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Prospects for U.S. Taiwan Policy and Comprehensive Analysis of Taiwan Strait Situation Trends

Date:2025-07-09 Source:International Cooperation Center
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On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump assumed office as the 47th President of the United States. Unlike his first inauguration in January 2017 as a political outsider and businessman, this return granted him a greater mandate. In the November 2024 presidential election, he secured more popular votes than Democratic candidate Kamala Harris. Additionally, in the 119th Congress, Republicans held 53 seats to Democrats' 47 in the Senate, and 220 seats to Democrats' 215 in the House of Representatives. Politically, Trump's second term commenced with the advantage of a "unified government." Coupled with a conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court, these conditions further solidified his position as a strong executive with judicial backing. In a video address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Trump declared this outcome "a significant mandate from the American people, unprecedented in years." No longer the political novice of his first term, Trump now possesses deeper comprehension of U.S. political economy, the "deep state," and foreign relations. These factors collectively signify a fundamentally transformed power base and governance posture for the Trump 2.0 administration.

I. Policy Concepts and Decision-Making Preferences During the Trump 2.0 Era

What remains unchanged is Trump's steadfast commitment to the distinctive "America First" ethos and foreign policy.‌ At its core, this doctrine seeks to revitalize U.S. competitiveness, alleviate structural contradictions, and consolidate American global hegemony. This paradigm attempts to redefine core American values, serving not only the interests of Trump himself, the Republican Party, and the MAGA ("Make America Great Again") faction but also advancing U.S. national interests and hegemonic imperatives amid geopolitical shifts. ‌Scholarly consensus highlights transactional, exerting maximum pressure and creating uncertainty in Trump's decision-making.‌ Harvard Professor Stephen Walt contends that Trump's approach "transcends transactional reciprocity, manifesting as blatant extortion, bullying, and coercive demands for unilateral concessions." Academics also observe unprecedented political engagement by major capital groups—exemplified by Elon Musk—in reshaping governance and policy. The future intertwining of Trump, the Republican establishment, and corporate power signals a new political-economic phenomenon. ‌Reviewing U.S.-China relations, Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy marked a watershed.‌By labeling China a "revisionist power," it catalyzed a bipartisan, whole-of-government consensus viewing China as the primary systemic challenger. Consequently, the Trump 2.0 administration's China policy—anchored in strategic competition and containment—will share Biden's substantive objectives while diverging tactically through Trump’s personal idiosyncrasies.

From the perspective of the political traits and decision-making mindset of the US president, Trump himself rarely viewed Taiwan from the perspective of democratic values and ideological spectrum, nor did he treat the Taiwan question as a priority in foreign relations. John Bolton, who served as the national security advisor to President Trump, has published a book revealing that Trump actually showed little respect for Taiwan and adhered to a unique transactional mindset. This is quite different from the strategic thinking of Biden, the establishment wing of the Democratic Party, and some Republican hardliners. On the Taiwan question, Trump may have a strategic bottom line, but his tactics are flexible and prone to change. The academic community believes that the Taiwan-related policies during Trump's first term were the result of the coordinated efforts between Trump and the hardline anti-China faction. In his second term, the national security and foreign affairs team was more loyal and followed Trump's worldview and political concepts. The US' Taiwan-related policies towards China are expected to become more "Trumpian" in the future.

II. Characteristics of Taiwan-related Policies During the Trump 2.0 Era

During the Trump 2.0 era, the polarization characteristic of American political parties became increasingly prominent. The political spectra of the two parties did not move towards the center but shifted towards two extremes. Trump's anti-establishment traits remained fundamentally unchanged. He tended towards pragmatism and changing the status quo, challenging traditional rules and regulations. This trait was frequently seen in Trump's policy towards Taiwan during the 1.0 period, such as his public signing of the "Taiwan Relations Act," sending high-ranking officials of the US cabinet to visit Taiwan, and regularly selling offensive weapons to Taiwan. Under the promotion of strategic hawks like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien at that time, the one-China policy of the United States showed a drifting phenomenon, deliberately highlighting its differences from the one-China principle, thus creating a dissociation effect. The Trump 2.0 government took over the further devaluation of the one-China policy implemented during Biden's four-year term. The "Taiwan Relations Act" and the "Six Guarantees" towards Taiwan constituted a greater degree of counterbalance and deconstruction of the three joint communiques between China and the United States. On core sensitive issues such as "Taiwan is part of China" and "China has sovereignty over Taiwan," the Trump 2.0 government might "instrumentalize" and "use as a bargaining chip" Taiwan-related issues, and utilize them to pressure and blackmail China. The "deep state" in the United States and the strategic hardliners of the Trump administration do not rule out the possibility of influencing or even "manipulating" Trump's policies, aiming to undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and obstruct China's unification strategy.

During the Trump 2.0 era, the globalism, multilateralism and neoliberal ideology that had been booming after the end of the Cold War will enter a period of decline and transformation. After Trump largely integrated the Republican Party, the mainstream concepts and policy tendencies of the US government will be national sovereignty supremacy, economic security, conservatism and unilateralism. The anti-establishment populist agenda has already manifested rapidly after Trump's re-election. The US has launched a comprehensive crackdown on illegal immigrants that blur the boundaries of national sovereignty, announced withdrawal from the World Health Organization, the Paris Agreement, and the UN Human Rights Council, and implemented "bullying diplomacy" towards Denmark and Panama on territorial sovereignty issues. Compared to globalism and liberalism, Trumpism places greater emphasis on economic and technological sovereignty and the American centrism, and attributes China's rapid rise partly to the internationalist capital and pan-globalization thinking within the US. The economic, trade and technological policies of the Trump 2.0 government towards China may shift from "de-risking" to "total decoupling", from "small wall" to "big wall", and have become a topic of concern. Due to its expertise in transactions and extreme pressure tactics, the Trump 2.0 government is likely to demand even higher economic interests from Taiwan than before. Trump aspires to Taiwan's advanced chip manufacturing capabilities and will require TSMC to continue expanding its investment in the US and accelerate the transfer of semiconductor technology and talent to the US. In the highly anticipated fourth industrial revolution, China has demonstrated strong capabilities in intelligent technology, quantum technology, new energy, and biotechnology. The Trump 2.0 government is committed to weakening China's high-end technological development, industrialization capabilities and global supply chain layout, hoping that Taiwan will join the "de-China" alliance of the global semiconductor industry and restrict economic exchanges and cooperation between the two sides to the greatest extent.

During the Trump 2.0 era, the United States will continue to implement a broader regional strategy with deeper military security implications in the Indo-Pacific region. During Trump's first term, Chinese Taiwan was included in the scope of the Indo-Pacific strategy for the first time, and Taiwan became a relevant party in the strategy, elevating the status of the substantive relationship between the United States and Taiwan. In terms of its relationship with the United States, the Taiwan authorities are in a subordinate and passive position, but they have been lobbying and influencing the views and policies of both parties of the United States on Taiwan. As the United States' containment strategy towards China and the division of the global technology supply chain continue to escalate, the lobbying power of the Taiwan authorities will increase their influence on the Taiwan-related policies of the US administrative and legislative institutions. The US Congress will continue to act as the "pusher" for the substantive relationship between the United States and Taiwan. The Lai Qingde authorities adopted an active alignment strategy towards the United States, maintaining consistency in political postures and security strategies with the United States, with the intention of seeking new strategic space. The "new two-state theory" separatist line does not rule out further intensification.

During the Trump 2.0 era, intervention in the politics and security of the Taiwan Strait remained a goal of the US's Indo-Pacific geopolitical strategy. Due to the prioritization of domestic politics and economy and the inward-looking strategy in the US, Trump objectively needed to prevent a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and avoid directly getting involved into a war. "Strategic ambiguity" remained the core of Trump 2.0's policy towards the Taiwan Strait. In the 2024 US presidential election, Trump, Vice President Vance (J.D. Vance), and Presidential National Security Affairs Assistant Mike Waltz all expressed a tendency to maintain "strategic ambiguity" on different occasions, attempting to maintain effective deterrence while maintaining strategic flexibility on the issue of "cooperating with Taiwan". This does not mean that the US will change its policy of "arming Taiwan" with asymmetric thinking. Trump 2.0's arms sales, military cooperation, and defense industry integration to Taiwan will continue, and the scale and frequency of US military exercises around the First Island Chain are likely to increase, thereby increasing the security risks in the Taiwan Strait region. In the "two conflicts" of Ukraine and Palestine-Israel, the powerful "military-industrial complex" of the US reaped huge profits. Under the Republican Party's governance, it will demand higher military purchase fees from the Taiwan authorities.

III. The Impact of Trump 2.0's Intervention in the Taiwan Strait Situation

Trump's mercantilism, realism and unilateralism will represent a significant rebellion or even a turning point against the Wilsonianism and liberalism that the United States has long adhered to. The internal decision-making model, power interaction pattern and strategic tactics of the Trump administration still need further observation and verification, but they are bound to affect the interaction trend of Sino-US relations.

During the Trump 2.0 era, the basic principles adopted by the Chinese government in handling Sino-US relations still adhere to the guideline, namely mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. China and the United States are two major countries with their own national development strategies and visions. China advocates building a community with a shared future for mankind and opposes the "new Cold War" and hegemonic politics in the 21st century. The one-China principle is the political foundation of China-US relations. After the long and intense competition between China and the United States over the Taiwan question, the Trump 2.0 administration should have a clearer and more discerning understanding of the importance and sensitivity of the Taiwan question. On January 17, 2025, President Xi Jinping called Trump by appointment and pointed out that there would inevitably be some differences between China and the United States. The key is to respect each other's core interests and major concerns and find proper solutions to the problems. The Taiwan question concerns China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, hope the US side will handle it with great care. This indicates that the complex and sensitive question has always occupied a very important position in the dialogue between the leaders of the two countries and in the head-of-state diplomacy. On January 24, 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the request of the latter. He said that taiwan has been a part of China's territory since ancient times, we will never allow Taiwan to be separated from China. The United States made a solemn commitment in the three joint communiques between China and the United States to uphold the one-China policy and cannot break its promise. Rubio stated that the US does not support "Taiwan’s Independence", and hopes that the Taiwan question can be resolved peacefully in a way that is acceptable to all parties. However, considering the turbulent situation in Taiwan during the Trump 1.0 period, as well as the US politics and Sino-US relations after Trump's return to office, the US's interference in Taiwan question and the obstruction of China's unification efforts will increase.

In the coming period, the international situation will be fraught with turmoil and transformation, with intensified geopolitical security competition and a widening global governance deficit. The trust deficit will become even more pronounced. The anxiety and urgency of the US's policy towards China, as well as its tough stance, will not change. The strategic competition against China will become more prominent in terms of security, populism, and confrontation. If the US does not alter its hegemonic logic and zero-sum mindset, the transactional thinking and blackmail strategies of the Trump 2.0 era may exacerbate the instability in the region. 

Based on the logic of grand history and grand strategy, China does not aim to challenge the United States' position in the Indo-Pacific region or globally. However, it is unwaveringly committed to achieving complete national unity and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It strives to actively manage and stabilize Sino-US relations in this historical process. The Chinese government will emphasize the equal importance of "anti-Taiwan independence" and "anti-interference", strengthen risk control and situation shaping, and unswervingly advance the cause of national reunification. (Author: Wang Shushen, Deputy Director and Researcher of the Taiwan Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)