia should look for Russian thought from its own historical civilization, rethink its foreign policy, and establish its international relations theory based on its interests and historical experience. Russia's behavior in the international arena should conform to its traditional values and strive to live in harmony with different countries, peoples, cultures and civilizations in the international community.

Second, Russian diplomacy should now address the following important issues: avoiding the outbreak of nuclear war; Creating favorable conditions for Russia's development and rearranging foreign economic ties; Assisting Russian companies in their economic activities at home and abroad; Developing close coordination and collaboration with Belarus, Russia's main ally; Developing economic integration and strategic cooperation with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union and the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization; Continue to expand practical interaction and strengthen mutual understanding with Russia's main strategic partners (China, India); Actively develop contacts with Turkey, Iran and other countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa and other countries that do not participate in sanctions against Russia; We will work with the SCO, BRICS countries and other relevant countries to gradually build a new foundation for an international financial architecture that is not dependent on the US dollar.

Third, Russia should not become an isolated economic island. It should take this opportunity to deepen reforms. Zigankov believes that the current idea of building a "Russian fortress" in Russia is very dangerous; The goal of Russian diplomacy should not be to build a fortress isolated from the world economy, but to integrate with the world's most dynamic regions. Russia faces new opportunities to integrate the Eurasian region, and Russia needs to develop dialogue among civilizations, open its economy, and oppose regional hegemony. According to Lukyanov, Russia is part of the world, and the Western-centered global system relies heavily on external markets, technology and other elements. The next decade will be a time to explore their own potential and development opportunities, adapting to the "no West" way of life. Timofiev believes that Russia should re-shape the Russian state, deepen the reform of the economic system, and change the way of foreign economic relations. Kashin suggested that Russia should use its few tools to diversify its foreign trade relations with non-Western countries, improve export infrastructure in the Far East and reduce its economic dependence on China.

Finally, attention must be paid to arms control, in particular to avoiding nuclear confrontation. Arbatov, academician of the Institute of World Economy and Politics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, compared the Ukrainian crisis with the Cuban missile crisis and believed that Russia-US relations had turned a circle and returned to the Cold War; Russia and the US should learn from the Cuban missile crisis; Sooner or later, the Ukraine issue will be resolved peacefully, and after that, the Russia-US arms control dialogue will need to be restarted. Kortunov argues that the bomb is not a toy for presidents and that the five nuclear-armed countries need to hold an emergency meeting to discuss global strategic stability. Discussions on Europe's nuclear agenda must begin, with a moratorium on the deployment of short - and medium-range nuclear missiles on the continent. Igor Istomin, director of the Department of Applied Analysis of International Issues at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, believes that the lessons of the Cold War should be learned in a system of mutually hostile relations. Lukyanov pointed out that the Russian state is caught in a triple contradiction: with the international order, with Ukraine, and with itself. The three contradictions follow their own development laws and are interwoven. The crisis will change the pecking order of major players such as the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia. Russia wants to disrupt the crumbling international order. The fate of the Soviet Union, which proposed grand international changes only to be the sole victim, should not be forgotten. The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is facing the darkest moment, the national consciousness is completely intensified, and the search for the national boundary becomes the essence of the contradiction between Russia and Ukraine. The concept of a "Russian world" will also pale. Russia's own contradictions are at the heart of the problem. The crisis has exposed important flaws in Russia's national governance system, such as the operational performance of decision-making mechanisms and the efficiency of key departments. The key way out of the current situation is whether Russia itself can change to adapt to the sharply deteriorating external environment.

On the whole, Russian scholars are more inclined to believe that the future will be a heavier historical period for Russia, Russia's geopolitical environment will further deteriorate, and Russia under Putin's leadership will face unprecedented diplomatic, political and economic challenges. With the entry of Putin into the fourth presidential term, Russian politics has entered a new cycle, in the context of the country's modernization process has not achieved a breakthrough, the external process of the country has suppressed the internal process, the political rigidity and extremes have been significantly strengthened, and the social atmosphere and popular psychology have become tense. Russia's geo-space has become the focus of Putin's administration, and the status of geo-policy has been significantly improved, even overtaking the process of national modernization, dominating Russian politics, and making the question of where Russia is going to history once again become the central topic of academic discussion.

Ⅲ Russian think Tank's assessment of China-Russia relations since the Ukraine crisis

The relationship between China and Russia has always been a concern of Russian academic circles. In the analysis of the Ukraine crisis, Russian scholars observe and assess the significance of Sino-Russian relations for Russia, China's position in the Ukraine crisis, and put forward thoughts on how to deepen cooperation with China.

As for why Sino-Russian relations are important to both countries, Academician Viktor Larin, vice president of the Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has brilliantly expounded that the most important common interest of China and Russia is not to be enemies. Sovereignty, national independence, people's welfare and values as the basis of national existence are the common pursuit of China and Russia. Russia should not rely on China to develop its Far East; Russia needs to work closely with China to actively and effectively promote and defend Russia's national interests, solve Russia's domestic development problems, jointly resist U.S. hegemony, and maximize scientific and technological cooperation.

For China's position in the Ukraine crisis, the Institute of World Economy and Politics of the Russian Academy of Sciences Mikhyev and Lukonin believe that the Ukraine crisis makes China face a very complex choice; China cannot blame Russia, nor can China support Russia's special military action against Ukraine. They believe that as the Ukraine crisis continues to develop, China is trying not to focus on the Ukraine crisis to arrange the international agenda, and is trying to strengthen economic ties with the United States and the European Union; China wants to stay out of the Ukraine crisis, which it says is a European security issue. Kashin observes that China directly criticizes NATO's eastward expansion policy and the West's failure to listen to Russia's security concerns; If the crisis in Ukraine continues, it will be difficult for China to remain a friendly neutral.

Sub-national cooperation is crucial to deepening China-Russia relations. The Russian Academy of Sciences Far East Shue Lujanin believes that the fundamental change since Russia's special military operations to Ukraine is that Russia completely bypasses Europe and redeploits economic and trade investment, technology, resources and energy flows in the direction of Asia; Russia's "look East" policy will be revised to target neutral and friendly countries in the region, especially China. The Far East is an important development direction for Russia, and the transportation and logistics infrastructure in the Far East should be improved, and corridors and platforms should be established. The limiting factor of local cooperation between China and Russia lies in the unequal economic strength between China and Russia.

On the whole, Russian scholars speak highly of relations with China, believing that Sino-Russian relations are helpful for Russia to get out of the crisis, but Russia should rely more on its own strength.

Ⅳ Unbounded Domain: Geopolitical thinking in the analysis of the Ukrainian crisis by Russian think tanks

The analysis of the Ukrainian crisis in Russian academic circles is mostly based on the theoretical paradigm of realism. Realism occupies a dominant position in the field of Russian state relations. Part of the reason is that realist theory is an abstraction of the state of the balance of power in eighteenth-century Europe, combined with the political theory of ancient Greece. Russia's practical experience in international relations comes mainly from the negotiation with European countries on the European continent. As for the causes of the Ukraine crisis, the Russian academic community mainly follows the analytical framework of structural realism, believing that the United States and western countries create pressure on Russia at the system level, and Russia as a unit is under the system pressure, and domestic factors affect Russia's diplomatic choices. The discussion in the Russian academic community is more about the impact of the Ukraine crisis on Russia and how Russia should respond. There is little disagreement in the Russian academic community that the Ukraine crisis will have a significant negative impact on Russia. Mr Karaganov sees the Ukraine crisis as a "patriotic war", a matter of life and death for Russia. In response, in addition to rearranging diplomatic and foreign economic ties, and reforming the domestic economic system, Russian scholars also put forward philosophical reflections on the country's development path and national thought.

The Russian think tank's research on the Ukraine crisis has a clear geopolitical image behind the realistic theoretical analysis. The theory of geopolitics originated from the British thought of political geography and the German thought of geopolitics, and the thought originated from the practice of the European countries competing for the status of great powers and leadership in the 19th century. Even today, geopolitical theory is still very influential in the United States and Europe. Russia's unique geographical and natural environment gives Russia a rich creative source of geopolitical thought, and Russian scholars devote themselves to studying the relationship between Russia's unique geographical environment and foreign policy. This led to a debate among Westerners, Slavophics and Eurasians about the direction of the country. Russia's geopolitical thought comes from Europe, coupled with Russia's historical experience of dealing with European countries since the 18th century, geopolitical thought often plays the role of underlying logic. Geopolitics is still very much alive in Russian academia. Although some Russian scholars have criticized geopolitics as a pseudoscience, for example, Shei Glaziev believes that geopolitics is a pseudoscience concocted by Western countries to destroy Russia, carrying anti-Russian and anti-Russian sentiments. However, he also follows the logic of geopolitics, criticizing U.S. policy toward Russia and suggesting that war between Russia and the West is inevitable.

From a geopolitical point of view, the crisis in Ukraine is the result of systemic containment and counter-containment by the United States, Western countries and Russia. At the end of the Cold War, the United States continued to squeeze Russia's strategic space and contain Russia by promoting the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union. The struggle between Russia and the United States and Western countries over Ukraine still reflects the idea of geopolitical expansion, but with different means. While the United States and the West have relied primarily on the mix of values and rules that prevailed since the Cold War, Russia has relied on the older, territorial, and "blood and iron" approach to influence. Russia believes that the days of America's sole global domination are over, and that the US-led international order based on Western values is crumbling. So this time, Russia has decided to take the initiative to challenge the post-Cold War security order in continental Europe that excludes Russia. In Lukyanov's words, the Russian fortress decided to test its capabilities, Russia decided to change the world order on its own.

The relationship between Russia and its neighbors in the post-imperial era has been an important diplomatic issue for Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Scholars such as Di Bordachev have pointed out that among all the successors of the European imperialist states of the 19th century, Russia is a unique phenomenon, because some of Russia's neighbors were once imperial frontiers. From the research of Russian think tanks, Russian scholars still tend to adopt a geopolitical perspective. Starting from the center-periphery paradigm, Russian scholars regard Russia as the power center in the post-Soviet space, and regard neighboring countries including Ukraine as the edge and important geopolitical buffer zone of Russia, which does not allow external forces to intervene. It guides Russia's diplomatic practice.

The concept of "borderless territory" is intended to explain a country's geopolitical code to the public and the international community, and to construct a rational basis for a country's foreign policy. The "unbounded domain" proposed by scholars such as Di Boldachev is based on the physical geographical connection and the common historical and cultural connection. According to the authors of the concept, the "unbounded domain" respects and recognizes the international law status of formal borders between countries, but due to the absence of a clear physical geographical boundary between the two countries, the change of historical borders, and the traditional power contrast in the region, the development and policy choices of the Ukrainian state directly affect Russia's national interests. The concept of "borderless territory" is inherently contradictory, with Russian scholars emphasizing that Russia is not ready to restore its empire, but the concept provides justification for breaking through the formal border between Russia and Ukraine. This concept, like "Russian world" before it, is an ideological tool of Russian diplomacy, an attempt by post-imperial Russia to manage its relations with its neighbors.

The crisis in Ukraine has once again made the question of the demarcation of borders between states, as well as between civilizations and ethnic groups, another central topic of discussion in Russian international relations circles. The differences in identity between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, the concept of a psycho-spiritual border and the transition of borders between states are important precipitating factors for the crisis in Ukraine. Hot topics among Russian scholars include the "collection of Russian lands," the revival of Putin's "New Russia project," and where the borders of the "Russian world" should be. Within the framework of the center-periphery, the so-called "multiple borders" have emerged between Russia and Ukraine, in which formal inter-state borders coexist with "informal borders" such as historical borders, borders of national interests, psychological borders, and borders of civilizations. In fact, "multiple boundaries" are artificially constructed in the interleaving of time and space to provide a basis for transcending boundaries.

Not all Russian scholars support Russia's pursuit of Ukraine, especially in the form of special military operations. Scholars such as De Trenin, Yi Timofiev, and Ann Kortunov do not agree that Russia is currently dealing with the Ukraine crisis by launching special military operations. They believe that an important reason for the slow process of post-Soviet space integration is that Russia does not have an attractive economic and social system. Russia should abandon its geopolitical mindset, treat Ukraine as an ordinary neighbor, and concentrate on developing its own economy and solving its own social problems. When Russia can contribute the Russian model and Russian wisdom to the world, neighboring countries are naturally willing to learn from Russia and actively join the integration process advocated by Russia. However, this Western-leaning voice is not the mainstream in the current Russian intellectual world.

Overall, although the Russian intellectual elite is divided into different schools of thought, the mainstream opinion of each school is in support of the current Russian policy toward Ukraine. From the interaction between think tanks and the Russian regime, it can be seen that scholars from the Valdai International Debate Club, the Russian Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy, and the Higher School of Economics, such as Seh Karaganov and Faye Lukyanov, are most involved in Russian foreign policy decisions. Interestingly, the academics who are currently most supportive of Putin's anti-Western policies are among Russia's most Western-savvy elites. The Russian thinker Vadim Zimbolsky (B.II IbM6ypckni) once suggested that Russia might be an island floating in the vast Eurasian ocean, and that by means of geographical space Russia could find a path of revival different from that of the imperial era. The Ukraine crisis has once again pushed Russia to the crossroads of historical development, and the question of how Russia should stand in the world is the main concern of Russian scholars, and the ideological tendency of establishing "Russian fortress" and "Russian island" is becoming more and more obvious. The ideas of Russian scholars lack compromise, and their implementation will face great challenges.(Author: Chu Dongmei Deputy Director and Associate Researcher of Northeast Frontier Research Office, Institute of Chinese Frontier Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)