The Strategic Intent, Implementation Path of the U.S. Internationalization of the Taiwan Question and Trend Assessment of Trump 2.0 Era

Abstract:The United States spares no effort to push for the internationalization of the Taiwan Question, attempting to draw its allies into cross-Strait affairs in a broader and deeper manner, so as to forge an international united front to pressure China on the Taiwan Question. Compared with the past, its means of advancing the internationalization of the Taiwan Question have undergone major new changes, presenting new approaches in political, economic, military, foreign relations and other dimensions. As the internationalization of the Taiwan Question grows increasingly severe, this paper focuses on analyzing the U.S. strategic intent and implementation paths behind this move. It also examines the characteristics and development trajectory of U.S. practices concerning the internationalization of the Taiwan Question during the Trump 2.0 era, so as to propose countermeasures for the Chinese mainland.

Great-power competition has become the dominant pattern of international politics at present and for the foreseeable future. Against this backdrop, external forces have continuously intensified their manipulation and meddling in the Taiwan Question, with their interference methods growing increasingly sophisticated. The Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China identified external interference as a key disruptive factor undermining the process of peaceful cross-Strait reunification, making counter-interference a core priority of the mainland’s Taiwan policy in the coming period. It is of great practical significance to enhance the systematic and dynamic analysis of attempts by external forces and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities to internationalize the Taiwan Question, and to grasp the evolutionary rules of external interference in the issue. The so-called internationalization of the Taiwan Question mainly refers to a series of new moves and trends led by the United States and other external forces. By leveraging political, economic, security, diplomatic and public opinion tools, they support Taiwan’s pursuit of a so-called "international space", hype up the Taiwan Question through multilateral international organizations, platforms and relevant countries, and maximize its international exposure. Such moves amplify international disruptive factors regarding the Taiwan Question, with the fundamental aim of challenging the One-China Principle and stripping the Taiwan Question of its inherent nature as China’s internal affair.

I. Historical Origin of U.S. Internationalization of the Taiwan Question and Literature Review

The Taiwan Question is purely China’s internal affair. Driven by hegemonic mentality and Cold War thinking, the United States has long meddled in the Taiwan Question under the strategy of containing China with Taiwan. The U.S. push for the internationalization of the Taiwan Question dates back to the 1950s, with its core logic of turning Taiwan into an unsinkable aircraft carrier to contain the People’s Republic of China. From military intervention to obstruct the People’s Liberation Army’s reunification efforts after the Korean War, to strengthening U.S.-Taiwan military and political ties in the post-Cold War era, the United States has continuously hollowed out its One-China policy. It attempts to decouple the Taiwan Question from China’s internal affairs and turn it into an issue subject to multilateral interference by external forces.

The U.S. attempt to internationalize the Taiwan Question emerged at the very inception of the issue. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. The next day, the U.S. decided to launch armed intervention in Korea and dispatched its Seventh Fleet to intrude into the Taiwan Strait. On June 27, U.S. President Harry Truman issued a statement ordering the Seventh Fleet to block any military action against Taiwan, claiming that Taiwan’s future status should be determined pending the restoration of Pacific security, the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty, or deliberation by the United Nations. While militarily intervening in the Taiwan Question, the Truman administration openly put forward the undetermined status of Taiwan theory. By blatantly using military force to block the Chinese mainland’s reunification of Taiwan and taking Taiwan occupation as a long-term policy, the U.S. seriously violated China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and hindered China’s reunification process, laying the groundwork for the protracted Taiwan Question. In fact, immediately after the emergence of the Taiwan Question, the U.S. began to pursue its internationalization, leaving enduring international obstacles to China’s settlement of the issue to this day.

Throughout the ups and downs of China-U.S. relations, the Taiwan Question has always been positively correlated with bilateral ties. External international factors affecting the Taiwan Question have waxed and waned, exerting strong disruptions to cross-Strait affairs in multiple phases: the 1950s–1990s, the early 21st century, and post-2016. Correspondingly, the frequency and intensity of U.S. efforts to internationalize the Taiwan Question have fluctuated in tandem with China-U.S. relations, with cross-strait political changes and the island authorities’ varying stances on the issue serving as critical intervening variables.

In recent years, amid intensified China-U.S. strategic competition, the U.S. has regarded Taiwan as a crucial strategic card to divert China’s strategic attention and contain its rapid rise, seeking to achieve the goal of containing China with Taiwan by playing the Taiwan card. To escalate its interference, the Biden administration has actively united Western allies to meddle in cross-Strait affairs and hype up the internationalization of the Taiwan Question. Since 2021, a growing number of countries and international organizations have issued joint statements with the U.S. advocating so-called "peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait".

Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, substantive U.S.-Taiwan relations have advanced rapidly in recent years, with Taiwan receiving upgraded political and military support from the U.S. Since the DPP took office in 2016, it has colluded with U.S.-led external forces out of separatist interests for "Taiwan independence", closely aligned itself with the U.S. containment strategy against China, and intensified its practices of relying on the U.S. to seek independence and resisting reunification by force. This has further escalated the internationalization momentum of the Taiwan Question.

Academic circles have produced extensive mature research on the tactics, strategies, impacts and future trends of U.S. efforts to internationalize the Taiwan Question. In terms of tactics, the Biden administration has coordinated efforts across five dimensions: legitimizing Taiwan-related discourse, advancing legislative support, leveraging alliance systems, consolidating Taiwan’s so-called diplomatic allies, and expanding multi-issue agendas to push forward the internationalization of the Taiwan Question. Meanwhile, the U.S. has strengthened narrative construction for the internationalization of the Taiwan Question in global political communication, establishing a 1+4 Taiwan-related narrative framework anchored in democracy, economy, peace and internationalism discourses. Strategically, U.S. approaches include political tactics, alliance tactics, diplomatic tactics and issue-based tactics. In terms of impacts, the Biden administration has continuously strengthened its strategy of containing China with Taiwan, exploited pro-Taiwan forces in Congress to upgrade substantive U.S.-Taiwan relations, and further internationalized the Taiwan Question. This has emboldened the DPP authorities’ attempt to seek independence by relying on external forces and raised the risk of cross-Strait conflicts. Regarding future trends, the incoming Trump administration has shown a slowdown in advancing the internationalization of the Taiwan Question, manifested in weakened congressional legislative support for Taiwan, fading values-based advocacy for Taiwan, diminishing coordination among U.S. allies in backing Taiwan, declining momentum in U.S. efforts to consolidate Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, and contraction of agendas for expanding Taiwan’s so-called international space.

In summary, existing studies have comprehensively analyzed and sorted out the U.S. push for the internationalization of the Taiwan Question from diverse theoretical and policy perspectives. Nevertheless, most research is confined to examining U.S. Taiwan policy shifts or bilateral U.S.-Taiwan relations, with a predominant focus on the Biden era. Systematic specialized research on this issue remains relatively insufficient. The growing risk of the Taiwan Question’s internationalization in recent years is closely linked to intensified China-U.S. strategic competition amid great-power rivalry and evolving East Asian geopolitics. Further in-depth analysis is needed on the U.S. underlying strategic intentions and ensuing harms, as well as prudent assessment of its implementation paths and effects. In particular, it is worth exploring how the Trump 2.0 administration will inherit and adjust the Biden-era political legacy on the internationalization of the Taiwan Question, its distinctive practices and future trajectory. This paper analyzes the above issues based on official U.S. documents, existing academic research and latest policy developments.

II. U.S. Strategic Intent in Internationalizing the Taiwan Question and Its Harms

U.S. Taiwan policy has always been embedded in the overall framework of China-U.S. relations, while its approach to China ties in recent years has been incorporated into the so-called framework of great-power strategic competition. Against this backdrop, the U.S. treats Taiwan as a pawn to contain the Chinese mainland, deliberately hyping up the internationalization of the Taiwan Question — an inherent Chinese internal affair — to raise the cost of China’s reunification and delay cross-Strait reunification for strategic containment purposes. Ultimately, the U.S. push for the internationalization of the Taiwan Question serves its overarching strategy of containing China.

The landscape of China-U.S. strategic competition has remained unchanged from Trump’s first term, through four years of the Biden administration, to Trump’s return to the White House in 2025. The U.S. has continuously hollowed out the One-China policy, and U.S.-Taiwan relations are evolving toward substantive diplomatic ties without formal diplomatic recognition. Under the guise of the One-China policy, the U.S. advances substantive relations with Taiwan, which perfectly aligns with the DPP authorities’ pursuit of steadily deepening substantive U.S.-Taiwan partnership. U.S.-Taiwan collusion has deepened increasingly, with bilateral ties taking on stronger official overtones. In recent years, the U.S. has adopted substantive measures to cater to the demands of "Taiwan independence" forces and support Taiwan’s expansion of so-called international space, fueling the growing internationalization of the Taiwan Question.

The Taiwan Question is purely China’s internal affair, and its so-called internationalization is in essence a key component of the U.S. cognitive warfare against China. Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in 2022, cognitive warfare has become an important tool in great-power games. The U.S.-launched cognitive warfare against China constitutes a vital part of its new containment strategy. Exploiting the international community’s lack of familiarity with the historical origins of the Taiwan Question, Western countries attempt to Ukrainize the Taiwan Question to obstruct China’s reunification and peaceful rise. In February 2023, former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken blatantly claimed that the Taiwan Strait is not China’s internal affair but a global issue, attempting to legitimize U.S. military intervention in cross-Strait security. The core motivation behind the U.S. push for internationalization is to strengthen military deterrence against the Chinese mainland and deter any use of force by the mainland against Taiwan. As China’s military strength and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities advance, the military gap between China and the U.S. narrows, eroding U.S. capability of deterrence by denial.

Research by Harvard University Professor Graham Allison points out that China’s A2/AD capabilities have extended to the First Island Chain and will reach Guam in the Second Island Chain by 2025, leaving the U.S. with lost dominant advantages in the region. To bolster military deterrence against the mainland, the Biden administration has deepened military and security cooperation with Taiwan to arm the island, while leveraging its alliance strategy to rally more Western countries for military containment of China and sustain the internationalization of the Taiwan Question.

Overall, the U.S. strategic intentions boil down to two points:First, to build a U.S.-dominated discourse system on the Taiwan Question to contain China’s development. By internationalizing the issue, the U.S. seeks to mount international pressure on China, contain and suppress its development, and gain bargaining chips for negotiations with the mainland across all fields.Second, to make Taiwan a pivotal link in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The U.S. has integrated more Taiwan-related content into its Indo-Pacific Strategy in recent years to amplify Taiwan’s role in the region. This helps forge a common perceived enemy for its allies to mitigate internal divisions, and enables the U.S. to advance its Indo-Pacific agenda under the pretext of safeguarding Taiwan’s security, creating excuses for increased military deployments in the region. Since the launch of Trump 2.0, U.S. Taiwan policy has been guided by pragmatic transactionalism centered on America First, further reducing Taiwan to a pawn in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The negative impacts and harms of the Taiwan Question’s internationalization are self-evident. It inflicts severe damage on cross-Strait relations and China-U.S. ties, and may spill over to the entire Western Pacific region if improperly managed.

III. Implementation Paths and Effects of U.S. Internationalization of the Taiwan Question

Since Trump’s first term in 2017, the U.S. executive branch and Congress have acted in tandem, uniting Western allies to advance the internationalization of the Taiwan Question via domestic legislation, cognitive discourse shaping, military deterrence reinforcement and international alliance coordination. The DPP authorities, bent on seeking independence through external forces, have actively colluded with the U.S. under its instigation and support, severely undermining cross-Strait peace and stability, complicating cross-Strait situation, and raising the difficulty and cost for the Chinese mainland to resolve the Taiwan Question.

1.Enshrining Legal Basis for Internationalization via Domestic Legislative Revision

The U.S. Congress enacts Taiwan-related domestic laws to pave the way for Taiwan’s expansion of international space and lay legal groundwork for future U.S. interference in Taiwan affairs. Since 2017, the U.S. executive and legislative branches have reached high consensus on accelerating the internationalization of the Taiwan Question. Congress has become a stronghold for containing China with Taiwan and pushing Taiwan to confront China, passing multiple bills over the years to support Taiwan’s international participation, ease restrictions on U.S.-Taiwan exchanges, and advocate Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.

The Taipei Act stands as the most representative congressional legislation advancing the internationalization of the Taiwan Question. In March 2020, Trump formally signed the so-called Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, marking a shift from verbal policy support to legislative and tangible action for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. In July 2023, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, which falsely claims that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 is irrelevant to Taiwan, rejects its constraints on Taiwan’s international status, and mandates actions to elevate Taiwan’s global standing. Exploiting the absence of explicit wording in Resolution 2758 stating Taiwan is part of China, the bill confuses global public opinion and advocates for "Taiwan independence". Nevertheless, major Taiwan-related legislations including the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (2018), Taipei Act (2020) and Taiwan Assurance Act (2020), though signed into law, retain enormous ambiguous leeway, carrying more symbolic than substantive significance.

Since 2025, state legislatures across the U.S. have successively passed pro-Taiwan resolutions. Following Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota, the Illinois House of Representatives adopted Resolution 0108 in May 2025, supporting deepened sister-state ties with Taiwan for five consecutive years, reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act, backing Illinois enterprises referring to the island as "Taiwan", advocating bilateral trade agreement negotiations and Taiwan’s accession to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The resolution endorses Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UN, WHO, ICAO, UNFCCC and INTERPOL, and opposes any distortion or abuse of Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s contributions to the international community.

2.Shaping Global Cognitive Discourse for the Internationalization of the Taiwan Question

Constrained by the One-China Principle as a universal international consensus, the U.S. cannot blatantly interfere in China’s internal affairs. Instead, it manipulates the Taiwan Question into a global issue to establish alternative rules outside the existing international legal system. Adopting a binary framework of freedom versus power and democracy versus autocracy, the U.S. leverages cross-Strait affairs to stoke ideological confrontation, fragment the international community, and frame the Chinese mainland as a hostile other in Western public perception. It launches cognitive and legal warfare on Taiwan-related issues to raise China’s diplomatic costs, deplete its strategic resources and contain its development.

In recent years, anti-China forces in the West have sought to reinterpret UN Resolution 2758 within the UN system, reviving the discredited undetermined status of Taiwan theory. U.S. politicians have repeatedly claimed on various occasions that Resolution 2758 does not involve Taiwan or define its status. In October 2021, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Rick Waters falsely accused the People’s Republic of China of misinterpreting Resolution 2758 to exclude Taiwan from the UN and its affiliated agencies. Richard Bush, former Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), echoed the claim that the resolution only addresses the legitimate representation of China at the UN rather than Taiwan’s territorial affiliation to China. Antony Blinken subsequently issued a statement supporting Taiwan’s participation in the UN system, urging UN member states to back Taiwan’s meaningful international participation in line with U.S. One-China policy. In September 2025, AIT questioned the validity of the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, reviving the undetermined status of Taiwan theory and blatantly denying the post-WWII international order, with the U.S. State Department endorsing such remarks.

Encouraged by the U.S., its allies have intensified official exchanges with Taiwan authorities across multiple fields, challenging the international norm of the One-China Principle. The Australian Senate and Dutch Parliament have passed motions claiming Resolution 2758 excludes Taiwan. In January 2026, the European Parliament adopted two resolutions on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy 2025 annual implementation reports, incorporating numerous pro-Taiwan clauses. The resolutions falsely declare the Taiwan Strait international waters with freedom of navigation, condemn the Chinese mainland for intimidating cross-Strait peace and stability, claim cross-Strait jurisdictions are mutually independent, and oppose China’s alleged distortion of Resolution 2758. Such provocations seriously violate the One-China Principle, disregard the UN Charter and basic norms of international relations, send wrong signals to separatist forces for "Taiwan independence", and face widespread international opposition and condemnation.

3.Hyping Cross-Strait Tensions and Exerting Maximum Pressure via Military Deterrence

The U.S. actively advances U.S.-Taiwan military and security cooperation, integrates Taiwan into its regional alliance security framework, and employs military deterrence to block China’s settlement of the Taiwan Question by military means. Seizing on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the U.S. draws parallels between the Ukraine crisis and cross-Strait situation, hyping the narrative of today Ukraine, tomorrow Taiwan and pushing for the Ukrainization of the Taiwan Question. This falsely equates Taiwan, an inalienable part of China, with sovereign Ukraine, promotes NATO’s strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific, and serves as a core component of consolidating U.S. global alliances to check China’s challenge to U.S. regional military hegemony.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has directly impacted U.S. policy calculations. To enhance the credibility of deterrence against any mainland military action on Taiwan, senior U.S. officials have increasingly disclosed potential response strategies and embraced the concept of integrated deterrence combining deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. This whole-of-government approach integrates military, economic and diplomatic tools and deepens all-round cooperation with regional allies to mount maximum pressure on China. In essence, U.S. cross-Strait policy has shifted from maintaining cross-Strait status quo to strengthening military deterrence to safeguard U.S. regional military supremacy. U.S. officials openly regard integrated deterrence as the core policy anchor to deter mainland military action against Taiwan, with strengthened cooperation with allies and partners as an indispensable link.

Senior U.S. officials constantly amplify the China military threat theory, warning of possible military responses to mainland actions in the Taiwan Strait, repeatedly signaling potential abandonment of strategic ambiguity, and adopting an open stance on U.S. military defense commitments to Taiwan. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has heightened U.S. military concerns over potential mainland reunification operations. Serving officers including Mark Milley, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, have testified in Congress to hype China’s military threat, pushing for increased defense budgets and enhanced U.S. deterrence. Former U.S. President Joe Biden repeatedly made verbal gaffes claiming military defense of Taiwan to create psychological and public opinion deterrence. The U.S. incessantly hypes the China threat theory to court Asia-Pacific allies, advocate U.S. military defense of Taiwan, exaggerate China’s so-called aggression threat, and frame China as an escalating strategic challenge. In effect, such moves have aggravated cross-Strait tensions and tarnished China’s international image.

4.Leveraging Alliance Systems to Encourage Collective Third-Party Intervention in the Taiwan Question

The U.S. woos allies and partners to rally global attention and intervention in the Taiwan Question, making international collective meddling a primary means of its internationalization. The U.S. actively advances the internationalization of the Taiwan Question through diplomatic means, particularly via its alliance network to forge unified international positions and actions on cross-Strait affairs under bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. In the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. exploits mini-lateral mechanisms to meddle in the Taiwan Question. Member states reach consensus based on shared values and threat perceptions, embedding the Taiwan Question into mini-lateral frameworks to drive the transformation of U.S. alliance architecture. The U.S. amplifies the role of treaty allies and partner countries, embedding its Taiwan policy into bilateral ties with Japan, South Korea and Australia, as well as multilateral intelligence and military frameworks including the Quad, AUKUS and U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation, plus NATO. This accelerates the alliance-based and multilateralization of U.S. Taiwan policy. Given their military-security alliance nature, these mechanisms are more sensitive than routine bilateral/multilateral statements on cross-Strait peace stability, laying the groundwork for a multi-layered military intervention alliance. While containing China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, such moves further institutionalize the internationalization of the Taiwan Question.

The U.S. incorporates the Taiwan Question into various bilateral and multilateral agendas under its dominance, inciting allies to echo its stance and hype the issue into a global hotspot. Pushed by U.S. pressure, its Ukrainized Taiwan policy has spilled over to shape allied policy thinking, with NATO and other allies plotting more active meddling in cross-Strait affairs. Led and orchestrated by the U.S., nearly all Western countries have engaged in collective or individual interference in cross-Strait affairs to varying degrees. The Taiwan Question has thus evolved into a core bilateral and multilateral diplomatic issue, and even a major global flashpoint and crisis hotspot.

Since February 2025, joint statements from U.S.-Japan summit, U.S.-Japan-South Korea foreign ministers’ meeting and G7 foreign ministers’ meeting have falsely highlighted the importance of cross-Strait peace and stability, opposed unilateral status quo alteration by force or coercion, and endorsed Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. U.S. warships including USS Johnson and USNS Bowditch, as well as Canadian frigate HMCS Ottawa, have transited the Taiwan Strait consecutively; British patrol vessel HMS Spey and Japanese destroyer JS Takanami have also sailed through the strait with deliberate media hype. Eager to stir up troubles in the Indo-Pacific and opportunistically play the Taiwan card, these countries’ high-profile naval transits have seriously undermined cross-Strait peace and stability. In advancing the internationalization of the Taiwan Question, the U.S. employs political proxies and alliance intervention, heightening the recklessness of its provocative acts.

5. Instigating DPP Authorities to Collude in Advancing Internationalization

Since assuming office in 2016, the DPP authorities, emboldened by U.S. instigation and support, have fully pushed for the internationalization of the Taiwan Question to pursue de facto independence and expand Taiwan’s international participation space. Citing so-called shared global interests and Taiwan’s strategic political-economic value, the DPP continuously advances the issue’s internationalization. Backed by Western anti-China forces, Taiwan’s political figures conduct frequent overseas visits to collude with Western anti-China politicians, spread separatist fallacies for "Taiwan independence", seek international media exposure, upgrade substantive foreign relations, expand Taiwan’s so-called international space, and rally external forces to back separatist agendas.

During Tsai Ing-wen’s tenure, Taiwan actively joined the U.S.-led democratic alliance and strove to forge a U.S.-Taiwan values-based partnership. In October 2022, the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) co-hosted the World Movement for Democracy Assembly with Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, inviting European parliamentarians and think tank representatives to mobilize so-called democratic forces, forge an eastern front of democratic struggle, and hype the false narrative of today Ukraine, tomorrow Taiwan. In July 2023, NED President Damon Wilson visited Taiwan to attend the 20th anniversary conference of Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and awarded Tsai Ing-wen a so-called Democracy Service Medal. Taiwan authorities were also invited to the third Global Democracy Summit hosted by the U.S. in March 2024. The U.S. practice of pursuing bloc politics and camp confrontation under the guise of democracy represents a revival of Cold War thinking. Its so-called Democracy Summits, widely questioned by public opinion, merely serve to consolidate U.S. interests and hegemony in the name of democracy.

Since Lai Ching-te took office, his administration has adopted more radical practices of relying on the U.S. to seek independence and resisting reunification by force, with stronger confrontation against the mainland and more provocative posturing. While advocating adherence to rules-based international order and regional peace, the U.S. frames China as a rule-breaker and destabilizing force in global public discourse. Lai Ching-te has fully embraced U.S. narrative frameworks in cross-Strait rhetoric, adopting Western discourse to depict cross-Strait relations, smear the mainland, and replace the one-China essence with the false narrative of democracy versus autocracy. He openly portrays Taiwan as a sovereign independent state, inflates its status with grand international rhetoric, and seeks to build new separatist discourse for "Taiwan independence". Lai repeatedly claims Taiwan belongs to the world, equates cross-Strait issues with the Russia-Ukraine and Palestine-Israel conflicts, advocates value diplomacy, and attempts to secure de facto international recognition of Taiwan independence via the internationalization of the Taiwan Question, fully exposing his opportunist nature of seeking independence by colluding with foreign forces. He seeks to reshape the international discourse narrative on cross-Strait relations to sway global public opinion, leverage Western external forces to meddle in cross-Strait situation, and gain political bargaining chips against the mainland.

U.S. moves to distort the international legitimacy of UN Resolution 2758 and advocate Taiwan’s substantive participation in UN affairs have further emboldened the DPP’s pursuit of expanded international space. In July 2024, the annual meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), established by Western anti-China parliamentarians, adopted a landmark resolution endorsing distorted interpretations of Resolution 2758 by U.S. and Taiwan political figures and scholars. Lai Ching-te falsely claimed at the meeting that the mainland misinterprets the resolution to fabricate legal grounds for military action against Taiwan. In November 2025, Taiwan’s Vice Leader Hsiao Bi-khim delivered a speech at the IPAC annual meeting held at the European Parliament building, which Taiwan authorities hyped as a historic first address by a Taiwan vice leader at the European Parliament. Such acts exemplify IPAC-DPP collusion to mount anti-China public opinion campaigns, interfere in China’s internal affairs and advance the internationalization of the Taiwan Question.

IV. Characteristics and Trajectory of the Internationalization of the Taiwan Question Under Trump 2.0

Since returning to office in 2025, the Trump administration’s governance remains anchored in America First, with its Taiwan policy guided by transactional interest maximization. Unlike the Biden administration’s explicit commitment to defending Taiwan, Trump has maintained strategic ambiguity on potential mainland military reunification or U.S. defense commitments, only expressing reluctance to see cross-Strait conflicts. It is thus clear that the U.S. will retain strategic ambiguity on Taiwan in the future, with concrete practices centered on U.S. military and economic strategic interests.

In its second term, the U.S. will continue to play the Taiwan card to serve China-U.S. strategic competition and advance its ambition of containing China with Taiwan. The U.S. tendency to hollow out the One-China Principle, contain China with Taiwan and even damage Taiwan to contain China has become more pronounced. It will largely sustain the Biden-era momentum of internationalizing the Taiwan Question with adjusted priorities.

1.Characteristics of the Internationalization of the Taiwan Question Under Trump 2.0

A.Declining congressional legislative momentum for pro-Taiwan bills. Since Trump’s second term, congressional progress on Taiwan-related legislation has slowed, with most proposals carrying only symbolic significance, reflecting congressional interference constrained by the executive branch’s policy preferences. As a representative of strongman politics in the U.S., Trump favors executive dominance in foreign policy, especially on core national security and strategic competition issues, with heightened concentration of executive power. Unlike the Biden era’s close congressional-executive coordination on Taiwan issues, the Trump administration has strengthened its control over Taiwan policy, reducing congressional initiative and enthusiasm for Taiwan-related legislation. This does not mean Congress has abandoned its interventionist stance; instead, it has shifted from an active promoter to a passive responder, adjusting the volume and content of Taiwan-related bills in line with the administration’s strategic priorities. For instance, military sales-related proposals gain priority amid the administration’s focus on arming Taiwan for military deterrence, while symbolic pro-Taiwan bills prone to straining China-U.S. ties are reined in, resulting in fewer and slower legislative advances.

B.Weakened value-based alliance discourse between the U.S. and Taiwan. Trump prioritizes pragmatic interests over ideological considerations. While recognizing the Taiwan card as a vital tool to contain China, his administration frames Taiwan policy purely through interest-based transactionalism. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy makes no mention of ideological rhetoric such as liberal democracy and anti-autocracy when assessing Taiwan-U.S. interests, reflecting Trump’s transactional diplomacy decoupled from traditional political ideology. In policy practice, the administration no longer deliberately portrays Taiwan as a beacon of democracy or an outpost of the free world in Asia, focusing instead on tangible interest exchanges in bilateral interactions. For example, the 2025 U.S.-Taiwan economic dialogue centered on semiconductor cooperation and agricultural procurement, with perfunctory U.S. responses to DPP attempts to hype shared democratic values, excluding such rhetoric from joint statement core content. This policy orientation lays bare the interest-exchange essence behind U.S.-Taiwan ideological posturing, undermining the DPP’s strategy of securing long-term Western support via value-based alliances and weakening the effectiveness of its global democracy card.

C.Diminished enthusiasm for supporting Taiwan’s expansion of international space. Though maintaining petty provocative moves on Taiwan issues, the Trump 2.0 administration lacks substantial momentum in assisting Taiwan to consolidate diplomatic allies and expand international space. U.S. retreat and reduced engagement in international organizations have directly weakened its capability to back Taiwan globally. Since taking office for the second time, Trump has adjusted U.S. participation in international organizations by slashing UN funding, withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council, suspending aid to UNRWA, and quitting UNESCO. In January 2026, Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from 35 non-UN international organizations and 31 UN-affiliated agencies, with planned exits from the WHO and Paris Agreement to advance America First diplomacy. Public opinion on the island acknowledges Taiwan’s diminishing prospects of joining the UN, WHO and other organizations via U.S. support, rendering the DPP’s pursuit of international space futile and costly.

D.Arming Taiwan and exerting pressure on China via military deterrence. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy elevates the priority of the Taiwan Question and emphasizes military deterrence in maritime affairs. Geopolitically, the U.S. regards Taiwan’s location as a pivotal node for sustaining Western Pacific military deployments and troop mobility. The strategy openly pledges to strengthen allied capabilities to deter any attempt to seize Taiwan, firmly tethering Taiwan to the U.S. strategic chariot and escalating efforts to arm the island. Trump has paid close attention to arms sales to Taiwan since taking office. In November 2025, the U.S. State Department approved the first arms sale package of Trump’s second term worth approximately 330 million U.S. dollars, covering advanced military equipment and technical support and further escalating cross-Strait tensions. In December 2025, the administration approved another arms sale to Taiwan exceeding 11.1 billion U.S. dollars, a record high in U.S.-Taiwan arms transactions. The weaponry features enhanced offensive and anti-landing capabilities, aligning with the DPP’s strategy of bolstering defense resilience and asymmetric warfare. This marks an escalation of the U.S. strategy of arming Taiwan to contain China, pushing cross-Strait situation to the brink of conflict and severely threatening regional stability and cross-Strait peace.

E.Establishing a regional allied mechanism for Taiwan defense coordination. The U.S. seeks to scale back direct forward confrontation and share defense burdens via its alliance system, building a regional strategic balance mechanism for Taiwan defense coordination through distributed troop deployments and allied linkage. Beyond unprecedented focus on Taiwan, the 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly defines two core U.S. national interests regarding Taiwan: its global dominance in the semiconductor industry, and its geopolitical position as a vital corridor to the Second Island Chain and hub connecting Northeast and Southeast Asia. The strategy also links the South China Sea and Taiwan Question, echoing the U.S. policy trend of integrated maneuvering across the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. It stresses maintaining a favorable conventional military balance as a core element of strategic competition, prioritizing deterrence of cross-Strait conflict ideally through military superiority. The ambiguous wording reveals U.S. uncertainty over its military capability to cope with potential cross-Strait conflicts. Accordingly, the strategy acknowledges the U.S. cannot and should not bear First Island Chain defense burdens alone, urging Japan, South Korea, Australia and other allies to expand U.S. military access to ports and facilities, increase defense spending and invest in deterrence capabilities. This signals U.S. efforts to build a Taiwan defense coordination mechanism incorporating broader regional partners, further transforming cross-Strait affairs into a collective regional security issue.

2.Trajectory of the Internationalization of the Taiwan Question Under Trump 2.0

One quarter into Trump’s second term, the future trajectory of the Taiwan Question’s internationalization remains fraught with uncertainties. In the short run, the Trump administration’s cautious handling of Taiwan issues to facilitate China-U.S. economic and trade agreements and bilateral cooperation has temporarily curbed and slowed down its internationalization momentum. In the long run, however, the U.S. will never abandon this strategic gambit. Trump’s ambiguous stance on defense commitments to Taiwan and lukewarm attitude toward the Lai Ching-te administration, coupled with intense focus on arms sales, tariffs and semiconductor cooperation, demonstrate the transactional duality of his Taiwan policy rooted in America First interests. The pace of future internationalization efforts hinges on U.S. strategic calculations and interest trade-offs in China-U.S. competition.

Determined to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose "Taiwan independence" by force if necessary, the U.S. is reluctant to be dragged into direct military conflict with China. Maintaining the cross-Strait status quo of no reunification, no formal independence and no military conflict best serves U.S. national interests. Trump’s remarks in May 2025 that China-U.S. economic and trade talks are conducive to peace and reunification drew widespread cross-Strait attention. In October 2025, the RAND Corporation, a top U.S. think tank, released the landmark report Stabilizing U.S.-China Competition, recommending decades-long Taiwan policy adjustments including no support for Taiwan independence, no pursuit of permanent cross-Strait separation, no opposition to peaceful reunification, and even endorsement of gradual peaceful reunification. In January 2026, Trump stated in a New York Times interview that the Taiwan Question is China’s internal affair, dealing a blow to the Lai administration and highlighting U.S. indifference to cross-Strait provocations. Faced with diminishing effectiveness of hardline containment to block cross-Strait reunification, the U.S. has resorted to delaying tactics, with the gradual reunification theory emerging as a loss-control strategy. Ostensibly supportive of China’s reunification, this theory is essentially a transactional ploy for the U.S. to gain bargaining leverage and extract concessions from China, which demands high vigilance.

Against the backdrop of critical Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations, escalating U.S.-Iran tensions and a major U.S. strategic pivot to the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. is eager to avoid cross-Strait flare-ups. Meanwhile, U.S. allies hold divergent interests on the Taiwan Question and disagree on burden-sharing. European allies are constrained by uncertain Russia-Ukraine negotiations and European security instability, limiting their capacity to invest in the Indo-Pacific and lacking unified internal stances on Taiwan issues. In the Asia-Pacific, Japan’s radical pro-Taiwan moves align with U.S. strategic intentions, yet Japan’s far-right drift poses potential risks for U.S. reliance on Tokyo to advance the internationalization of the Taiwan Question. In U.S.-Taiwan relations, Lai Ching-te has maintained an elusive posture toward the U.S. since taking office, increasingly exposing his separatist nature as a staunch advocate for "Taiwan independence". Growing U.S. concerns over cross-Strait runaway tensions have sustained lingering skepticism toward Lai within U.S. policy circles. To allay U.S. misgivings, the Lai administration has conceded to U.S. demands on tariffs, arms sales, economy and technology, yet failed to secure explicit U.S. defense commitments, with mounting Taiwanese public skepticism toward the U.S. Persistent mutual distrust between the U.S. and Taiwan will also mitigate risks of further internationalization of the Taiwan Question.

In summary, uncertainties persist in Trump 2.0’s China and Taiwan policies, yet the Taiwan Question will remain the core flashpoint of China-U.S. strategic games. The overall trajectory of China-U.S. relations will determine cross-Strait developments as an inevitable trend. The positive head-of-state meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Trump during the 2025 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Busan laid a sound foundation for bilateral ties. A potential Trump visit to China in April 2026 may stabilize China-U.S. relations and restore the traditional track of joint cross-Strait crisis management. Given scheduled high-level China-U.S. engagements and follow-up economic and trade consultations in 2026, the Trump administration prioritizes stability in China policy, as evidenced by its temporary suspension of new arms sales to Taiwan to foster short-term bilateral détente. Nevertheless, the upcoming November 2026 U.S. midterm elections and evolving global hotspot conflicts may reignite structural China-U.S. contradictions and trigger new risk points. A deterioration in China-U.S. relations will inevitably prompt renewed U.S. escalation of its contain-China-with-Taiwan strategy and intensified efforts to internationalize the Taiwan Question, requiring enduring high vigilance.

V. Conclusion

The Chinese mainland’s strength and capability to oppose independence and promote reunification have grown increasingly robust, with diversified countermeasure tools against external meddling in cross-Strait affairs and separatist provocations by "Taiwan independence" forces, yielding continuous victories in safeguarding national sovereignty and curbing separatism. The comprehensive strength gap between China and the U.S. is narrowing, while the cross-Strait strength gap is widening rapidly, enhancing the mainland’s dominance, control and shaping power over cross-Strait relations. For China, it is critical to maintain strategic resolve, seize opportunities amid complex global and regional changes, proactively shape external dynamics to offset strategic pressures, and expand national security and development space.

In response to the U.S. push for the internationalization of the Taiwan Question, the mainland should adopt the following countermeasures: Comprehensively assess the evolutionary trajectory of U.S. practices on the internationalization of the Taiwan Question, enhance legal discourse capabilities, and guide the international community to form correct perceptions of Taiwan’s legal status. China needs to conduct targeted legal struggles at the international level regarding Taiwan’s legal status under international law, and more effectively advance the cause of national reunification within the international order underpinned by the UN Charter and international law.(Author: Wen Tianpeng, Lecturer, School of Marxism, University of Science and Technology Beijing)