Abstract: since 2022 the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become a key driver for the change of the Eurasian order. Affected by this, the balance of power, mutual recognition and the identity and strategic orientation of different Eurasian countries have undergone historic changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia's status as a leading country in the Eurasian region is challenged by multiple challenges, such as its own declining strength, all-round sanctions by the West, and the increasing sense of autonomy of Eurasian countries. There will be more room for Eurasian countries to independently choose their development paths based on their national conditions and strategic interests, and the Eurasian region will show a more diversified development trend. "Eurasia" as a transitional geopolitical concept may gradually fade out of the international political field of view.
In recent years, under the influence of multiple factors, the adjustment, evolution and reshaping of the international pattern and world order have accelerated. In Eurasia, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to continuous instability, which has become a key driver for the change of regional order. Affected by this, the balance of forces, mutual recognition, and the identity and strategic orientation of the countries in the region have undergone major historic changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago. These changes will profoundly affect the changes in the Eurasian order and become an important part of the current and future major international changes.
Ⅰ. Russia's centrality in the Eurasian region faces multiple challenges
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, although Russia, which inherited most of the legacy of the Soviet Union, is no longer a superpower, it has always regarded the "post-Soviet space", that is the Eurasia region, as its important sphere of influence, and has been the core leading country in the Eurasia region for a long time. It not only has a comprehensive national strength far exceeding that of other Eurasian countries, but also has a significant influence on other Eurasian countries that cannot be ignored. Especially since 2007, under the guidance of the international strategic view that Russia has achieved the rise of a great power, the acceleration of the decline of the United States, and the acceleration of the collapse of the liberal international order, Russia has successively made use of a series of events such as the Russia-Georgia War, the Crimean crisis, the Donbas conflict, the political turmoil in Belarus in 2020, and the "January Incident" in Kazakhstan in 2022 to grow geopolitical influence in Eurasia. Viewed from the general connection approach of historical materialism, Russia's series of actions are not isolated and accidental, but different components of its grand strategy of "Rise again". It is conceivable that if Russia's "special military operation" against Ukraine is fully successful, then a "new Russian Empire" will take shape. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which lasted more than two years, has descended into a protracted stalemate and a war of attrition, which has brought historic shocks to Russia.
First, the Russia-Ukraine conflict did not achieve a complete victory as quickly as Russia had expected. Russia and Ukraine changed positions several times, and even the Russian mainland was attacked. On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a "special military operation" against Ukraine, and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine broke out. After the Russian conquest of large areas of Ukraine through the "Blitzkrieg", Ukraine launched a counter-offensive in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions in the autumn of the same year, and regained large areas of lost territory. Ukraine's "Spring offensive" launched in June 2023 did not achieve its intended goals, but it also dealt a powerful blow to Russia's effective forces, weapons and logistics with its advanced battlefield awareness and long-range precision strike capabilities. Since the end of 2023, Ukraine has continuously launched attacks on Russian military bases and strategic infrastructure with long-range drones, and by mid-2024, Russia has lost 15% of its oil refining capacity. In August 2024, the regular Ukrainian army invaded the Russian Kursk region and occupied more than 1,000 square kilometers of Russian land. All signs show that the Ukrainian army's "return gun" is not a simple harassment war, but a carefully designed strategic counterattack.
Second, Russia has been subjected to unprecedented all-round economic sanctions by the United States and the West, and the obstacles facing its economic development have significantly increased, and it faces the danger of further marginalization in the international supply chain and the global economic governance system in the future. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has forced "low politics" such as economic cooperation to give way to "high politics" centered on security. The United States, Europe and even some neutral countries have imposed unprecedented severe sanctions on Russia, from restricting financing, export control, freezing assets, energy embargoes and price limits, to excluding important Russian banks from the international capital clearing system, which has dealt a heavy blow to Russia's economic operation, especially its economic relations with the outside world. In addition to the economic sanctions imposed by the United States and Western countries and international organizations, thousands of multinational companies have also announced their withdrawal from Russia or suspension of services, not only involving energy, finance and high-tech industries, but also involving biopharmaceuticals, life services and other fields. This new phenomenon in the international political and economic system has further aggravated the economic difficulties in Russia and even affected the daily life of the Russian people.
In the energy sector, the US and Europe have made unprecedented efforts to rid themselves of energy dependence on Russia, with the G7 and the European Union imposing price limits and embargoes on Russian offshore oil exports and refined oil exports on December 5, 2022 and February 5, 2023 respectively. Although Russia circumvented sanctions through "shadow fleets", discounted sales, and intensified energy exports to eastern countries, it still suffered huge losses. More than two years after the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, energy trade between Russia and the EU has plummeted. The EU imports of Russian fossil fuels fell from a high of $16bn a month in early 2022 to around $1bn a month by the end of 2023. In 2021, the EU imported 155 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia, which has fallen to 27 billion cubic meters in 2023. While Russia has gradually shifted its oil exports to Asia, the shift in gas exports has not been easy due to a lack of corresponding infrastructure. At its peak, Gazprom, which contributed 8% of Russia's industrial output and secured 25% of the state budget, recorded a historic loss of $6.8 billion in 2023 and $5.5 billion in the first half of 2024. In the medium term, there will be 122 billion cubic meters of gas exports per year that cannot be diverted, a significant loss even taking into account the marginal increase in Russian LNG exports (2 billion cubic meters in 2021-2023). In more than two years, the total amount of crude oil and petroleum products imported by the EU from Russia has dropped significantly, and the EU has got rid of its energy dependence on Russia to a considerable extent, and the close energy cooperation between Russia and the EU since the Cold War has been greatly weakened.
Although Russia has announced 3.6% economic growth in 2023, it must be noted that this is largely a "wartime boom" spurred by a surge in military production, which is a recovery from the 2.1% recession in 2022. Since the beginning of this year, the sanctions pressure on Russia by the United States and European countries has not weakened, but has expanded. In addition, the Russian economy also faces many challenges, such as industrial imbalances, inflationary pressure, and labor shortages. In the case of the deterioration of the political and economic environment, the Russian economy still faces many risks and challenges to achieve sustainable growth, and its position in the world economic system is further affected.
Third, Russia has been damaged by the "boomerang" of security, and the geo-security environment has further deteriorated. Since the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Russia has tried to prevent NATO from further expanding to the east, trying to subvert the European security order dominated by the United States and NATO after the Cold War. However, in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO quickly stepped out of the "brain death" state and re-put on the battle. This is reflected in five aspects: 1. most NATO countries are increasing their military spending to the 2% of GDP standard required by NATO; 2. NATO rapidly increased its forward military deployment in Eastern Europe, from the previously proposed 80,000 to 300,000. 3. the accession of two traditionally neutral countries, Finland and Sweden, to NATO has led to the extension of the land border between Russia and NATO by thousands of kilometers, and the geopolitical environment Russia is facing in the Baltic Sea region has further deteriorated. 4. The United States reshaped its influence and dominance in the trans-Atlantic alliance through the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and strengthened its European strategic autonomy to deal with the "Russian security threat" as the core. Germany became the staunchest supporter of Ukraine, and France even said it could send troops to aid Ukraine. 5. Ukraine, a country with complicated historical origins with Russia, has completely parted ways with Russia and even turned against it. In the future, Ukraine may become the strategic front of NATO to counter Russia. Former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbrzezinski predicted that "the loss of Ukraine would be geopolitically significant because it would greatly limit Russia's geostrategic options" because "Russia, which still controls Ukraine, could still seek to serve as the leader of a confident Eurasian state, dominating the non-Slavs in the southern and southeastern parts of the Soviet Union." But without Ukraine and its more than 52 million Slavs, any attempt by Moscow to re-establish a Eurasian empire risks plunging Russia into a protracted conflict with ethnically and religiously awakened non-Slavs."
Fourth, Russia's international environment has deteriorated on a large scale. Since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the UN General Assembly has held four relevant meetings to condemn Russia, the Council of Europe and the UN Human Rights Council have temporarily suspended Russia's membership, and the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court have also taken tough measures against Russia. At the same time, some UN member states expressed dissatisfaction with "Russia's frequent use of veto power in the Security Council" in recent years and called for accelerated reform of the UN, including the Security Council. On April 26, 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a proposal by 83 member states for a "standing mandate for General Assembly debate in the event of a veto in the Security Council", which decided that if one or more of the five permanent members used their veto power in the Security Council, the General Assembly would automatically convene within ten days. All UN member States can review and comment on the exercise of the veto. This in effect forms a limit to the "one vote of veto" that has been given to the P5 since the founding of the United Nations. For a long time to come, Russia is likely to fall into a state of relative isolation, and its position in international politics and the global governance system will be affected.
Fifth, the intensification of the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the United States in Eurasia and the prolonged conflict between Russia and Ukraine have led to the domestic political undercurrent in Russia. At the beginning of Russia's "special military operation" against Ukraine, anti-war demonstrations broke out in many places in Russia, which were quelled by the government, but the opposition intensified and expressed itself in more radical ways. Anti-government forces such as the " Russian Liberation Army ", “ the Russian Free Army " and “ the Siberian Battalion ”, composed of thousands of Russian citizens, also returned to Belgorod and other places to harass with the support of Ukraine. Anti-government riots have broken out in several ethnic regions of Russia. In June 2023, the "Wagner Corps", led by its leader Prigozhin, revolted against Moscow. Although the rebellion eventually died down, the rebellion itself and its aftermath showed that Russia was not all calm. Looking back at Russian history, a major foreign war defeat triggered a subversive change in domestic politics. A conflict with Ukraine would put Russia at a historical crossroads more than 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It can be seen that the contrast between strategic expectations and reality exposes many deep-seated problems in Russia, showing the gap between Russia's declining comprehensive national strength and its great power ambitions. The declining power and influence of the core countries will bring about major changes in the Eurasian regional order.
Ⅱ. Important changes have taken place in the identity and strategic orientation of Eurasian countries
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eurasian countries embarked on a process of comprehensive social transformation, seeking a new identity and defining a new strategic orientation in the global political and economic system. At the same time, Russia has a profound influence on these countries, especially since 2008 when Russia tried to regain full geopolitical influence in Eurasia. However, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which has lasted more than two years, could prove to be an important turning point in the development of Eurasia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the rapid evolution of the century of change, the countries in the Eurasian region are faced with the problem of determining a new identity and geostrategic orientation.
(1) Identity
Under the provocation of the United States to deliberately promote the eastward expansion of NATO, Ukraine sought to take refuge in the EU and NATO, trying to integrate into the European integration process and the trans-Atlantic security system, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the final confrontation between Russia and Ukraine in this respect. The conflict has turned Russia and Ukraine, two countries with complicated relations, against each other. On February 28, 2022, just six days after the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky officially signed the application for EU membership. In December 2023, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, announced his decision to launch negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the European Union. In early March 2024, the European Commission approved the negotiating framework for Ukraine's accession to the EU. On June 25, the European Union officially launched accession negotiations with Ukraine.
Ukraine's relationship with NATO dates back to the early 1990s. Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and signed a Partnership for Peace with NATO in 1994. In July 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed the Charter of the NATO-Ukraine Special Partnership and established the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the two sides have strengthened cooperation in key areas. Since the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, NATO has provided unprecedented support to Ukraine. On September 30, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Parliament Speaker Volodymyr Stefanchuk and Prime Minister Vladimir Shmigal jointly signed Ukraine's application to join NATO. In 2023, the NATO-Ukraine Council will be replaced by the NATO-Ukraine Council, in which NATO Allies and Ukraine will have equal status. The change reflects the strengthening of Ukraine's political ties with NATO. At the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, the Allies reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to become a NATO member, recognized Ukraine's substantial progress on enhanced military interoperability and reforms, and will continue to support and review Ukraine's achievements in military interoperability. The meeting of NATO foreign ministers will periodically assess the progress of the adjusted annual national program, and when the Allies agree and the conditions are met, NATO will invite Ukraine to join the alliance. In the future, Ukraine is bound to move toward an identity based on so-called shared interests and values with the United States and Europe, rather than an identity based on shared religious and historical roots with Russia.
Unlike Ukraine, which adopted Euro-Atlantic as its new identity, Kazakhstan is now engaged in "de-Russification" and the restoration of "historical memory." On March 15, 2024, President of Kazakhstan Mikhail Tokayev proposed a contest for the redesign of the national emblem. He said that the current design of the national emblem is too complex and too closely linked to the "Soviet-era characteristics", which does not reflect the national character of Kazakhstan and does not adequately reflect the future direction and values of the country. It is necessary to fully understand the country's history and protect and promote cultural heritage. He also said that Kazakhstan is the direct successor of the nomadic civilization of the steppe. For the purpose of restoring historical memory, he believes that the country's modernization needs to effectively use soft power and carry out the popularization of cultural heritage in an all-round way. Kazakhstan's move has sparked widespread concern in Russia.
(2) Strategic orientation
The geostrategic orientation of Eurasian countries is undergoing major changes. On the one hand, Eurasian countries are full of security concerns due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict; On the other hand, these countries actively pursue diversified and balanced foreign policies in various ways.
Armenia is distancing itself from Russia and moving closer to America and the West. Armenia was once one of Russia's staunchest Allies in Eurasia, counterbalancing Azerbaijan and Turkey with Russian military support. In particular, in the conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region (Nagorno-Karabakh), Armenia has long maintained a dominant position, and Russia has maintained its traditional strategic influence in the South Caucasus. However, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine distracted Russia, and Armenia lost the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan and had to agree to fully return the Nagorno-Karabakh region occupied for many years to Azerbaijan, which caused internal resentment against Russia in Armenia. In the past two years, Armenia has not only been absent from the Russian-led summits of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, directly demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops in Armenia, submitted an application to join the European Union, but also made clear its support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Cyprus, and all countries. On June 12, 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Pashnyan said the country is ready to withdraw from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Central Asian countries have expanded external ties on all fronts. In recent years, Central Asian countries have established the "C5+1" meeting mechanism with China, the United States, the European Union, Japan, India and other countries and international organizations. Since 2015, Central Asian countries and the United States have held several meetings under the "C5+1" mechanism. On September 19, 2023, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, the United States held the first "C5+1" summit with the leaders of five Central Asian countries to discuss security, trade and investment, regional connectivity, respect for sovereignty and territory, and reforms to improve governance and the rule of law. U.S. President Joe Biden has proposed increasing U.S. assistance to Central Asian security and enhancing regional economic connectivity, including through a new commercial platform for private sector development to complement diplomatic engagement, strengthening energy and supply chain security in the years ahead, and cooperation initiatives to find dialogue potential for critical minerals and guarantee the rights of persons with disabilities. In particular, Central Asian countries have actively developed relations with China, and the development of the "C5+1" mechanism between Central Asia and China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have become models of cooperation between Central Asian countries and China.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, due to the existing supply chain, industrial chain reorganization and other reasons, the economic relations between the newly independent Eurasian countries and Russia have been weakened compared with the Soviet period. Although Russia actively gathers Eurasian countries through economic integration schemes such as customs union and Eurasian Economic Union, the integration cooperation between Eurasian countries and Russia is not satisfactory due to its own economic strength. After the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in the face of all-round Western sanctions, Russia used the "parallel import" method to import a large number of dual-use equipment and components urgently needed by military enterprises through Central Asian and Caucasian countries. In 2022, the trade volume between Russia and Central Asian countries increased by 15% to more than $42 billion. This has caused concern in the United States and Europe. Since the end of 2023, the United States and Europe have intensified their crackdown on Russia's evasion of sanctions, forcing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and other Eurasian countries to stop providing services for the Russian local bank payment system "Mir" bank cards. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have suspended the use of the "mir" payment system since September 2022. Eurasian countries' financial ties with Russia will weaken further, with lasting negative effects on overall economic cooperation.
Ⅲ. The future direction of the Eurasian order
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a historic event with a shock comparable to the collapse of the Soviet Union and will have a structural impact on the Eurasian regional order. Under the combined action of the above multiple factors, the future direction of the Eurasian regional order will show the following important trends.
First of all, Russia's status as the core country in the Eurasian region has been challenged, its leading Eurasian integration process has been blocked, and efforts to restore its status as a world power have been frustrated. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the main successor of the Soviet Union, has a comprehensive and significant influence on the countries in the Eurasian region. Especially since 2007, as Russia has launched a series of actions in Eurasia, its strategy to revive the world power has continued to make phased progress. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict will bring a negative impact on Russia in all aspects. With the further weakening of its own strength and the new adjustment of the identity and strategic orientation of Eurasian countries, Russia's traditional dominant position in Eurasia will continue to decline, and its political, economic, security and cultural influence on regional countries will continue to weaken. Russia-led Eurasian integration institutions such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization have struggled to make substantial progress.
Secondly, the trend of Eurasian countries choosing different development directions according to their national conditions and strategic interests will be strengthened, and the Eurasian region will show a trend of more diversified development. Although the Eurasian countries began the process of independent nation-building after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the traditional influence of Russia still persists, which largely influences the social transformation of relevant countries, especially the choice of foreign policy. With the change of geopolitical pattern and power under the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the strategic choices of Eurasian countries may present several different types.
A. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and other countries, which are more inclined to Europe and actively seek to integrate into the European integration process. The EU also gave a positive response. On June 23, 2022, Moldova and Ukraine were approved as candidate countries by the EU. On 8 November 2023, the European Commission adopted the EU enlargement Package, which recommended opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova and granting candidate status to Georgia.
B. Azerbaijan, which has in fact formed a comprehensive strategic alliance with Turkey, won the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia with Turkish support, and thus became the strongest supporter of the "Turkic union of States" advocated by Turkey, thus weakening Azerbaijan's historical identity and practical ties with Russia.
C. The Central Asian powers such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are trying to find their own identity from the past, but their real goals seem to be in the balance, and they seem to be teetering between maintaining Soviet-style political and cultural traditions, fully Europeanizing, and becoming secular Islamic states.
D. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, countries with strong economic and security dependence on Russia. These two countries have insufficient blood production capacity and will face further economic difficulties. Moreover, the infiltration of religious extremism and other factors will further complicate the security environment.
E. Belarus, which is firmly cooperating with Russia. Since the domestic political turmoil subsided in 2020, Belarus has focused on Russia's support for its domestic and foreign policies. In the short and medium term, Belarus will not drift towards Europe and will remain Russia's most trusted and reliable ally.
Thirdly, the "frozen conflicts" in Eurasia created by the collapse of the Soviet Union may be resolved in a different way. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were many "frozen conflicts" in Eurasia, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Transnistrian Left Bank conflict, the border conflict between Central Asian countries and the water resource utilization conflict. Despite the complex background of these conflicts, Russia has used them to maintain its dominant position in the Eurasian region, which is an important reason why the conflicts remain unresolved for a long time. However, with the continuous evolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, these "frozen conflicts" may also be gradually resolved in different forms. Ukraine will move away from Russia and towards America and the West. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been temporarily resolved by means of war, as a result of which Armenia has fully handed over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which it has actually occupied for many years, to Azerbaijan in order to achieve final reconciliation between the two countries. Border and water disputes between Central Asian countries are gradually being resolved through peaceful negotiations. The "German-left" issue may end with Moldova finally regaining its sovereignty over the region.
In the future, as Eurasian countries choose their development paths more independently, determine their strategic orientations, and gradually resolve the "frozen conflicts" in Eurasia, the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union may gradually subside. "Eurasia" as a transitional geopolitical concept may gradually fade out of the international political field of view. But one crucial question for the world and international order remains unclear: where Russia is headed. (Author: Feng Yujun, Professor of History, Peking University)