The Difference Between Chinese and American Security Order and The Construction of Asian Security Order

Abstract: The construction of the Asian security order is crucial to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The order concepts of China and the United States are key factors influencing the construction of the Asian security order. In terms of the Asian security order concept, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative, while the United States has put forward the "rules-based international order". The differences between the order concepts of China and the United States lie in that the United States advocates unilateral security, while China advocates cooperative security; the United States pursues hegemonic politics, while China pursues Asian consultation; the United States aims to promote camp confrontation, while China aims to build an Asian community with a shared future. Asian countries generally support China's order concept and have doubts about the United States' order concept. Only a few countries such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India support the United States' order concept. Considering the characteristics of the Asian security environment and drawing on the relevant laws of other major powers, China should adhere to the principle of indivisible security when promoting the construction of the Asian security order, strengthen top-level design for "peace" reassurance, comprehensively utilize "economic" and "security" means, continue to promote security through economic development, and increase investment in security resources; meticulously cultivate and gradually advance by region and country, and balance the handling of Russian and American factors.

I. Lack of security order in Asia and strategic competition among major powers

The term "order" derives primarily from discussions in sociology and political science and refers to the existence of stable patterns of behavior that enable people to confidently expect cooperation from others. It can be seen that the so-called Asian security order is the mode and state of stable security behavior in Asia through relevant institutional arrangements. On this basis, the so-called concept of Asian security order is the concept aimed at Asian security order.

Unlike Europe and North America, the regional security order in Asia has not been established since the Second World War, and is in a state of obvious lack. The current security situation is mainly manifested in the unstable security situation, and the Korean nuclear issue is not only unresolved, but also continues to ferment. In terms of institutional arrangements, there are 14 multilateral mechanisms in Asia, mainly focusing on economy, society and culture, while only the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization focus on security. The ASEAN Regional Forum is too broad and loose in terms of mechanisms, topics and participating countries, and has increasingly become a "talking shop". Although the SCO has gradually expanded its membership in recent years, its sphere of influence has mainly focused on Central Asia. On 4 July 2023, the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization issued a declaration, which clearly stressed that Central Asia is the "core area" of the SCO. The main reasons for the lack of security order in Asia are the confrontation between blocs during the Cold War, hegemonism and anti-hegemonic struggle today, great power competition, and the lack of widely accepted leadership in the region. For a long time after World War II, the Asian order was affected by the Cold War pattern and divided into two hostile camps. The United States and the Soviet Union did not make concessions to each other, and there were influential middle ground countries such as China and India between them. Since the end of the Cold War, US leadership in Asian security matters has increased, but this is mainly reflected in its Allies, especially in the security alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. In this sense, Zheng  Yongnian argues, "The Asian order we are experiencing is not so much an Asian order as an extension of the Western (first European, then American) order in Asia." China has never accepted the legitimacy of US dominance in Asian security affairs, let alone the copying of the Western order in the region. In the final analysis, it is up to the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, to handle the problems of Asia and to maintain the security of Asia.

Great power competition leads to the lack of security order in the region, and at the same time, the lack of security order in the region directly promotes the intensification of strategic competition among great powers. The United States is exerting military pressure on China by stepping up its weapons upgrades in the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, as well as through joint military exercises and scheduled visits. The United States has also formed security oppression against China through the US-Japan-ROK security cooperation, the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the US-UK-Australia trilateral security partnership, and US-Japan-Philippines security cooperation. The United States has also secured economic cooperation, enticing neighboring countries to leave the China-centered regional value chain under the pretext of "economic security," and using its temporary advantages over China in the field of high-end technology, inducing Japan, South Korea and other countries to block China's technology, and forming a chip quartet alliance. Moreover, the United States is also creating a confrontation of values by holding the so-called "Global democracy Summit" in 2021 and 2023, and pushing South Korea to hold the third "Global Democracy Summit" in 2024.

At present, China is committed to the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. To this end, it is of Paramount importance to promote the building of a security order in Asia. This will not only ease the strategic competition among major powers in the region, but also serve the purpose of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Scholars at home and abroad generally point out the significance of regional order construction for the rise of great powers, "To achieve real success, a great power must be able to promote a stable international order to a certain extent", "the most important symbol of a country's successful rise is to build an international order dominated by itself". Historically, any rising power has reshaped one or more regional orders to varying degrees. For China, it must first be able to lead the transformation and construction of the security order in Asia before it can lead the transformation and construction of the global security order. From the perspective of security, Asia has the most direct impact on China's security environment, involving China's borders and frontiers, and having a direct impact on China's sovereignty security and homeland security. China's security pressure in the new era is mainly concentrated in Asia, and China's security resources are also limited. Taking the defense budget as an example, China's defense budget in 2024 is about 234.7 billion US dollars, which is only 26.5% of the US defense budget of 886 billion US dollars in the same period. China's regional security order building should focus on Asia.

Concept is the guide to practice. To build a security order in Asia and promote stability in the security situation in Asia, we need to carefully analyze the concept of order of relevant countries in the region, especially the concept of order of major powers. Major powers played a core role in the establishment of international and regional order in the past, and the most central force in the establishment of Asian security order in the future will remain major powers. To this end, some scholars have analyzed that the essential cause of the "neighborhood dilemma" between China and India lies in the competition between the two rising powers for the dominance of the regional order, and the fundamental way out of the dilemma lies in reshaping the regional order by constructing the "double triangle" regional order. Some scholars have analyzed the competition between China and Japan for the regional order, pointing out that Japan's core purpose is to "defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from the destruction of the challenger China, so that Japan will improve its own defense capabilities and strengthen the Japan-US alliance, while trying to plant Japanese ideas to guide the regional order in the direction of Japan."

Nevertheless, the future direction of the Asian security order depends largely on the interaction between China and the United States. On the one hand, regional powers such as Japan and India are more likely to take sides in the Sino-US competition and play little independent role. In April 2024, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pointed out in a speech to the US Congress that "the United States is not alone in shaping the Indo-Pacific order, and Japan will stand firmly with the United States" and openly stand with the United States. In his speech to the US Congress in June 2023, Indian Prime Minister Modi pointed out that "the world urgently needs a rules-based order, and in order to achieve this purpose, India will stand at the forefront with the United States as a partner", clearly expressing the intention to stand with the United States. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the competition between China and the United States has intensified, and the United States strategically attaches particular importance to the use of security means in Asia to increase pressure on China. In May 2022, US Secretary of State Blinken pointed out in his report "US Policy towards China" that "China is a negative factor for the stability of today's international order", "China is the only country that not only has the intention, but also the ability to reshape the international order", and then stressed "how the United States and the international community should work together to defend the current international order". The main concern of the US strategic community about China lies in the so-called "what is the goal of a China with growing military strength in regional security?" To this end, the United States also uses its Monroe Doctrine as a reference, hyping China's goal is "as a rising country needs' sphere of influence 'and' backyard '" and" China wants to dominate the Asian order in terms of security." At the same time, the United States is constantly hyping the possibility of China's use of force, believing that China is changing its policy of peaceful rise, especially that it is very likely to use force against Taiwan in the next five years, and the basis given by the United States is very far-fetched, such as China's abandoning the policy of "resolving the Taiwan issue with a view to the future", vigorously improving military technology, and frequent visits by leaders to relevant military departments. The fundamental purpose of the United States is to frighten Asian countries and isolate China, so as to take the lead in shaping the Asian security order.

It can be seen that the future direction of the Asian security order mainly depends on the interaction between China and the United States, which not only depends on the development of the power transfer between the two countries, but also depends on which view of the order between the two countries is more attractive. In view of this, the core issue of this paper is the differences between China and the United States on the security order in Asia and the attitudes of relevant countries in the region. On this basis, it points out the direction of building the security order in Asia in the future. The research method mainly adopts the combination of comparative analysis and case analysis, text analysis and historical context analysis, aiming at providing strong surrounding environment support for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Ⅱ. The Differences Between China and the U.S. in Their Views on Security Order

(1)The proposal of the China-U.S. concept of order

On April 21, 2022, President Xi jinping delivered at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference pointed out that "in order to promote the security of the world, China is willing to put forward a global security initiative: we should adhere to the common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and jointly safeguard world peace and security", which is the first time that China put forward a global security initiative. In October 2022, the report of the Party's 20th National Congress stated: "China has proposed the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, and is willing to work with the international community to implement it," This indicates that the proposal of the Global Security Initiative not only stays on the concept of propaganda, but will gradually promote the implementation, which not only provides a way to promote the construction of the global security order, but also provides China with options for the construction of the Asian security order.

With regard to the connotation of the Global Security Initiative, President Xi has pointed out "six must adhere to": Adhere to the common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security view; Adhere to respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs; Adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; to take seriously the legitimate security concerns of all countries and upholding the principle of indivisibility of security; To resolve differences and disputes among countries peacefully through dialogue and consultation; to maintain security in both traditional and non-traditional fields in a coordinated manner. These connotations have been reflected to varying degrees in China's previous foreign policies. In January 2017, China issued a white paper entitled "China's Policy on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation", which elaborated on China's policies and propositions on Asia-Pacific security cooperation, Asia-Pacific security concepts, and positions and propositions on regional hotspot issues.

In terms of the direction of the Asian security order, the US government most often refers to the "rules-based international order". On March 18, 2021, at the first China-US high-level Strategic Dialogue after the Biden administration took office, US Secretary of State Blinken pointed out that "the Biden administration is committed to safeguarding the interests of the United States and strengthening the rules-based international order." On October 12, 2022, in the National Security Strategy Report released by the Biden Administration, the United States stated five principles of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the first of which is that "the United States will support and strengthen partnerships with countries that adhere to the rules-based international order." At the same time, the most frequently cited claim of the United States in Asia is "freedom of navigation" which is along with "maintaining, training, and equipping naval forces" and "deterrence of aggression", is regarded by the United States as one of the three fundamental missions of the Navy.

In order to achieve the above goals, the US government often mentions the strategic measure is to work with like-minded countries to maintain regional order and deal with the so-called "China challenge". The important documents issued by the US government have repeatedly made it clear that it does not advocate the establishment of an Asian version of NATO in the security field, but will cooperate with like-minded countries. To this end, the United States frequently encourages relevant countries to also call for freedom of navigation, and holds joint military exercises with Allies and relevant countries to carry out so-called "safeguarding" freedom of navigation operations, especially relying on "small multilateral mechanisms", such as US-Japan-ROK cooperation, US-Japan-Philippines cooperation and so on. Under the influence of the United States, some countries have also begun to prefer small multilateral mechanisms. For example, on March 1, 2023, then-Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi skipped the G20 Foreign Ministers' meeting held in New Delhi, India, under the pretext of attending the Senate Budget Committee. However, on March 2, when the budget meeting was still being held, he left for New Delhi, India, to attend the foreign ministers' meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, showing that he ignored the G20 and attached importance to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

(2)Differences in the views of order between China and the United States

It can be seen from the above that there are obvious differences between China and the United States in the view of security order. First, the difference between unilateral security and cooperative security. Different from the "might makes right" in dealing with international relations in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, after World War II, all countries began to emphasize that cooperation between countries should be based on multilateral mechanisms and rules, which is the background of the emergence of "rules-based international order". China has never stated that it does not abide by the rules-based international order. The key question is what kind of "order" is to be observed. The so-called "order" of the United States is obviously the so-called "liberal international order", which was established on the basis of the victory of the United States after the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War. It is based on the values of democracy, freedom and human rights of the United States, and advocates the development model of Western capitalism. In treating countries with other development modes with a condescending attitude, they often use human rights, economic sanctions and even force to suppress and change, with the purpose of trying to realize the domination of the Western liberal international order, maintain the leadership position of the United States and realize unilateral security. In October 2021, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Geng Shuang clearly pointed out the hypocrisy of the United States at the Legal Committee of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly: "The real purpose of certain countries advocating the 'rules-based international order' is to interpret and apply international law at will, impose their own will on other countries, and replace universally accepted international laws with their own rules." The so-called "rules-based international order" runs counter to the rule of law and reflects unilateralism rather than multilateralism.

Unlike the US view of order, which emphasizes unilateral security, the Global Security Initiative proposed by China adheres to genuine multilateralism, upholds the principle of indivisibility of security, and emphasizes cooperative security. China has repeatedly stressed that one country's security cannot be based on the insecurity of other countries. The traditional Chinese culture of "the gentleman is harmonious but different" and "do not do to others what you do not want to do" has guided the way for the realization of common and indivisible security among countries. Western scholars pay special attention to the principle of indivisibility of security in their analysis of China's security order. In fact, the principle of indivisibility of security is not original to China. It was first written into the Helsinki Accords reached by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, with the aim of integrating European security as a whole. The insistence on the indivisibility of security reflects the strategic wisdom that Europe has accumulated after a long history of confrontation and war. The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 just shows that some countries have forgotten and violated this principle in an attempt to achieve unilateral security.

Second, the difference between hegemonic politics and Asian negotiation. "Freedom of navigation" as a very old technical term, since the 17th century began to appear, on the basis of the sea belongs to all mankind, should guarantee freedom of navigation. The United States pointed out that the main purpose of the so-called "freedom of navigation" is to prevent some countries from "excessive claims" to maritime rights and interests, but what "excessive claims" are, the United States is unclear. The United States insists that all countries must abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but it has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the fundamental reason is that it wants to avoid being bound by it, so that it can decide the judgment criteria for "excessive demands". As more and more countries have strengthened their awareness of maritime rights and interests and enhanced their ability to safeguard maritime power, they have begun to make legitimate demands and say "no" to the United States' arbitrary entry into their territorial waters. These legitimate demands were stigmatized by the United States as "excessive demands."

The impact of the so-called "freedom of navigation" of the United States on the security situation in Asia is most prominent in the South China Sea issue. In July 2020, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement falsely claiming that China was "bullying" in an attempt to control the South China Sea and that "the world will not allow China to become a maritime empire in the South China Sea". This was the first time that the United States publicly stated its position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea and openly stood against China. On July 12, 2021, the fifth anniversary of the so-called "South China Sea arbitration" made by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the guided-missile destroyer US Benford trespaded into China's territorial waters off Xi Sha. On November 29, 2022, just two weeks after the summit between the heads of state of China and the United States in Bali, the US Navy's Seventh Fleet conducted another so-called "freedom of navigation" mission in the South China Sea, leading to a dispute with the China Navy. In 2023, the US military sent three aircraft carrier strike groups, USS Nimitz, USS Reagan and USS Carl Vinson, to enter the South China Sea for a total of six times. Meanwhile, the US military carried out large-scale exercises and training in the South China Sea and surrounding areas for about 107 times. Since the end of the Cold War, the relevant frictions between China and the United States in the Chinese coast, such as the 2001 Sino-US plane collision in the South China Sea and the 2009 confrontation of the Flawless spy ship, are all related to the so-called "freedom of navigation" of the United States.

Regarding to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea advocated by the United States, in November 2022, then-Premier Li Keqiang made it clear that "maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea are in the common interests of all parties. China is the largest trader of goods, with 60 percent of its trade passing through the South China Sea. Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea are never problems." In the final analysis, the "freedom of navigation" of the United States is to ensure its smooth navigation in the world's oceans, and its real purpose is to maintain maritime hegemony, which also includes free access to the region as a non-regional country in Asia. As mentioned above, the President Xi Jinping made it clear that "the security of Asia is ultimately maintained by the people of Asia". On the South China Sea issue, President Xi stressed on many occasions that China is always committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, adheres to peaceful settlement of disputes through friendly consultation and negotiation with countries directly concerned, and opposes internationalization and interference by external forces.

Third, the difference between promoting camp confrontation and building a community with a shared future for mankind. The series of small multilateral mechanisms constructed by the United States, despite the cry of freedom, democracy and human rights, are essentially to promote camp confrontation and service power competition. In April 2024, the joint Statement reached by the United States, Japan and the Philippines arbitrarily criticized China's position and behavior in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the East China Sea (Diaoyu Islands), followed by criticism of North Korea and Russia. The main reason why the United States is inclined to adopt a small multilateral mechanism is that it believes that the big multilateral mechanism with the United Nations as the core is inefficient and the bilateral mechanism is insufficient in suppressing China and Russia.

Unlike the US, China clearly opposes "small blocs" such as the US, Japan and the ROK, and has put forward the concept of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness" in its neighborhood diplomacy, and is committed to building a community with a shared future in its neighborhood and in Asia. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, China has taken the initiative in Asian security affairs. On the Korean Peninsula issue, China has put forward the "suspension for suspension" initiative and the "dual-track approach" approach. On the Afghan issue, China has not only appointed special envoys, but also proposed the Tunxi Initiative to help Afghanistan's reconstruction and development and issued China's Position on the Issue of Afghanistan. In response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China not only appointed a special envoy to mediate and coordinate, but also issued a document entitled "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis".

Ⅲ. Asia's response to the view of China and US security order

Asian countries generally support the Chinese view of order and question the US view of order. Up to now, China, Pakistan, Laos and other 14 neighboring countries and two regional organizations have announced the establishment of a community of common destiny, the latest of which was announced with Timor-Leste on July 29, 2024, "committed to promoting the construction of a community of shared future for mankind." Some scholars have also pointed out that the international institutional order has begun to change from the liberal institutional order based on Western rules to the new multilateral institutional order based on the community of human destiny, and believe that "the regional coordination model advocated by China is likely to surpass the group ecology made by the United States and become the mainstream direction of the order of the Asia-Pacific region ."

The Global Security Initiative has also been warmly welcomed by Asian countries. For example, the Joint press Statement reached by Indonesian President Joko Widodo during his visit to China in July 2022 pointed out that "Indonesia attaches importance to global security initiatives and is willing to work with China to maintain peace and stability through dialogue and diplomatic channels". "Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia, should support Global Security Initiatives to avoid renewed tensions in the South China Sea in the region," the Indonesian scholar said. During the SCO summit in September 2022, the participating countries expressed their active support for the Global Security Initiative. American scholars also clearly pointed out that "the US government should attach importance to the Global Security Initiative, and should not assume that the international community will not respond positively."

At the same time, most Asian countries are skeptical of the US view of the security order. Taking Southeast Asia as an example, due to the geostrategic importance of the region, especially the importance of shaping regional order through ASEAN +3, ASEAN +6, and East Asia Summit, the Biden administration attaches great importance to its role in the "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report" in 2022. Senior US officials, including Biden, also frequently visit Southeast Asia, but the vast majority of Southeast Asian countries do not support America's view of security order. The Biden administration has made it clear that no Southeast Asian country has asked for a new alliance with the United States. Since small multilateral mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, India and Australia and the trilateral security partnership between the United States, Britain and Australia are the main manifestations of the United States' view of the Asian security order, Southeast Asian countries' attitude towards the American view of the order is prominently reflected in their attitude towards these small multilateral mechanisms. While Southeast Asian countries have responded positively to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on issues such as COVID-19 vaccines, most members are skeptical on the security front. Indonesia is most concerned about marginalizing ASEAN because of the QUAD, Singapore is concerned about intensifying competition between China and the United States, Laos and Cambodia are wary of the QUAD because of its anti-China stance, and Malaysia and Thailand are also suspicious of the QUAD. Since once joining the Quadrilateral security dialogue means pro-US anti-China, and contradicts the neutral position of ASEAN, the regional poll shows that 68% of the respondents do not advocate the expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which fully reflects that Southeast Asian countries generally do not want the "QUAD+" extended to the region.

Regarding the trilateral security partnership between the United States, Britain and Australia, the mainstream view of Southeast Asian countries is also mainly skeptical. In September 2021, the Indonesian government issued a statement saying that it was "very concerned about the resulting arms race in the region", based on the fact that given the geographical proximity, once Australia has nuclear submarines through the trilateral security partnership between the United States and Britain and Australia, it not only means that Australian submarines have longer endurance, faster speed and better concealment. And it can carry advanced missile systems, which will obviously upset the military balance in the region. Indonesia also has problems with Australia over the Timor-leste. Malaysia has also expressed clear concerns about the trilateral security partnership between the United States, Britain and Australia, while Thailand has stayed on the sidelines and Singapore and Vietnam have not expressed support.

The reasons why most Southeast Asian countries have a less positive view of the American order are as follows: First, distrust of the United States. Historically, due to the end of the Cold War, the United States turned its focus to Europe, the Middle East and Northeast Asia, and began to ignore Southeast Asia, and even withdrew its troops from the region in 1992. It was not until 2012 that the Obama administration launched the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" policy and began to pay new attention to Southeast Asia. In 2016, the Obama administration hosted the first US-ASEAN Summit. At the so-called "Global Democracy Summit" held by the Biden administration in 2021, according to its "democracy" standards, only Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in Southeast Asia participated, and other countries were excluded, including Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, which have close relations with the United States. Second, with the development of China, and China attaches importance to developing relations with Southeast Asian countries, Southeast Asian countries realize that China's rise has opportunities for them, "Southeast Asia does not think that China's expanding influence is a threat, but believes that opportunities and challenges coexist." Even Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, which have disputes with China in the South China Sea, do not want to have hostile relations with China. In the region, Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam are working bilaterally with China to build a community of common destiny. After all, while many countries in the region have expressed misgivings about the rise of China, they argue for guidance through "participation" and "enmeshing" rather than containment and suppression through alliances with other major powers. They do not recognize the United States, Japan, India and Australia quadrilateral security dialogue and the United States, Britain and Australia trilateral security partnership to prevent China's rise. Third, Southeast Asia regionalism. Southeast Asia as a whole is playing an increasingly important role in regional and international affairs, especially in the direction of Asian regional order, ASEAN has been playing a central role and is unwilling to "take sides". For this reason, ASEAN introduced multilateralism and founded the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only multilateral security mechanism in East Asia so far, in 1994. The ARF Introduce the concept and practice of cooperative security, including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union.

Not only in Southeast Asia, but also in other subregions of Asia, countries generally have doubts about the concept of the US order. In Northeast Asia, Mongolia maintains a neutral position between China and the United States, Russia-US relations have deteriorated further due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, North Korea and the United States are in hostile relations, Pakistan in South Asia explicitly opposes the quadrilateral security Dialogue, and the relevant countries in Central Asia maintain a balanced position among the larger countries and respond coldly to the United States' view of the security order. There are two main reasons for this. First, there are fundamental problems with America's view of order. In this regard, Zachary Paikin, a research fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy (IPD) in the United States and Canada, believes that the "rules-based international order" has three fundamental flaws: firstly, the concept is inherently problematic, and theory is disconnected from reality. In theory, rules of state conduct must be based on international law, but in practice, in order to achieve this, international relations cannot be handled on principles alone, and compromises will have to be made when necessary. Secondly, the change of times and the influence of the power struggle of great powers cause the ambiguity of "order". The rules themselves are political, the result of a power struggle, and the question is not only what order to follow, but "whose" order to follow. Third, hegemony, great power coordination, and spheres of influence cannot provide the international order that the world needs today, and it is increasingly difficult to imagine any single order that can meet the challenges the world faces. The difficulty of "hegemony" is that there are other sub-power centers, and the United States is not willing to do so. "Great power coordination" cannot be realized because of the intensifying competition among great powers. Due to the unwillingness of small and medium-sized countries to choose sides between China and the United States, as well as the impact of globalization and great power competition, these small and medium-sized countries also have the ability to avoid choosing sides, so the "sphere of influence" is not feasible.

Second, America's ability to promote a security order has declined. In August 2021, the United States and the West hastily withdrew from Afghanistan without achieving peace, leaving behind a bad regional security situation that reflects the declining influence of the United States in Asian affairs. In April 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran achieved reconciliation under the mediation of China. Considering that the United States has always had a greater influence in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia is a traditional ally of the United States, this move means that the American-led order in the Middle East is shaking, and China's influence in the region is rising. At the same time, America's ability to mobilize Allies has declined. During the Cold War, the United States integrated its alliance system with the Soviet Union as its adversary, and its Allies were willing to pay for the global expansion of the United States out of fear of the Soviet Union. At present, although the Biden administration hopes to integrate regional Allies and partners to jointly suppress China, considering that China is the largest economic and trade partner of most Asian countries and China is committed to common development of foreign policy, it is obviously difficult for the United States to fully mobilize Allies and partners to pressure China. For example, as one of the countries that rely most heavily on the "Indo-Pacific strategy" of the United States, Australia. Since the Albanese government took office in May 2022, it has sent out positive signals on China-Australia relations, reaffirmed its commitment to the China-Australia comprehensive strategic partnership, stated its commitment to the One-China policy, and expressed its commitment to handling relations with China in a mature manner. Prime Minister Albanese also paid an official visit to China in November 2023. It shows the positive willingness to improve and develop bilateral relations.

Although most Asian countries are dissatisfied with the US view of security order, a very small number of countries support it, especially Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India and other countries. Japan not only takes the initiative to strengthen strategic cooperation with the United States, but also actively plays the role of agent of the United States in the Asian region, in February 2022, the Biden administration issued the "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report", and then in March and April 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida successively visited India and Vietnam, strengthening the "Indo-Pacific" cooperation is an important issue. The Yoon Seok-yoon administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy Report is highly similar to the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which was drafted by the North American Bureau of the South Korean Foreign Ministry rather than the Northeast Asia Bureau, indicating that the "strategy" is mainly aimed at cooperating with the United States. The Philippines is the most open supporter of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the trilateral security partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia among Southeast Asian countries. In May 2022, after Marcos Jr. won the Philippines presidential election, he sharply turned to the United States, and in February 2023, the Philippines publicly announced that it would open the use of four more military bases to the United States, one of which is only 400 kilometers away from Taiwan. For India, as mentioned above, the Modi government has changed its "non-alignment policy", established a quasi-alliance with the United States, and actively cooperated with the United States' "Indo-Pacific strategy".

Although the motivations behind the parties differ, there are two main aspects. First, because of the struggle for dominance of the regional order. Japan has made no secret of its competition with China for leadership of the regional order, and in December 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida went so far as to publicly call China become Japan's "greatest strategic challenge ever." "Japan has serious anxiety in the face of China's rise and is considering containing China's rise with the help of the United States". India has a similar competitive mentality towards the rise of China. The Yoon Seok-yoon government of South Korea not only hopes to achieve the status of "global hub country" by "relying on the United States", but also takes the initiative to "assist the United States" to help the United States maintain the so-called liberal international order. Second, they want US support in territorial disputes. "Japan, the Philippines and India have territorial disputes with China and look to the United States to counterbalance China on related issues." In the joint statement reached at the U.S.-Japan-Philippines Summit in April 2024, the United States focused on reassuring the Philippines and Japan regarding the territorial disputes between China. Although both China and India believe that the border dispute is a matter between the two countries and do not want other countries to intervene, in March 2021, India discussed the Sino-Indian border security situation at the quadrilateral security Dialogue summit, and the United States has expressed understanding of its position, and the 2022 India-US joint military exercise is located near the China-India border area.

Ⅳ. Promote the Building of a Security Order in Asia Through Global Security Initiatives

To sum up, China and the United States have obvious differences in their views on security order. Most Asian countries support China's view on security order. In the face of the lack of security order in Asia, it is necessary to gradually promote the construction of security order in Asia in the direction of global security initiatives. Historically, any form of order building has been difficult because it requires providing stability, involves the science and rationality of the order, takes into account the interests of the parties involved, and maintains the delicate dynamic balance of forces behind the order. In terms of different forms of order, the construction of security order is even more difficult because of the high sensitivity and scarcity of security. In history, the establishment of a security order has basically taken place after wars, and in a state of peace, how China can promote the establishment of a security order in Asia is a huge challenge. In view of the above difficulties and challenges, China should combine the reality of Asia in its construction and draw inspiration from the practices of other relevant major powers.

First, we should attach great importance to building a security order in Asia, adhere to the principle of indivisibility of security, and re-guarantee peace through strengthening top-level design. All major countries in the world attach great importance to the building of security order in the neighborhood. During the rise of the United States, under the framework of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States expanded its territory through the Mexican-American War and the Spanish-American War, gradually driving Spain and other old "suzerains" out of Latin America and stabilizing the so-called "backyard". In the process of restoring its "strength", Russia also attaches great importance to the shaping of the surrounding security environment, taking it as the most important and priority external security goal. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has launched the second Chechen War, the Georgia War, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in its neighborhood, hoping to highlight its international status and maintain the strategic buffer zone and national security. Effectively respond to Western pressure. Although the specific ways that the United States and Russia attach importance to are different, they both show that they attach great importance to the surrounding security order. China needs to attach great importance to building a security order in Asia in the context of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and the global security initiative should first take root in Asia.

China should first address Asian countries' recognition of China's concept of order, explain the global security initiative from the perspective of disciplinary affiliation and academic issues, demonstrate its theoretical scientificity and diplomatic practicability, and especially explain the Asian community of shared future orientation and the indivisible principle of security. It is necessary to adhere to the path of peaceful development, especially in the face of the demonization of China by the United States and the doubts of relevant countries about whether China will continue to follow the path of peaceful development in the context of the great changes not seen in a century, and it is necessary to re-guarantee "peace" to neighboring countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine have broken out in relevant regions, in which major powers have directly participated to varying degrees. However, China adheres to the path of peaceful development. Since the self-defence war against Vietnam in 1979, China has not been at war with other countries for more than 40 years, which is extremely rare in the history of foreign relations between major powers. This is also an important experience that China has made great achievements rapidly since the founding of the People's Republic of China, especially since the reform and opening up.

Second, we should make comprehensive use of "economic" and "security" means. We should not only continue to promote security through economy, but also increase the input of security resources. Both the United States and Russia attach great importance to the investment of security resources in the process of shaping regional security order. The United States has made clear its strategic commitment to its Allies and provided military equipment to reassure them. At present, the United States has clearly defined alliances with 55 countries, and the United States has made a clear commitment to "nuclear protection" for NATO members, as well as Japan and South Korea, while achieving military and operational integration by improving the interoperability of military equipment with relevant Allies. Russia's relations with Vietnam, India and other countries mainly focus on security cooperation. Russia also focuses on enhancing its voice through full participation in security mechanisms, including the United Nations, the Eurasian Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Collective Angin Treaty. At the same time, the United States is also good at adopting economic means in the process of building a regional security order. After the Spanish-American War, the United States focused on expanding its commercial interests and avoided involvement in the wars between the great powers of the time. Although the United States participated in two world wars, it had the sense of being "forced" into them. In Latin America, the United States has strengthened its ties with countries in the region through increased trade and direct investment, allaying their security concerns.

The Global Security Initiative proposed in 2022 is an important initiative proposed after the Global Development Initiative proposed in September 2021, and is a reflection of the integration of "development" and "security" at the diplomatic level. It is important to strengthen economic governance and non-traditional security governance, promote cooperation in the digital economy, and promote dialogue on the stability of industrial and supply chains. At the same time, it should be noted that for a long time, China has paid more attention to the economic order and put more emphasis on economic and cultural cooperation while developing relations with Asian countries, and insufficient investment in security resources. Professor Zheng Yongnian even believes that "compared with Western culture, Chinese culture has always paid no attention to security order." While continuing to give full play to economic advantages to promote "security" by "economy", it is especially necessary to combine bilateral and multilateral efforts to increase security resource input.

Third, intensive cultivation should be carried out gradually by regions and countries, and the Russian factor and the American factor should be handled in a balanced way. 

V. Conclusion

At present, the remnants of the Cold War and lack of trust in Asia are superimposed on each other, territorial issues are intertwined with historical issues, the Great power game and the construction of order are mutually influenced, and the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has prompted Asian countries to pay more attention to security, which has exacerbated the above complicated situation. The lack of security order in the region has not only led to the continuous rise of regional peace deficit and security deficit, which has continuously induced regional arms race, but also provided a starting point for some non-regional powers to divide and disrupt Asia. China should attach great importance to promoting the construction of Asian security order in the context of national rejuvenation. At present, the Asian region is closely linked with the international community, and the United States and other countries outside the region also have profound influence. China's efforts to build a security order in Asia not only require eliminating interference from the United States, but also require other Asian countries to measure China's concept and practice of order against the United State's, which also puts higher demands on China. From the analysis of this paper, it can be seen that the Global Security Initiative leading the construction of Asian security order is far higher than the security order view of the United State's based on the Cold War mentality, and should represent the direction of the construction of Asian security order. China should maintain strategic confidence, take into full account the particularity of the Asian region and the will of Asian countries, absorb other countries' views on order and practical experience of order, and gradually promote the Global Security Initiative to take root in Asia and successfully build an Asian security order. (Author: Wang Junsheng, Director and Fellow of China's Neighborhood Strategy Research Office, Institute of Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy, CASS)