Open Regionalism and the Future of China-U.S. Relations

At this new historical stage, the trajectory of China-U.S. relations demonstrates unprecedented uncertainties. Although the San Francisco summit, where leaders from both countries convened, has achieved significant consensus and improvement plans to stabilize this relationship, international observers remain ambivalent. Most analysts believe that the structural contradictions between the two sides will result in a transformation of China-U.S. relations characterized by intense competition and conflict, posing more risks than opportunities. The future of China-U.S. relations  not only affects the development and stability of both countries but also involves global peace and prosperity. In recent years, as the U.S. increasingly emphasizes great power competition over global cooperation, the resulting shift has cast a shadow over global peace and development and mired the international multilateral governance system in difficulties and inefficiencies. In this context, regional multilateral cooperation has naturally emerged as the alternative platform to underpin economic globalization. The interactions between China and the U.S. in regional multilateral cooperation are pivotal to the transformation of bilateral relations and international order. At present, the U.S. and other Western countries, with their technological and capital advantages, continue to drive the ebb of globalism and focus on friendshoring and industry and technology alliances. In contrast, China and other emerging economies have been behind the emergence of cross-regional cooperation mechanisms, which represent a more progressive, open, and inclusive form of new regionalism. The intertwined of evolution and growth of those two regionalisms may server as the basic clue of and manifestations of the future transformation of the international order. That is a major issue which is worthy of continuing attention and research.

Outlook After the San Francisco Meeting

On November 15, 2023, the China-U.S. Summit took place in San Francisco, where Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden conducted candid and in-depth exchanges on strategic, overarching, and fundamental issues concerning China-U.S. relations, as well as critial matters related to world peace and development. This summit sent a positive signal of détente between the two countries to the world. Both sides expressed intentions for further cooperation, clarified bottom lines in managing bilateral relations, and restored or established certain bilateral dialogue mechanisms with a special focus on setting up ad hoc bilateral working groups on artificial intelligence governance and counternarcotics cooperation. As China and the U.S. are global major powers, the summit between both leaders not only plays a crucial role in navigating bilateral relations but also has a significant impact on the evolution of the global political and economic landscape, as well as on the course of global peace and development.

However, it must also be noted that the multidimensional challenges confronting China-U.S. relations cannot be completely resolved through a single leadership summit. First and foremost, China is quickly catching up the U.S. in economy and market size, technology innovation, defense capabilities, and talent competitiveness. As China is striding out for advance manufacturing, it is inevitable for the U.S. to worry about whether it can maintain its comprehensive advantage, leading to extreme and distorted views on China. Secondly, internal governance failures in the U.S., including severe income inequality, frequent class and racial conflicts, and  escalating social tensions, have led to political polarism and partisan strife. Thus, the label of “strategic competition with China” has become the sole bipartisan consensus and served as a strong excuse for many interest groups, including the military-industrial complex, to vie for a share of the federal budget pie. Consequently, anti-China sentiment has permeated the U.S.. President Xi Jinping emphasized during his visit to San Francisco that the focus of China-U.S. relations should be shifted to the grassroots and the public by vigorously promoting people-to-people exchanges and interactions. That decision is pertinent and reflects strategic foresight. Furthermore, the world order is in a period of accelerated transformation, characterized by increasing multiploidization and significant decline of the U.S.’s unipolar hegemony. On one hand, various countries (including the European powers which are also part of the West) are seeking to utilize international contradictions and create opportunities for ascent, which undoubtedly further exposes the limitations and dysfunction of the existing rules and order. However, the U.S. is adopting various negative and adverse actions, including trade unilateralism, which will accelerate the “destabilization of the global alliances and institutions that it spent seven decades building.” On the other hand, as the only two super-economies with over 10 trillion U.S. dollars, China and the U.S. need to prioritize the stability of the existing international system to the greatest extent before pushing for pragmatic reforms of the system. At the same time, the two countries also bear significant responsibilities for issues of global governance such as public health crises, climate change, counterterrorism, and financial stability. However, the “America-first” approach is the core of America’s hegemonic diplomacy. Populist and extreme conservative forces in the U.S. will continue to override its debates on diplomacy. The rest of the world is concerned that if Trump wins in the 2024 election, the U.S. may once again retreat from the global and multilateral mechanisms. In comparison, China always grasps its interests based on the balance between international and domestic affairs, overcome temporary and sporadic issues as well as ideological disputes. China also adheres to its fundamental policies of opening up and promoting economic globalization. Its policies exhibit continuity, consistency, and predictability. President Xi Jinping noted that on leading global response to outstanding challenges, “China-U.S. cooperation may not solve all problems, but few problems can be solved without it.” China does hope to work with America on continuing globalization. However, if the U.S. insists on tapering its cooperation with China on global issues, China can do little to restore the cooperation despite its good intentions.

The Future Landscape of Competition and Cooperation between China and the U.S.

As mentioned above, the “China growth” has objectively altered the existing paradigm of China-U.S. relations. A significant aspect of “cognitive variables” which must be mentioned is the shift in America’s perception of China—from “a regional power” and a future global power (from Nixon’s speech in Kansas in 1971) to the only competitor with “both the intent and the power” to reshape the U.S.-led global order. Indeed, China acknowledges that it has inadvertently stepped into the center of the world stage. As a result, Washington is determined to launch what it calls “strategic competition” with China at any cost, not only by taking stringent measures in trade, investment, finance, technology, talent, academia, society, defense, security, and cyberspace in an attempt to sever existing exchanges between the two countries but also by speeding up the establishment of political, economic, technological, and security alliances and networks so as to contain China’s development. Consequently, intense regional competition between China and the U.S. has undoubtly emerged in following areas. Firstly, as a latercomer and a traditional continental power, China faces intractable historical challenges in its geostrategic environment. Consequently, Washington, driven by its strategic needs towards China, adjusts its stance by exploiting the contradictions between China and its neighboring countries and instigate crises. America has overtly supported countries like India and the Philippines in contriving land and maritime territorial disputes with China. Secondly, the U.S. masterminds exclusiveness in other regions of the world, forcing relevant countries to pick sides and undermining China’s efforts to cooperate with those countries for mutual benefits. Instances in recent years are Lithuania’s withdrawal from the “17+1” cooperation mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and Italy being forced not to renew the BRI cooperation agreement. Thirdly, beyond strengthening existing alliances like the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (comprising the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), the U.S. has established new multilateral alliance mechanisms such as AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.) and QUAD (U.S., Japan, India, Australia). It even attempts to transform NATO, originally a regional defense organization in Europe, into a strategic deterrent force capable of assisting in East Asia. Recent NATO summit communiqués have repeatedly stated that China poses challenges to its interests, security, and values. With Japan’s instigation, NATO once planned to set up a liaison office in Tokyo, taking a tentative step toward its “Indo-Pacific pivot”.

China’s practice of regionalism is synchronous with and complementary to its long-standing international strategy of peaceful development. As early as the onset of the Cold War, in order to safeguard its security and elevate its international political status, China united with numerous developing countries that had gained independence from colonial rule. It dedicated itself to “intermediate zones” diplomacy which transcended the superpower rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It planted the seeds of friendship and mutual assistance in the Asia-Africa-Latin America regions, supporting and participating in regional and cross-regional cooperation mechanisms intended for collective development among Asian and African nations. Later on, China maintained interactions through economic, cultural, or quasi-official channels with capitalist countries such as Japan, the UK, France, and Germany, and formally established diplomatic relations with the precursor to the European Union, the European Economic Community, in 1975. Since the onset of reform and opening-up, the neighborhood has been the priority and developing countries the foundation of China’s diplomacy. With the rapid growth of national strength and experience of multilateralism practice, especially after joining the World Trade Organization at the beginning of the 21st century, China’s willingness and actions to advocate and build comprehensive regional cooperative mechanisms became more prominent. From the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “BRICS plus” Mechanism, China-ASEAN (10+1) Cooperation Mechanism, China-Central and Eastern European Countries 17+1 cooperation mechanism, China-EU Summit, China-Central Asia Summit, China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit, China-Arab States Summit, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China-CELAC Forum, to participating in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the forthcoming application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), this extended list of achievements showcases China’s positive stance and diligent practice in open regionalism. It is noteworthy that the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), after a decade of development amid challenges, spans across Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America and reaches across the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Sea, and Black Sea. It serves as a major cross-regional development cooperation platform benefiting over 140 member countries.

When comparing regionalism between China and the United States, several key differences emerge:

Firstly, the concept and practice of regionalism in China are continuously informed by a clear strategic focus and moral foundation. China has been committed to its status as a developing country and a socialist major power, and thus it values the principle of equality, mutual benefit, and shared development in advancing regional cooperation. The international cooperation under the BRI continuously expands and tightens its circle of friends and network of partners. This success lies not only in China’s deep political mutual trust and economic complementarity with the developing countries and regions, but also in BRI’s guiding principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits, which resonate with progressive ideals and moral appeal. In contrast, the United States’ regionalism concepts and practices have evolved from mercantilism to liberalism, then to neoliberalism, and lately to the “New Washington Consensus”. Regardless of these shifts, the essence remains focused on “America First” and a sense of exceptionalism. Therefore, America’s regionalism cannot escape its utilitarian, unequal, and exclusive characteristics.

Secondly, the China’s regionalism development process involves learning, adapting, and creating inclusive multilateralism. To be inclusive is to acknowledge the diversity of partners, to properly address the variety according to their developmental levels, capabilities, and demands, and to manage changes and risks that arise during cooperation. As such, China succeeds in demonstrating the characteristics of a major country, such as strategic patience, responsibility, and pragmatic flexibility, in terms of the paths, standards, and timelines in regional cooperation. However, the American approach, largely due to its hegemonic nature and the limitations of its political system, is characterized by prioritizing leadership over consultation, setting high entry barriers with weak differentiation, favoring coercion over gradual progress, and prioritizing domestic laws over international agreements. Consequently, those attributes lead to a regional cooperation policy that is assertive, volatile, and lacks sustainability, which has significantly affected its credibility in international cooperation.

Thirdly, China’s ultimate goal in promoting regionalism aligns with the open nature of economic globalization. Its regionalism operates as a dual-directional process that involves both bottom-up and top-down interactions, with clear demand-driven, problem-oriented, and continuous expansion characteristics. For instance, the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Economic Cooperation machanism established in 1992 initially focused on resource sharing and development in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin. Over time, it has gradually expanded to cooperation among the six river basin countries in drug control, combating smuggling, transnational organized crime, and telecommunication fraud. Various regional, sub-regional, and cross-regional cooperation mechanisms between China and foreign countries including the BRI universally extend to multi-level, wide-ranging, and multi-actor cooperation. They focus on promoting policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. In contrast, whether it is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) or the Blue Dot Network infrastructure investment plan, the United States exhibits a strong motive of bloc confrontation and coterie culture. Through “high-standard” infrastructure aid to key regions of American interests and targeted countries, the U.S. aims to disrupt the strategic layout of the BRI. However, apart from issues such as outdated infrastructure and rising government debt, America’s actual capacity in specialized equipment, construction, and financing of major infrastructure projects is no match for China’s. The feasibility of these plans remains questionable. 

Like the ocean, economic globalization is in ebb and flow. As globalization retracts, regionalism, as the intermediary layer between nations and global development, inevitably serves as a special platform in connecting and continuing international cooperation during this special period. It lays the foundation for the rise of a new type of globalization. China and the U.S. have cultivated their distinctive characteristics and traditions through their long-term practices in regionalization. The ongoing strategic competition is undeniably compelling both sides to focus more on the game at the regional level. What important is whose regionalism proposals and practice outcompete the other side on equality, inclusiveness, and openness. President Xi Jinping has said that China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other global initiatives are open to all countries at all times including the United States. China is also ready to participate in U.S.-proposed multilateral cooperation initiatives. This latest stance rests upon China’s confidence and open-mindedness and serves as a clever response to the U.S. offensive. Although looking forward, the challenges facing China-U.S. relations are unprecedented, if the two regionalism strategies gradually converge towards mutual openness, it could pave a new path for stabilizing and developing that relation. It would also advance the vision of a global village and a community with a shared future for mankind.（Author: Wu Baiyi, Senior Research Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)）