Analysis of Geopolitical and Security Structure of the Korean Peninsula under the Context of Major Power Competition

Abstract: Since the first term of the Trump administration, the geopolitical status of the Korean Peninsula has significantly increased. The leaders of North Korea and the United States held three summit meetings, and South Korea's importance within the Biden administration's alliance system has risen. The relationship between North Korea and Russia has rapidly improved. However, the related security conflicts on the Korean Peninsula have intensified. The Biden administration has increased pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has resumed and expanded its strategic weapons development. The standoff between North and South Korea has intensified, and the regional security structure has shown signs of a Cold War-like situation. In the future, whether the two countries, the United States and North Korea, can take the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as the negotiation direction faces great uncertainty. There is still a fundamental contradiction between the two sides regarding the sequence of denuclearization and the lifting of sanctions. The standoff between North and South Korea and the Cold War-like structure of the regional security have further complicated the Korean Peninsula issue. The current severe situation on the Korean Peninsula poses a huge challenge to China's surrounding security. The risk of nuclear proliferation and accidental conflicts in the surrounding areas has increased, and the diplomatic maneuvering space for maintaining surrounding security has been compressed. In view of this, China should continue to promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, strengthen strategic communication with North Korea and Russia, and firmly oppose the confrontation of camps and the Cold War pattern. 

Since the first term of the Trump administration, both the relations among major powers and the situation on the Korean Peninsula have undergone significant changes, and they have also influenced each other. On one hand, the major powers on the Korean Peninsula are concentrated. Due to the intensification of the US-Russia confrontation and the fact that the US regards China as its biggest strategic competitor and implements strategic pressure on China, it has become difficult for major powers to carry out substantive cooperation on the resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue. The issue has remained unresolved for a long time, and the situation has become more complicated. On the other hand, both North Korea and South Korea have realized that through international coordination including cooperation among major powers, they cannot solve the problem. The strategic confrontation between the two sides has intensified, and their tendencies to "take sides" have strengthened. This not only makes the situation on the Korean Peninsula increasingly complex and tense, but also further stimulates the competition among major powers. Exploring the essential characteristics and development trends of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and proposing countermeasures have important theoretical significance and urgent practical significance.

Ⅰ. The geopolitical significance of the Korean Peninsula has increased. 

Since the first term of the Trump administration, the geopolitical significance of the Korean Peninsula has significantly increased. This is mainly reflected in the fact that its priority level in the agendas of major countries has notably risen. 

1.The United States and North Korea held three summit meetings

In June 2018, US President Trump met with North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong Un in Singapore. This was a historic summit between the two countries, and both sides issued a joint statement. Trump promised to provide security guarantees for North Korea, and Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his unwavering commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two sides also reached consensus on "immediately transferring the remains of identified prisoners and missing personnel from the war" and other matters. In August of the same year, 55 US military remains from the Korean War era were transported to Hawaii. In February 2019, the two highest leaders held another summit in Hanoi, Vietnam. Although they failed to reach a consensus due to significant policy differences, both countries highly praised this meeting and expressed their intention to continue promoting direct dialogue. Trump said, "The meeting with Kim Jong Un was very pleasant. The United States will continue to promote a good relationship with Kim Jong Un and North Korea." On March 1st, the Korean Central News Agency published an article stating that the leaders of the two countries candidly exchanged views on how to develop their relations in the new era. In June 2019, the two highest leaders met on the North Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone in South Korea. Trump became the first US leader to cross the 38th Parallel from the South Korean side and enter North Korea. These actions of Trump were related not only to his lack of political burdens as a businessman after entering politics and his willingness to take unusual measures, but also to his confidence and even arrogance, as well as his preference for attracting media attention. These personality traits of Trump will also influence his policy towards North Korea in the second term. 

2. South Korea's importance within the alliance system of the Biden administration in the United States has increased

In November 2020, after winning the presidential election, Biden rushed to the Korean War Veterans Memorial Park in Philadelphia to lay flowers, sending a signal of his high regard for the alliance between South Korea and the United States. In May 2021, South Korean President Moon Jae-in visited the United States, which was his first overseas trip after the outbreak of the pandemic and the second visit by a foreign leader after Biden took office in the White House. After his visit to the United States, Moon Jae-in wrote, "This was the best visit and meeting." On May 10, 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol became the president of South Korea, and on May 20, Biden visited South Korea. This was the shortest record for a meeting between the highest leaders of the United States and South Korea after the new South Korean president took office, and it also broke the precedent where the new South Korean president visited the United States first and the US leader returned for a visit later. In April 2023, Yoon Suk-yeol conducted a seven-nation state visit to the United States to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Korea-US alliance. The two sides reached the "Washington Declaration", emphasizing that based on the so-called "value alliance", the two countries are committed to developing five major alliance relationships: security alliance, industrial alliance, technological alliance, cultural alliance, and information alliance. 

3. The relationship between Russia and North Korea has rapidly improved

After the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022, North Korea announced in July of the same year that it recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk. In September 2023, Kim Jong Un visited Russia. This was not only his second visit to Russia since his visit in April 2019, but also his first overseas trip after the end of the pandemic. In June 2024, Russian President Putin visited Pyongyang. This was the second visit by the highest Russian leader to North Korea after his visit to the country in 2000. The two sides signed the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", which consists of 23 articles. Article 4 stipulates that if one party is under a military attack by a single country or multiple countries and is in a state of war, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the domestic laws of both countries, the other party shall immediately use all means to provide military and other assistance; Article 3 stipulates that once one party is directly threatened by a military aggression, both parties shall immediately open consultation channels to discuss a plan to eliminate the threat. According to statistics, Kim Jong Un referred to the relationship between North Korea and Russia as an "alliance" a total of seven times on that day. Four of these were during his speech when signing the treaty, and the other three were during a walk together with Putin in the courtyard of the Suwon Mountain Reception Center, awarding Putin the Kim Il Sung Medal, and delivering a speech at the welcome banquet.

II. Regional security conflicts are gradually intensifying. 

Although the geopolitical status of the Korean Peninsula has risen in recent years, the issues related to the peninsula have not been resolved smoothly. Instead, there has been a trend of escalating security conflicts in Northeast Asia.

1.The Biden administration has escalated pressure on North Korea. 

Unlike the Trump administration's priority focus on resolving the Korean Peninsula issue, North Korea was not included in the Biden administration's eight-point foreign policy agenda. Instead, it explicitly identified North Korea as a challenge among the threats facing the U.S. In March 2021, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin emphasized the need to strengthen national defense to counter external threats, including North Korea. The Biden administration has reaffirmed its public designation of North Korea as a U.S. national security threat.

The Biden administration has intensified pressure on North Korea across security, economic, and human rights domains. On security:‌ The U.S. not only fully resumed all previously suspended joint military exercises with South Korea—halted due to COVID-19 outbreaks and improved U.S.-North Korea relations—but also enhanced strategic deterrence against North Korea. During his 2022 visit to South Korea, Biden reversed his earlier stance and publicly stated that the U.S. would redeploy "strategic assets" to South Korea if necessary. In September 2022, the U.S.-South Korea Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group (EDSCG) meeting resumed. In February 2023, the two countries conducted a nuclear deterrence exercise (DSC TTX). In July 2023, they held their first Nuclear Consultative Group meeting. During this period, U.S. aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and ballistic missile submarines made frequent visits to South Korea. On economic pressure:‌ In December 2021, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on North Korea under the pretext of "human rights violations"—a rare move for a new administration in its first year in office. In January 2023, the Biden administration nominated Julie Turner as the special envoy for human rights in North Korea. This position had been vacant for six years prior to this.

2.North Korea has resumed and expanded its strategic weapons development. 

In January 2021, Kim Jong Un called for increasing the country's nuclear arsenal. In January 2022, he explicitly stated that all previously "temporarily suspended activities"—referring to nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests paused since 2018—would be restarted. North Korea quickly resumed and expanded its nuclear weapons development, reportedly conducting nearly 70 missile launches in 2022 alone. By comparison, between 2012 and 2021 (the first decade of Kim's leadership), North Korea conducted a total of 129 missile launches, averaging about 13 per year. Since 2023, North Korea has further intensified its development and testing of strategic weapons, including military reconnaissance satellites, ICBMs, nuclear submarines, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). North Korea has also legally reinforced its status as a nuclear weapons state. In September 2022, it enacted a law on nuclear deterrence policy, reaffirming its status as a nuclear power and legally defining the mission, structure, and command of its nuclear forces, including scenarios for their use. While North Korea's 2012 constitutional declaration of its nuclear status primarily aimed to declare its possession of nuclear weapons, the 2022 revision sought to demonstrate how it would use them when necessary. In September 2023, during the Ninth Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea amended its constitution to explicitly enshrine the "permanent goal" of achieving advanced nuclear weapons development. Kim Jong Un emphasized during the session that "the constitutional revision demonstrates North Korea's nuclear strategic forces to the world, and enshrining the policy of nuclear force strengthening in the highest law of the state is a major measure in national construction. North Korea's status as a nuclear weapons state must never be changed or compromised."

3.The confrontation between North Korea and South Korea has intensified. 

In October and December 2022, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration imposed sanctions on North Korea twice—an unusually aggressive approach for a new government in its first year, with consecutive rounds of sanctions being even rarer. Militarily, the two sides have engaged in escalating provocations, including mutual drone incursions and artillery fire that landed in each other's exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Both nations have also heightened strategic weapons competition: while North Korea accelerated its development and testing of strategic weapons, South Korea—after the U.S.-South Korea Missile Guidelines were abolished in 2021—successfully tested its own submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Following North Korea's announcement of a successful reconnaissance satellite launch, South Korea also declared its own military reconnaissance satellite deployment. Faced with North Korea's rapid strategic weapons advancement, calls for South Korea to pursue independent nuclear capabilities have surged unprecedentedly. President Yoon Suk Yeol publicly stated that if North Korea continued to escalate its nuclear program, South Korea would consider deploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or developing its own nuclear weapons.

The confrontation between North and South Korea is particularly evident in their mutual redefinition of each other.‌ After the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in December 2022 designated South Korea as a "clear enemy," South Korea's 2022 Defense White Paper—released in February 2023—referred to North Korea as an "enemy" for the first time in six years. In December 2023, Kim Jong Un explicitly stated at the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the WPK's Eighth Central Committee that "North-South relations are no longer those between fellow Koreans but are now entirely those of two belligerent states in a war."

To implement this new positioning, North Korea amended its constitution to include ideological education clauses, instructing its people to view South Korea as "the primary and foremost enemy" and eliminating terms like "Three-thousand-li beautiful rivers and mountains" and "80 million compatriots." It also removed constitutional references to "the northern half," "autonomous peaceful reunification," and "national unity." Additionally, North Korea reorganized or dismantled its South Korea-related departments—merging the United Front Department with the Foreign Ministry and shutting down propaganda outlets targeting the South—while eliminating cooperative platforms and symbols, including completely severing the North Korean section of the Gyeongui Line (a symbol of inter-Korean exchange) and dismantling the "Three Charters for national reunification monument" in southern Pyongyang.

4.Cold War-like dynamics are emerging in Northeast Asia's security structure. 

As North Korea and Russia deepen their cooperation, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea are also strengthening their trilateral alignment, creating a confrontational standoff. Historically, U.S.-Japan-South Korea relations have been characterized by a U.S.-centric framework, with bilateral alliances between Washington-Tokyo and Washington-Seoul being prioritized while trilateral cooperation remained limited. However, since taking office, the Biden administration has actively promoted U.S.-Japan-South Korea coordination, not only reviving the trilateral vice-ministerial strategic dialogue mechanism—which now holds meetings every four months in rotating capitals—but also directly facilitating Japan-South Korea reconciliation. In March 2023, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration announced that South Korean foundations would compensate victims of forced labor under Japan's colonial rule, temporarily resolving the long-standing obstacle to improved bilateral ties. Subsequently, Yoon visited Japan and the U.S., accelerating trilateral cooperation among the three nations.

‌In August 2023, U.S., Japanese, and South Korean leaders held a Camp David summit—the first time the three countries convened a dedicated leaders' meeting outside multilateral platforms, signaling their collaboration's shift toward a "quasi-alliance" trajectory. On one hand, institutionalization has progressed: the three nations agreed to hold annual leaders' summits, rotating annual meetings between foreign and defense ministers, and regular director-general-level "Indo-Pacific" dialogues. They also pledged annual joint military exercises. In July 2024, their defense ministers signed the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation Framework, the first document outlining basic principles and policy guidelines for their security collaboration. Beyond defense, institutionalized cooperation now spans ideology, supply chains, high-tech, and finance. On the other hand, functional targeting is explicit: while coordination primarily addresses North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and aligns policies toward Russia, increasingly evident are its implications for China. The three have openly interfered in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and issues related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

III. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains the core issue

After Donald Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the U.S. and North Korea are likely to resume direct dialogue. From the U.S. perspective, Trump will likely once again seek face-to-face talks with Pyongyang—on his first day back in office, he publicly mentioned North Korea, acknowledging its "massive threat" to the U.S. while reiterating his good rapport with Kim Jong Un. From North Korea's side, despite its intensified strategic weapons development in recent years, its focus on economic growth remains unchanged. In 2024, Pyongyang introduced the "20×10" regional economic revitalization policy, aiming to build modern factories in 20 areas annually over the next decade to improve living standards. To secure better external security conditions or sanctions relief, North Korea will still need to engage with the U.S. However, the further complexity of denuclearization dynamics will directly constrain U.S.-North Korea dialogue and the future of the peninsula.

First, whether the U.S. and North Korea can still denuclearization as a negotiation goal faces significant uncertainty.‌ Second, the U.S. and North Korea remain fundamentally at odds over the sequencing of denuclearization and sanctions relief.‌ ‌Third, inter-Korean tensions and the Cold War-style regional security structure have further complicated the peninsula issue.

IV. Challenges to China's Peripheral Security and China's Responses‌

Against the backdrop of great-power competition, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has experienced twists and turns in recent years, posing severe challenges to China's peripheral security.

First‌, the heightened risk of nuclear proliferation on the peninsula has significantly undermined China's regional security environment. ‌Second‌, frequent U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and escalating tensions on the peninsula may lead to unintended conflict risks, directly impacting China's peripheral security. ‌Third‌, the intensification of Cold War-style dynamics in Northeast Asia has further constricted China's diplomatic maneuvering space in safeguarding its regional security interests.

V. Conclusion‌

Since the first term of the Trump administration, the Korean Peninsula's role in international geopolitics has significantly risen, yet this has not led to smooth resolutions of related issues. Instead, with three U.S.-North Korea summits ending in deadlock, domestic political transitions in the U.S. and South Korea, and spillover effects from events like the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Korean Peninsula has fallen into a new cycle of deterioration. This has not only intensified U.S.-North Korea antagonism and inter-Korean confrontation but also fostered a degree of bloc-based rivalry and Cold War-like dynamics in Northeast Asia. As a result, the risks of accidental clashes have increased, arms races have escalated, and North Korea's desired lifting of economic sanctions remains elusive—leading to a situation where all parties stand to lose.

Currently, with the start of Trump's second term, he has repeatedly expressed willingness to engage in direct dialogue with North Korea, offering renewed opportunities for political and diplomatic solutions on the peninsula. All parties should learn from past lessons, particularly the shift from dialogue to confrontation during Trump's first term. By moving in the same direction, they should jointly promote peace and development on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, striving for a win-win outcome for all. (Author: Wang Junsheng, Researcher at the Institute of Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

AI Translation (with edits)