The policy choice of the United States on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and its dilemma

The United States has given full support to Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Biden administration's policy on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is that the war should ultimately be resolved diplomatically; The United States will not demand territorial concessions from Ukraine as part of an eventual peace process; America will not go to war directly; U.S. military aid to Ukraine is meant to help it defend itself and put it in a strong position at the negotiating table. While providing substantial assistance to Ukraine and Europe, the United States has worked with Allies and partners to impose the largest set of sanctions and export controls ever imposed on a major world economy, and has taken concerted action in multilateral institutions to target and isolate Russia.

The consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are already visible: Europe's increased dependence on the U.S. for security; Nuclear weapons have become a deterrent to the West; Profound changes in the energy supply chain; Disruptions in food supply chains have strained global food supplies; Russia's national strength declined as a result of war exhaustion. How long will America's full support for Ukraine last? The issue has become an increasingly high-profile debate in the United States. A number of factors, especially the difference between the United States and NATO's goals for resolving the Ukraine crisis, have left the United States facing a dilemma of policy choices, and domestic strategists have constantly reminded the Biden administration: A prolonged war could ultimately hamper U.S. efforts to prevent the "rise of a new Eurasian hegemony" and interfere with America's global strategy of making the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority.

This paper mainly analyzes the policy objectives of the United States on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, what extreme sanctions it has taken against Russia, what assistance it has given to Ukraine, what consequences of the war so far, and what dilemma the United States is in on the conflict.

1.The policy of the United States on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, Mr. Putin announced that he had decided to take "special military action" in the Donbass region of Ukraine, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict began. Mr. Biden's immediate response was to declare that the United States would not intervene militarily, but would give maximum moral and aid support to Ukraine, and to impose extreme trade and financial sanctions on Russia. On April 24, 2022, US Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin rushed to Kiev to meet with Ukrainian President Zelensky, and on May 1, 2022, the Speaker of the House of Representatives led a delegation of members of Congress to follow, to convey to the world "the United States firmly stands with Ukraine" message.

However, as for the purpose of the US response, it was not until May 31, 2022, that President Biden published an article in the New York Times, which made it clear to the outside world for the first time. "America's goal is clear: We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine that is able to deter and defend itself from further aggression," Mr. Biden said in the article. To that end, "we moved quickly to send a significant amount of arms and ammunition to Ukraine to enable it to fight on the battlefield and to be in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table." Biden said the United States will continue to work with its allies and partners to impose the toughest sanctions ever imposed on a major economy. The supply of advanced weapons to Ukraine will continue. U.S. will provide billions of dollars more in financial assistance as authorized by Congress; will continue to strengthen NATO's eastern flank with the forces and capabilities of the United States and other Allies; efforts will be made to resolve the global food crisis that is worsening as a result of Russian aggression; will help its European Allies and others reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels.

Biden said that while the United States disagrees with Putin, "the United States is not trying to remove him from power in Moscow." As long as the United States or our Allies are not attacked, we will not be directly involved in this conflict." At the same time, the U.S. principle is "Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine" and the United States will not privately or publicly pressure the Ukrainian government to make territorial concessions." "The United States will continue to work to strengthen Ukraine and support its efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict."

"If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other potential aggressors that they can seize territory and subdue other countries," Biden said. This will endanger the survival of other peaceful democracies. It could mark the end of the rules based international order and open the door to aggression elsewhere, with disastrous consequences for the whole world." In conclusion, Biden was clear: "The use of nuclear weapons on any scale in this conflict is completely unacceptable to us and to the rest of the world and would lead to serious consequences."

In short, the gist of Mr. Biden's statement was this: wars are ultimately to be resolved diplomatically; The United States will not pressure Ukraine, privately or publicly, to make any territorial concessions as part of an eventual peace process. U.S. military aid is intended to help the Ukrainians defend themselves and put them in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table. The United States' goal is to provide Ukraine with the means to deter and defend against further aggression by providing Ukraine with higher-performance defensive weapons. William Taylor, a former acting U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, said the article spelled out U.S. interests and goals.

Biden's statements and administration statements, as well as those of other senior administration officials, represent a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward Russia. After Obama took office, in 2009, he launched a signal to Russia to "reset" US-Russia relations, and the two sides soon signed a memorandum of understanding on further reducing and limiting offensive strategic weapons. Signed an inter-governmental agreement on the transit of arms, armaments, materiel and personnel from Russia for the United States military's participation in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan; A bilateral Cooperation and Development Committee has been established to guide and coordinate bilateral cooperation in various fields. The two sides also signed the Third Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty, known as the Prague Treaty, in April 2010, establishing a new relationship between the United States and Russia in the field of nuclear strategy. However, the Obama administration eventually abandoned efforts to reset relations with Russia because of Russia's actions in Crimea in 2014. The United States announced a series of sanctions against Russia's defense, financial and energy sectors, including the country's largest bank.

During the Trump administration and the first year of the Biden administration, although the United States began to view Russia as a strategic competitor second only to China, its policy toward Russia remained one of managing competition and limiting confrontation, as the United States needed to focus greater attention on China and Iran. As the United States ratchets up sanctions on Iran, the United States acquiesces to Russia's supply of global energy, even if it means that Russia can increase its influence because it is more important for the United States to enlist Russia as a partner in containing China's rise. That is why, for 30 years before the conflict, U.S. policy toward Russia had oscillated between maintaining communication with Russia on major international issues and preventing Russia from undermining U.S. interests in Europe and the Middle East. During this period, the US policy towards Russia has changed from compromise to confrontation. For example, Obama "reset" the US-Russia relationship in 2009, and after 2014, "continue to adhere to the position of cooperation with Russia, but confront Russia in areas where the two countries have different opinions"; In the Trump era, important official documents such as the 2017 National Security Strategy Report, the 2018 National Defense Strategy Report, and the Nuclear Posture Review clearly listed Russia as the main realistic threat and strategic competitor to US national security, stressing that it "runs counter to the values and interests of the United States" and "seeks to restore its great power status." Nevertheless, the United States has not completely abandoned contact with Russia, but still advocates continuing to seek contact and cooperation with Russia in some areas, and hopes that through contact, Russia will have some changes in the future that are conducive to American interests.

Prior to the conflict, the tone of U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine was to balance closer ties between Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic bloc with a cooperative relationship and Ukraine -Russia cooperation. However, Putin's "special military operation" against Ukraine has ended the debate in the US about Russia policy. The U.S. policy signal is clear: The United States no longer sees the possibility of advancing cooperation with Russia on any agenda; At least under Putin. Instead, the United States began to fight Russia through economic sanctions and trade policies, finance, and direct military support for Ukraine. As part of an overall U.S. strategy to weaken Russia's capabilities, support for Ukraine has become critical. In the aftermath of the conflict with Ukraine, US policy focused on expelling Russia from the ranks of great powers. At this point, it is more important for American policymakers to weaken Russia's capabilities than to prevent closer cooperation between Russia and China, because China's economic development may be boosted by greater access to low-cost natural resources from Russia in terms of great power strategy, but a long-term decline in Russia's national strength, Will reduce the level of support that China is likely to receive from its partnership with Russia.

Ukraine is now a central priority of US strategy, no longer subordinate to US-Russia relations. It is worth noting that, in addition to reducing Russia's overall national strength, there has been an expectation in the US strategic community to support the establishment of Ukraine as a 21st century front-line state, designed to counter Russia and transform it into a role similar to that of South Korea, Taiwan, or Israel. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently proposed a "three lighthouses" related strategy, saying, "The United States must help build three lighthouses of freedom. These lighthouses should be concentrated in countries with great conflicts: Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. They can become the center of a new security architecture connecting the global alliance of free nations, strengthening the strength of each member, and linking the three bastions to NATO, which the new expanded Indo-Pacific security framework will form." While the Biden administration is not necessarily directly influenced by Pompeo's advocacy, Ukraine does have the potential to become a pillar of the Eastern bulwark of the Euro-Atlantic world (as Israel is to the Middle East and Taiwan is to East Asia). The United States has cultivated the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Quartet, the U.S.-British-Australia trilateral security alliance, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and is trying to build a network of partnerships with countries that share common values and connect the Indo-Pacific region with the Euro-Atlantic region, with Ukraine identified as an important part of this effort. This would allow Ukraine to play a more prominent role in geopolitics, making it part of efforts by the United States and its Allies to contain the Chinese challenge.

2.U.S. assistance to Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine conflict

After the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the United States quickly came to Ukraine's aid, providing a large amount of military, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and its EU neighbors.

On February 27, 2022, three days after Russia launched "special military operations," the U.S. Department of Defense made a list of weapons and equipment it promised to supply to Ukraine. Particularly notable among them is the delivery of 31 M1 Abrams tanks in early 2023 after multiple rounds of negotiations, which President Biden described as "the most powerful tank in the world" with power and performance comparable to Germany's Leopard II tank. At the same time, the United States has formed a Ukrainian Defense Contact Group with European partners and other countries, including Ukraine, to improve coordination on security assistance.

Since Crimea was annexed by Russia in 2014, as of February 3, 2023, the United States has provided about $32 billion in military assistance to Ukraine for equipment and training "to help Ukraine maintain its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO." About $30 billion since January 2021, and about $29.3 billion since Russia started its war in Ukraine, was authorized during the Biden administration. In addition, the United States has shared intelligence such as satellite imagery and analysis to support Ukraine's counteroffensive.

In addition, the United States has made related military deployments, including the deployment of about 18,000 troops to Europe in the spring of 2022 at a cost of $9.6 billion to bolster defenses and deter Russia.The bulk of U.S. military aid to Ukraine comes through three channels:

(1).The President shall withdraw weapons and equipment from existing Department of Defense stocks. As of February 20, 2023, President Biden has provided $19.22 billion in military assistance to Ukraine on 32 separate occasions by drawing defense goods and services from existing stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense.

(2). The U.S. Department of Defense's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiatives(USAI). The USAI is a U.S. authorization for the acquisition of new defense capabilities. For example, on January 25, 2023, the United States announced the purchase of a battalion of M1 Abrams tanks for Ukraine, valued at $400 million. In FY 2022, the program's appropriations include intelligence and logistical support, salaries, materiel, and weapons replacement.

(3). Foreign Military Financing (FMF) under The US Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is approved by the US Department of State. Eligible countries may purchase U.S. defense goods, services, and training through foreign military sales or direct commercial contracts. U.S. arms sales to Ukraine are also conducted through government-to-government sales under the Foreign Military Sales regime. Through January 2023, sales under this system were $595.9 million; From 2015 to 2020, the United States exported more than $274 million in defense goods and services to Ukraine through direct commercial sales.

Since 2014, the Global Security Contingency Fund, a joint program of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, has provided Ukraine with more than $42 million in training, advisory services, and equipment to support the tactical, operational, and institutional capabilities of Special Operations forces, National Guard, and military medical personnel. In addition, the Ministry of Defense provides professional training for Ukrainian military officers under its Security cooperation program, including partner capacity building, institutional capacity building and international military education and training. In April 2022, the United States announced the resumption of the training mission of the Ukraine Joint Multinational Training Group, created in 2015, to train Ukrainian forces outside Ukraine on how to operate U.S. and allied weapons systems.

On April 28, 2022, The United States Congress passed the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022, which President Biden signed into law on May 9, the day of the Victory of the Great Patriotic War. The bill temporarily waives the requirement for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for the President to authorize the U.S. government to "lend or lease defense items to the Government of Ukraine or to the governments of Eastern European countries affected by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine to help strengthen the defense capabilities of those countries to protect their civilian populations from potential or ongoing invasion." The passage of the bill would allow the U.S. government to provide a total of $33 billion in new aid to Ukraine after the initial $3.7 billion. This is only the second time in history that the Lend-Lease Act has been used, after Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act (full name: The Promotion of the Defense of the United States Act) in 1941 during World War II.

According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, as of January 2023, the United States has provided $12 billion in direct budget support to the Ukrainian government to help ease Ukraine's severe budget deficit. The support is aimed at maintaining essential government services, including hospitals, schools and utilities. The United States is second only to the European Union in its commitment to direct budget support, but far ahead of all other countries.

USAID's humanitarian response to Ukraine is focused on five areas: the deployment of Disaster Assistance response teams in Ukraine; Providing vital relief supplies; Responding to urgent needs, including responding to cyber attacks and protecting civil society and independent media; Assistance to displaced refugees; Provide technical support to Ukraine in coordination with the international community.

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as of January 25, 2023, USAID has provided $9.88 billion in development and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. For the 2022 fiscal year, the U.S. Congress approved more than $67 billion in aid to Ukraine.

On March 25, 2022, President Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the creation of a joint U.S.-EU Working group on energy security to diversify EU LNG supplies and reduce imports of Russian gas. At the same time, the United States, in cooperation with the G7 , has capped the price of Russian seaborne crude oil exports at $60 per barrel, and will impose sanctions through changes in maritime transportation insurance policies if they are violated.

3.US sanctions against Russia

The United States sanctions on Russia are the largest sanctions and export control measures ever imposed on a major world economy, including sanctions on individuals and entities, a total blockade of financial institutions, export controls, and the seizure of Russian assets in Ukraine.

As soon as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine broke out, the United States announced sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin and three members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation directly responsible for the "special military operations" : Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and First Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Federation and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Aleksandr Gerasimov. On March 3, 2022, the U.S. State Department placed Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov on the sanctions list, along with 26 individuals and 7 entities supported by Russian intelligence services. The US State Department also announced restrictions on visa issuance to 19 Russian oligarchs and 47 of their family members and close associates.

Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department has sanctioned 22 Russian defense-related companies, primarily targeting entities that develop and produce equipment for the Russian military. The United States also imposed new financing restrictions on 13 state-owned companies that are vital to the Russian economy, including Gazprom, barring them from raising money through American markets.

A few days before Russia's "special military operation" on February 22, 2022, the United States had frozen all assets of two Russian financial institutions related to the US financial system, and on February 28, it cut off the largest Russian bank from the US financial system, and imposed comprehensive blockade sanctions on four other major Russian financial institutions. To date, 10 of Russia's largest financial institutions are under U.S. sanctions aimed at driving Russian capital flight, currency devaluation, rising inflation, higher borrowing costs, and reduced access to global financial markets.

The United States has also imposed export controls on Russia to cut off key Russian industries' access to critical U.S. technology, including semiconductors, telecommunications, lasers, avionics and maritime technology. The measures are aimed at the defense, aviation and maritime industries, which are vital to Russia's long-term strategic interests. The U.S. Commerce Department has imposed export controls on oil and gas extraction equipment that supports Russia's refining capacity. With a large portion of Russian government revenue coming from oil and gas sales, the measures would reduce Russia's ability to raise money to support military operations.

According to a February 22, 2023, White House report, over the past year, the United States has imposed or expanded more than 2,000 sanctions lists and 375 export control entities, including major state-owned enterprises and third-country actors that support the Russian war machine. And impose increasingly extensive restrictions on military and industrial products that could support Russia's defense industrial base. In addition, the U.S. Congress revoked Russia's permanent normal trade relations status and privileges in international trade and raised tariffs on hundreds of Russian products imported into the United States.

On March 2, 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice established the "Burglary Operations Task Force" to seize the assets of suspected criminal Russian elites. On March 16, 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Treasury jointly launched the Russian Elite, Agents, and Oligarchs Task Force. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Commission are also members of the working group. The task force is tasked with investigating and prosecuting Putin Allies and seizing their assets, and as of June 2022, it had intercepted or seized more than $30 billion in "illicit assets."

On June 21, 2022, Democratic Representative Cohen of Tennessee introduced the "Use of Oligarch Assets for Ukraine Victory Act." The bill authorizes the Attorney General to use confiscated assets of Russian oligarchs for the reconstruction of Ukraine and is included as an amendment in section 1708 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2023. On December 29, 2022, the Fiscal Year 2023 Omnibus Appropriations Bill was signed into law by Biden.

4. The United States' repression of Russia in multilateral institutions

The United States is working with the European Union and other partners in multilateral institutions to take action against and isolate Russia in international institutions, including the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization, the Group of 20, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

On February 25, 2022, the day after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council demanding that Russia stop the war and withdraw its troops. The United States worked with Ukraine and partner countries to draft a United Nations General Assembly resolution entitled "Promoting Remedies and Reparations for Aggression against Ukraine" that would hold Russia accountable for violations of international law by invading Ukraine, which was passed by a vote of 94 to 14, with 73 abstentions, on November 14. In cooperation with Allies and partner countries, the United States has challenged Russia's candidacy for 2022 in four subsidiary bodies of the UN Economic and Social Council, further isolating Russia on the international stage.

The United States supported the provisional order of the International Court of Justice on March 16, 2022 requiring Russia to stop the invasion, and accused Russia of war crimes on March 23 (neither the United States nor Russia is a party to the ICJ statute). The State Department announced the launch of a new conflict observatory "to capture, analyze, and broadly provide evidence of Russian war crimes and other atrocities in Ukraine." The initiative has an initial funding of $6 million, with future funding coming from the European Democratic Resilience Initiative. In March 2022, the White House announced at least $320 million in funding for the fund. The new conflict Observatory project is part of a series of efforts by the U.S. government at the national and international levels.

The United States joined the European Union and 12 other WTO members in announcing on March 14, 2022 that it would stop granting WTO trade privileges to Russia and stop pushing for Belarus to join the WTO. In addition, the United States has been trying to address the adverse impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on global food security through a range of multilateral institutions, including the United Nations Global Task Force on Food, Energy, and Financial Crises, the G-7 Global Food Security Alliance, and the European Union.

On April 6, 2022, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen proposed at a hearing of the US House Financial Services Committee on the upcoming G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting that Russia should be expelled from the G20 forum and that the United States would boycott some G20 meetings if Russian officials attended. While Russia remains a member of the G20, the declaration issued by G20 leaders after the November 2022 meeting in Bali, Indonesia (attended by Russia's foreign minister), expressed the strong condemnation of the war by the majority of G20 members, as well as differing opinions on the situation and sanctions.

The United States has actively coordinated NATO's collective response to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, deploying more troops in Europe while making clear that NATO is not a co-belligerent. On April 26, 2022, the United States announced the formation of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a meeting between the United States and Allies inside and outside NATO that will be held approximately once a month at Ramstein Air Base in Germany to coordinate support for Ukraine's defense capabilities. Under the auspices of the group, in November 2022, the United States, in cooperation with the Netherlands, funded the transfer to Ukraine of 90 overhauled T-72B main battle tanks from the Czech defense industry inventory for a total value of approximately $90 million to further enhance Ukraine's armored combat capabilities.

5.Consequences of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine so far

While it is difficult to predict the outcome of future wars and how they will end, one thing is certain: this war "marks an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international cooperation that made it possible." It threatens not only the stability of Europe, but also global food security and energy security, including in the Middle East and Africa, and will thus profoundly affect future international relations. There are already some signs.

Europe will become more dependent on the US for its security. The war reaffirmed the centrality of the European Union to European security issues and the primacy of the United States, highlighted the indispensable leadership role of the United States as the guarantor of European security, and reawakened NATO Allies to the reality that they can only protect themselves under the American umbrella. For all its plans and ambitions, the EU has failed to achieve strategic autonomy.

The war accelerated NATO's expansion. Finland and Sweden, two countries that had previously refused to join NATO to avoid confrontation with Russia, did not hesitate to join. Unlike some of NATO's other new members, these two countries have relatively strong military forces, and their accession makes the Baltic Sea a de facto "inner lake" of NATO, greatly complicating future Russian defense plans, and tilting the balance of power in Europe decisively toward NATO. Although Ukraine is not yet ready to join NATO, it has taken an important step towards joining the European Union by obtaining candidate status in just three months.

The question of how to deal with the nuclear threat has once again become a focus of discussion within and outside the United States. When Putin announced on March 28, 2023 that Russia was suspending the New START treaty, Western countries had to be wary of Russian cues when making decisions about how to support Ukraine. Biden warned that the risk of nuclear Armageddon was at its highest level in 60 years, since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Since Russia and Ukraine are two of the world's major suppliers of energy commodities, the outbreak of conflict between the two countries has caused many supply disruptions or shortages in both developing and developed countries. Profound changes have taken place in the energy supply chain, the most fundamental of which is that Europe is no longer dependent on Russian gas, and trust between European consumers and their main suppliers has collapsed even after the war. Europe is looking for alternatives to Russia. At the same time, the over-reliance of some countries on China for renewable energy materials has caused concern in Europe and has had a knock-on geopolitical impact. For example, some African countries, such as Mozambique and Nigeria, suddenly find themselves in the West's sights as European countries look to African energy sources for their energy transition.

In order to solve the problem of global energy supply after sanctions against Russia, the United States is willing to renegotiate oil deals with Iran and Venezuela, which it deeply hates. In February 2022, the Biden administration reinstated sanctions waivers for Iran, allowing countries to cooperate with Iran on its civilian nuclear program. The Biden administration has been discussing the framework of a new nuclear deal with Iran since January 2023. In addition, previous U.S. administrations have severely sanctioned the Venezuelan government and restricted Venezuela's oil exports to the United States. But with global energy markets roiled by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Biden administration immediately sent a high-level U.S. delegation to Venezuela, where Washington could ease sanctions and allow U.S. oil producers to resume operations.

Russia has always been a major supplier of natural gas, even during the Cold War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the nuclear crisis of the 1980s. However, Europe's current policies will likely weaken the effectiveness of Russia's energy weapons, despite the huge costs to Europe of replacing Russian oil and gas with other energy sources.

During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia had short-term gains through high oil prices, with oil and gas revenues increasing by 28% compared to the pre-war period. But with pipelines to Europe currently idle, Russia has to look further afield for new customers to avoid asset shelving and further economic deterioration. It has already had some success: China and India are now Russia's largest oil importers, and on February 4, 2022, China and Russia signed a second 30-year gas supply agreement. Global energy markets have undergone fundamental changes with new agreements, increased supply of renewable energy, and changes and vulnerabilities in global energy supply chains.

Since Russia and Ukraine are both major global exporters of grain and fertilizer, the war has disrupted the global food chain and pushed grain prices to record highs, straining global food supplies. In March 2023, WFP officials said that "the world faces an unprecedented global hunger crisis," with 345 million people in 82 countries facing severe food insecurity. The food and energy crises are linked, with high oil prices pushing up fertilizer prices and transportation costs, which in turn squeeze farmers' profits while raising food prices for consumers.

To be sure, the war has exposed many of Russia's military weaknesses. Western economic sanctions on Russia have been unprecedented in both strength and breadth, leading thousands of foreign companies from Apple to McDonald's to terminate or curtail operations in the country. Combined with the flight of hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens, it is estimated that about $1 trillion has left Russia in the form of "capital flight."

Over time, as Europe's dependence on Russian oil and gas diminishes, Russia's ability to rebuild its military after the war will be further weakened. The impact of war on national power, the change in the balance of power among nations, and the reorganization of international relations will be inevitable.

6.A prolonged war will interfere with the United States' global strategy

It is widely acknowledged that the United States is the biggest beneficiary of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. But American strategic analysts are increasingly aware that a prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict will interfere with America's future global strategy. How long can the US remain the biggest beneficiary? How long can the United States support Ukraine with all its might, short of outright war? These are increasingly high-profile issues of debate in the United States; A number of domestic and foreign factors have also forced US policymakers to confront the problem.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, a Pew Research Center poll of 10,441 American adults conducted in March 2022 found that three weeks after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, nearly half of Americans (47%) approved of the Biden administration's handling of the "Russian invasion." Almost equally divided, 51% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents and 50% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning Democrats see "Russian aggression" as a "major threat" to U.S. interests. Moreover, U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine enjoys bipartisan support on several fronts.

A year into the war, however, American adults are more divided about the war and the government's actions. The share of Americans who see Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a major threat to U.S. interests fell to 35 percent in March 2022 from 50 percent a year earlier, while the share of Republicans who say so fell from 51 percent to 29 percent in January 2023.

In addition, the percentage of Republicans who believe the U.S. is giving too much aid to Ukraine has increased from 9 percent in March 2022 to 17 percent in May 2022, 32 percent in September 2022, and 40 percent in January 2023, which is related to Republicans being less likely to view the war as a major threat to the United States.

It is to be expected that, as the war drags on and drains American resources, the American public's support and patience for the war will wane, as has been the case in the long wars in which the United States has participated in history.

Opposition from center-right Republicans in Congress is also growing. In April 2022, when the use of Lend-Lease against Ukraine was discussed in the US Congress, all 100 senators voted for it, but in the House of Representatives, 10 Republicans voted against it, most of them members of the far-right Freedom Caucus. The situation is still fermenting.

In 2022, Republicans took control of the House of Representatives of the 118th Congress after the midterm elections and sought to reach an agreement in Congress to raise the U.S. federal debt ceiling by June 2023, with the aim of gradually reducing the government's fiscal deficit in the future. Far-right "America First" Republicans want to prioritize spending on illegal immigration at the southern border with Mexico, while President Biden seeks to raise the debt ceiling so that aid to Ukraine can be approved. Therefore, if the Biden administration fails to secure an agreement from Congress in the spring of 2023 to raise the government's debt ceiling for fiscal year 2024, future cuts in U.S. aid to Ukraine are not entirely out of the question.

The limit on the U.S. government's debt ceiling creates competition for different spending items. It takes money to fund semiconductor research and development in companies, money to expand military spending, money to support education and social welfare, money to stop illegal immigration. U.S. aid to Ukraine is now equal to the budgets of the U.S. Departments of Transportation, Labor, and Commerce combined. According to one critic, the Pentagon's budget is riddled with waste, and despite some claims that defense spending creates jobs, data show that spending $1 billion on health care, education, or clean energy can create thousands more jobs than spending $1 billion on defense.

Most of the world refuses to take sides. While many in the West hope that Russia's invasion will rally developing countries in support of a "rules-based order," Asia has largely rejected Western portrayals of the conflict as a struggle between might and justice, said David Brand, director of the Asia Pacific program at Chatham House. While the West has collectively condemned and sanctioned Russia and supported Ukraine, almost the entire southern hemisphere has refused to take sides. Many other countries in the southern hemisphere see Russia as a big country to do business with and accuse the United States of hypocrisy because of its past wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. This makes it difficult for the United States to attract countries in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere to build economic and strategic relationships.

The differences in war goals pose a dilemma for the United States. On the first anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, discussions about how to end the war not only show no one can predict how it will end, but also find that Ukraine's incompatibility with Russia's demands makes the prospect of war largely unpredictable. Neither side will give up the fight when both sides are confident that they have a chance of victory on the battlefield. This has led Western countries to worry that proclaiming Ukraine's interests to be perfectly aligned with those of the West will perpetuate the war by feeding Ukrainian dreams of total victory. And total victory in Ukraine seems elusive to the West. That leaves the United States, which has steadfastly supported Ukraine, with a key question: When and how is it in its interest to end the war?

It is becoming increasingly clear that Ukraine is distancing itself from US and NATO objectives. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said at the Davos meeting on May 15, 2022 that Ukraine should accept to give up some of its territory, reach a peace agreement with Russia, and immediately end the war that has now lasted for three months. Failure to restart negotiations with Russia and continued confrontation with Moscow could have disastrous consequences for Europe's long-term stability. Kissinger's words suggest that such a view exists in the United States, and they drew strong opposition from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Although the Biden administration sees Ukraine as part of its humanitarian cause and as a front-line state in the global war between freedom and tyranny, its practical interests in Ukraine are limited. First, it is in its interest to prevent the conflict from spreading beyond Ukraine, because it does not want to get involved in a direct war with Russia.Second, the United States has always hoped to maintain the opportunity for contact and dialogue between the United States and Russia on major issues of mutual interest (especially arms control) after the war.Third, the United States is very reluctant to push Russia into the position of seeking a permanent alliance with China, because this could lead to the rise of a so-called "true Eurasian hegemony," which would be an even greater tragedy for the United States.To that end, some have suggested that the United States must shift from its laissez-faire approach to the objectives of the war in Ukraine to a policy that creates momentum for both sides to end the war. By the same token, the United States also needs to find a way to restart dialogue with Russia and give it enough inducements to end the conflict.

As the war progressed, the internal divisions of the Western Alliance became clearer. The staunchest support for Ukraine has come from North America and the United Kingdom, Poland and the Baltic states, while the European powers (Germany, France and Italy) have been more cautious. This reflects a clear divergence of interests between the West and Ukraine.

While the Russia-Ukraine conflict has spurred European unity and the revival of NATO, the United States has gradually found that Europe's resolve to do more is weakening, and its long-standing habit of free-riding on security issues is returning. And the coming European recession is likely to exacerbate these trends. In the face of the economic consequences of war, including Western sanctions and Russia's weaponization of energy and food supplies, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain Western unity.

In the view of those American analysts who firmly believe that China is the greatest strategic competitor of the United States, if Europe's dependence on the United States continues, the United States will continue to overuse its capabilities in Europe, and as a result, its ability to effectively check China in Asia will be affected. They argue that a prolonged war would interfere with U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific, which would be a fundamental mistake for U.S. grand strategy. In addition, critics argue that Russia, weakened by the war in Ukraine, could become more dependent on China, while being forced to support Chinese policies in Asia, which would make it harder for the United States to counter China in Asia.

The strategic focus of the United States is still to return to the Asia-Pacific and strengthen strategic competition with China. If the United States becomes deeply entangled in a prolonged conflict in Europe, it will interfere with its overall strategy. America's prolonged focus on the Russia-Ukraine conflict could end up interfering with its goal of preventing "the rise of a new Eurasian hegemony."

To sum up, at a time when the United States and its Allies are trying to slow China's economic growth, limit its geopolitical influence, and prevent its emergence as an equal competitor, a prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict would disrupt America's global strategy of containing China and making the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority. (Author: Zhou Qi, Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Dean of the Institute of Global Governance and Development at Renmin University of China)