The Evolution of the United States' Asia-Pacific Strategy and the Trend of the Regional Security Landscape

Summary: The security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region is undergoing a profound and long-lasting transformation. As the dominant security actor in the Asia-Pacific region, the design and adjustment of the United States' regional security strategy are an important driving force for the evolution of the security landscape in the region. By examining the evolution of the United States' Asia-Pacific strategy under the background of the strategic game between China and the United States and the transformation of the regional security landscape, it is found that after identifying China as the main target of the United States' Asia-Pacific strategy, the Obama administration was concerned about the rise of China's geopolitical influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and the balancing feature of the Asia-Pacific strategy was prominent; the Trump administration was concerned about the growth of China's military power, and its Asia-Pacific strategy focused on suppression and containment; the Biden administration was more concerned about the "challenge" posed by China to the United States' security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and the strategic posture was characterized by deterrence. Since the Obama administration, the aggressive strategic posture and the relatively weak strength position have driven the United States to adopt an expansionary alliance strategy, and its traditional alliance system is expanding into an alliance network. The current changes in the Asia-Pacific security landscape are manifested by the diversification of actors and multiple checks and balances, enhanced interaction of security in the Asia-Pacific region, and the rising importance of Asian countries. The future direction of the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region largely depends on the evolution of the bilateral relationship between China and the United States. Once China and the United States move towards conflict, the regional security landscape will remain in a binary confrontation state for a long period of time, with division and confrontation as its main characteristics. In the case of a strategic understanding reached between China and the United States, a diversified regional security landscape with multiple coexisting and mixed forms of interaction such as cooperation, hedging, and competition will further develop.

I. Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region has undergone four major changes: the first was the formation of the Cold War pattern in the 1950s, the second was the change brought about by the reconciliation between China and the United States in the 1970s, the third was the adjustment following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, and the fourth was the impact brought about by China's rapid development and the strategic competition between China and the United States since the second decade of the 21st century. Compared with the previous three rounds, the current changes in the regional security landscape will be more profound and last longer.

After World War II, the United States became the dominant security actor in the Asia-Pacific region and thus also became the main driver of changes in the regional security landscape. The design and adjustment of the United States' Asia-Pacific strategy have driven the changes in the regional security landscape. During the Cold War era, the containment strategy pursued by the United States gave rise to the "radial" alliance system, shaping a binary-polarized security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. This landscape changed in the 1970s due to the improvement of Sino-US relations and came to an end with the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, based on its understanding of the regional security situation, the United States designed and implemented different Asia-Pacific strategies, presenting distinct phased characteristics. The first stage was from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration, where although the United States needed to handle security challenges from both state and non-state actors in the Asia-Pacific region, it did not face major or strategic-level challenges from any opponent. Therefore, the goal of its Asia-Pacific strategy was to maintain its dominant position and shape a regional security environment favorable to itself. The basic strategic posture was "contact plus prevention". The second stage was from the Obama administration to the Biden administration. The United States increasingly clearly regarded China as its "most important and significant security challenge" in the Asia-Pacific region. The goal of its Asia-Pacific strategy focused on responding to China to maintain the United States' dominant position, power advantage, and security interests in the region. The strategic posture presented distinct characteristics of balance, containment, and deterrence.

During these two stages, the strategic environment that the United States faced in the Asia-Pacific region was quite different, and the matching of strategic resources and strategic goals was also not the same. In the first stage, the United States enjoyed significant military superiority and the regional challenges or threats it faced were not severe. The security concerns of its allies were not prominent either. The traditional "radial" alliance system was basically capable of addressing security challenges. However, in the second stage, the United States' military superiority declined, and it faced more severe challenges. The security concerns of its main allies became increasingly prominent. The traditional alliance system was unable to cope with new challenges. Against the backdrop of significant changes in the regional strategic environment and the United States' security strategic goals, the United States' alliance system was also undergoing major adjustments. Structurally, it shifted from the traditional "radial" model to a networked one. In terms of operation mode, it changed from "the United States as the leader and allies as the followers" to a more equal interactive form. The role of allies in regional security became more proactive and prominent. Security partners were more deeply integrated into the alliance system, playing a more important supporting role in the United States' Asia-Pacific strategy.

The current changes in the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region are mainly driven by two factors: On one hand, the changes in the US' Asia-Pacific strategy and the strengthening of its alliance system have intensified strategic competition with China, increasing the risk of regional security fragmentation and the trend towards confrontation. On the other hand, the changes in the power balance among regional security actors and the adjustment of interaction patterns have led to the reconfiguration of security relations and the redistribution of security interests, driving the transformation of the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. During this process, the status and role of Asian countries will become more prominent, while the role of the United States and the way it functions are beginning to undergo significant changes.

In the context where strategic competition towards China has become the core of the US' Asia-Pacific strategy, it is worth continuously monitoring how the strategic posture has changed and how these changes affect the direction of the regional security landscape. Academia has conducted multi-dimensional research on the US' Asia-Pacific strategy / "Indo-Pacific strategy", focusing on the origin, connotation, impact, and China's response of the Obama administration's "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy and the "Indo-Pacific strategy" of the Trump and Biden administrations. These studies analyze the changes in the alliance system as a strategic means, covering various perspectives such as geopolitics, geo-economics, hegemonic theory, and alliance theory, thereby deepening and enriching the understanding of the evolution of the US' Asia-Pacific strategy in the context of strategic competition against China. However, these studies failed to place the US' Asia-Pacific strategy in a longer period (such as from the Obama administration to the Biden administration), through comparison and systematic analysis to reveal the clues and logic of the changes in the US' strategic posture towards China and their logic, which is the key to understanding the evolution of the US' Asia-Pacific strategy. In discussions about the security landscape or order changes in the Asia-Pacific region, some studies examine from perspectives such as power balance, unit interaction, institutional construction, concept shaping, and relationship networks, and note the role of economic factors, but lack an analytical perspective centered on the regional security landscape, and do not conduct more detailed analysis of the characteristics and trends of the changes in the landscape.

This article aims to study the evolution of the US Asia-Pacific strategy under the context of the strategic game between China and the US, as well as the transformation of the regional security landscape. It focuses on three main issues: First, the evolution of the US Asia-Pacific strategy from the Obama administration to the first term of Trump and then to the Biden administration. Although all three presidents regarded China as the main "regional challenge", their strategic concerns and response methods were different. Systematically analyzing and comparing the Asia-Pacific strategies of the three US presidents can more clearly and accurately reveal the changes in their strategic posture. Second, the changes in the US alliance system and their causes. The alliance system is the cornerstone of the US Asia-Pacific strategy, and its changes reflect the transformation of the US role in regional security. Studying the changes in the alliance system helps to better understand the evolution of the US Asia-Pacific strategy and the regional security landscape. Third, the changes in the regional security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. This round of changes is more extensive and profound than previous ones. It is driven by the adjustment of the US Asia-Pacific strategy and also has an impact on the US Asia-Pacific strategy. Revealing the new characteristics of these changes has a distinct value for accurately grasping the direction of regional security landscape. Starting from these issues, this article focuses on exploring the interactive relationship and internal mechanism among the US Asia-Pacific strategy, the alliance network, and the regional security landscape.

 II. The US Asia-Pacific Strategy from the Perspective of Strategic Competition with China

 Generally speaking, the security strategies of the United States mainly have three goals: safeguarding security interests, maintaining military superiority, and promoting international influence. Among these, the security interests of the United States include elements such as domestic security, the security of allies, and maritime navigation security. Military superiority encompasses both the leading position of the United States in overall military capabilities and maintaining a favorable power balance in key regions in its favor. International influence refers to the ability of the United States to shape the world and regional landscapes and influence the international political and economic development trends. In terms of importance or priority order, security interests with purpose attributes rank first; military superiority ranks second, with its instrumental nature being greater than its purpose, and it is the basic means to achieve the goal of interests; international influence ranks third. Although it also has more instrumental nature than purpose, it lacks the fundamental nature compared to military superiority. In terms of value ranking, security interests are the most crucial; military superiority comes second, which is a major interest; international influence is of relatively lower importance among the three.

The security strategy encompasses both the goals to be achieved and the means to achieve them. Both the goals and the means exhibit diversity. The competitive means to address security challenges include three levels: The first level is balance, which mainly refers to the behavior of actors enhancing their own capabilities through internal mobilization or external alliances, creating a favorable power balance in their favor or reducing the power advantage of the opponent, thereby achieving the purpose of restraining the opponent; the second level is containment or suppression, aiming to prevent the growth of the opponent's power and suppress its adoption of actions detrimental to itself; the third level is deterrence, that is, by sending clear signals of threat and retaliation or taking actual military actions, to dissuade the opponent from taking actions that challenge their interests. These three levels of security means show a progressive relationship in terms of degree, and their behavioral postures are different, bringing different impacts to the opponent. 

Historical experience shows that for different interests, the United States will design and employ different means based on its values and attributes. Security interests are purposeful and the most crucial. When security interests are threatened, the United States mainly resorts to means such as containment, deterrence and war, with a prominent element of confrontation and conflict. Military superiority, which combines both instrumental and purposeful elements and is a major interest target, is particularly significant. When military superiority is challenged, the United States often tries its best to contain and suppress its opponents, with a prominent element of competitiveness and confrontation. Although international influence is important, it is not a core interest target. Due to the limited effect of military means, when international influence is weakened, the United States mainly adopts comprehensive measures such as diplomacy, security and economy to counterbalance its opponents, with competitiveness being its main characteristic.

Given China's prominent geopolitical importance in the Asia-Pacific region, the US Asia-Pacific strategy has been largely shaped by its strategy towards China. In the context of regarding China as the main geopolitical rival, the different perceptions of "China's security challenges" by US policymakers have shaped the different situations and characteristics of its Asia-Pacific strategy. From the Obama administration to the first term of Trump and then to the Biden administration, the US Asia-Pacific strategy has always targeted China as its main objective. However, due to the different specific interests of the three presidents, the strategic means adopted by the US also vary. Generally speaking, the Obama administration was concerned about the rise of China's geopolitical influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and its Asia-Pacific strategy had a prominent balancing feature, paying attention to both security factors and diplomatic and economic factors. The first term of Trump was concerned about the growth of China's military power, and its Asia-Pacific strategy focused on suppression and containment, paying more attention to the changes in the balance of power between China and the United States. The Biden administration is more concerned about the "challenge" posed by China to the US' security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, with a strategic posture that emphasizes deterrence, paying attention to both China's military capabilities and its strategic intentions.

III. From the Alliance System to the Network of Alliances

The advancement of the US' Asia-Pacific strategy cannot be achieved without the support of its allies and security partners. At the same time as significant changes occur in the Asia-Pacific strategy, the US' alliance strategy is also undergoing important adjustments. This is not only reflected in the enhanced autonomy and role of allies, but also in the US' efforts to develop more security partners and carry out more substantive cooperation with them. The traditional alliance system is expanding into an alliance network. Given that alliances have the function of constructing international and regional order, the changes in the US' alliance strategy will inevitably affect the direction of the regional security landscape.

(1) The Adjustment of the United States' Asia-Pacific Alliance Strategy after the Cold War

The alliance system established by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region began in the early days of the Cold War and has three important characteristics: First, the alliance relationship was dominated by the United States absolutely. The United States, as the leader of the alliance, determined the form of the alliance, the functions of the alliance, and the obligations of the allies. Second, the alliance obligations were one-way, that is, the United States provided security protection to the allies, while the allies did not have to undertake reciprocal obligations. Third, the structure of the alliance system was relatively simple. In the "hub-and-spoke" system centered on the United States, each ally established bilateral security ties with the leading ally, the United States, but there was a lack of institutionalized security connections among the allies. The United States was the sole center point and node of the system. These characteristics largely originated from the huge power gap between the United States and its allies and were the basic form of the United States' Asia-Pacific alliance relations during the entire Cold War period. 

(2) Networkization and the establishment of a new partnership system 

Another significant change in the US's Asia-Pacific alliance strategy is the networking aspect. The shift in regional power dynamics has made the traditional "hub-and-spoke" structure of bilateral alliances no longer capable of addressing the new geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the rise in the strength, influence, and initiative of some regional members has also given the US new potential for developing an alliance system. The Obama administration has already begun to consciously create network-like security arrangements. During Trump's first term, it was clearly stated that a "networked security framework" should be established in the "Indo-Pacific region". The Biden administration has announced the consolidation and construction of a "resilient security framework" covering allies and security partners in the "Indo-Pacific region". It can be seen that from the Obama administration to the Biden administration, the US has been committed to establishing a new alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region that includes allies and security partners. 

(3) The Impact of Changes in the United States' Asia-Pacific Alliance Strategy 

The changes in the US' Asia-Pacific alliance strategy may bring about two significant consequences: Firstly, the US will enhance the capabilities of its allies and security partners, thereby altering the regional power balance. The relative decline in power advantage and the increase in reliance on allies and security partners mean that the US must support and even promote the capacity-building of relevant countries, enabling them to play a greater role in regional security affairs. In recent years, the US has actively enhanced Japan's missile defense, unmanned aircraft, electronic warfare and information warfare capabilities; helped Australia build nuclear submarines, enhancing Australia's missile, unmanned aircraft and hypersonic weapon capabilities; supported the Philippines in enhancing the maritime military capabilities and maritime law enforcement capabilities of its armed forces and coast guard; improved India's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime situation awareness, air combat and support, weapon and ammunition systems, and mobility capabilities; and strengthened Vietnam's maritime situation awareness capabilities and the law enforcement capabilities of the Vietnamese maritime self-defense force. The empowerment of the US' allies and security partners is bound to have a significant impact on the regional power balance. Secondly, the US' Asia-Pacific strategy is shifting from a dominant strategy to a balanced strategy. After World War II, the US has maintained a strong military presence in the Asia-Pacific region to gain a power advantage over its rivals. However, in the context of the changing regional power balance between China and the US, the goal of the US' Asia-Pacific strategy is now shifting to preventing the opponent from obtaining a power advantage in the Western Pacific, and maintaining a balance has become a new feature of the US' Asia-Pacific strategy. Compared with the dominant strategy, the balanced strategy means being more sensitive to the development of the opponent's military capabilities and changes in military situations, focusing on formulating one's own countermeasures accordingly, and requiring the US to further mobilize the resources of allies and security partners to effectively contain and weaken the opponent.

IV. The Trend of Security Landscape in the Asia-Pacific Region

The regional security landscape refers to the distribution and interaction structure of the main security forces within a region, reflecting the power balance among the main security actors and their interaction states. The changes in the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region are driven by the changes in the power balance within the region and shaped by the interaction patterns among the actors. In the 1950s, the Asia-Pacific region formed a Cold War security landscape characterized by a binary power structure and confrontation. In this landscape, the United States and the Soviet Union held dominant positions, and Asian countries largely demonstrated an appendage-like nature. In the 1970s, with the changes in the Sino-US-Soviet triangular relationship, a ternary power structure emerged, and confrontation and coordination became the main characteristics of the interaction among the actors. In this landscape, the importance of China became increasingly prominent. After the end of the Cold War, the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region developed towards a multi-power structure, with the interaction among the main actors presenting non-confrontational and cooperative characteristics. The dominant position of the United States began to decline, and the role of China and other Asian actors became more prominent. Since the second decade of the 21st century, the rapid development of China, the adjustment of the US Asia-Pacific strategy, and the reactions of relevant countries to these changes are driving a new round of profound changes in the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. From the perspective of power distribution, the diversified characteristics of the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific region have become increasingly evident. The United States remains the most significant actor, but its power advantage has been gradually weakening, and its dominant ability over the regional security situation has declined. In recent years, China's defense modernization construction has made significant progress and will continue to advance steadily. Corresponding to the growth in capabilities, China's maritime power projection capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region have significantly enhanced. The power distribution pattern of the United States maintaining its maritime hegemony and China being limited to a land power has been changing. Apart from the two most significant actors, Japan is vigorously developing its military capabilities, expanding its security ties with regional members, and substantially enhancing its influence on the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Southeast Asian countries, although having limited military strength, have seen the importance of ASEAN's geopolitical strategy increasing under the background of the strategic game between China and the United States. Due to generally adhering to not taking sides, ASEAN's balance of power gives it unique influence and also becomes an important actor in regional security. North Korea is steadily developing its strategic forces, thereby influencing the security landscape of the sub-region (Northeast Asia). India is seeking to increase its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, aiming to influence the regional security landscape through strengthening "Indo-Pacific" interaction. 

V. Conclusion

Since the 1950s, the security pattern in the Asia-Pacific region has undergone major changes approximately every 20 years. The Cold War pattern formed in the early 1950s lasted for about 20 years. By the early 1970s, due to the easing of Sino-US relations, it transformed from a bipolar confrontation to a "big triangle" structure. In the past 20 years, the end of the Cold War dissolved the Cold War structure in the Asia-Pacific region (with the exception of the Korean Peninsula), significantly improving the regional security situation. Most members of the Asia-Pacific region enjoyed the benefits of the post-Cold War era, and there was remarkable progress in regional economic growth and cooperation. However, about another 20 years later, with the changes in the US' Asia-Pacific strategy and the intensification of the strategic game between China and the United States, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region became tighter, and the security pattern entered a new transition period. If the two pattern changes in the 1970s and 1990s released geopolitical tensions and brought positive impacts to regional security, then this round of pattern adjustment was accompanied by an increase in geopolitical tensions and an increase in security risks, bringing more negative impacts to the regional security situation.（Author:‌ Wu Xinbo, Professor and Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University）

（Translated by AI with some revisions）