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European Integration, Strategic Autonomy and China-Europe Relations

Date:2024-04-23 Source:International Cooperation Center
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The integration process that began after the Second World War has brought huge benefits to Europe, but it has run into headwinds in recent years with the rise of populism, the polarization of European political thought and the increasing fragmentation of political parties. Fearing that it will be marginalized in a changing world and that the United States' strategic center of gravity is shifting eastward, Europe is actively strengthening its strategic autonomy to defend its interests without relying on other powers, including reducing its security dependence on the United States and distancing itself from the United States in its policy toward China. Whether Europe can achieve strategic autonomy will depend on the in-depth development of European integration. In recent years, the policies of the EU and its member states towards China have undergone adjustments and changes, and the two sides and contradictions are prominent. China has maintained continuity in its policy towards Europe, and supports Europe in achieving strategic independence and playing a greater role in the world. In the future, cooperation and competition in China-Eu relations will be intertwined, and the importance and complexity of China-Eu relations will rise simultaneously.

As the world's great changes accelerate, two key questions deserve consideration, both of which have important implications for Europe. The first concerns a multipolar world. While the United States currently refuses to recognize a multipolar world, French President Emmanuel Macron believes that the world of the future will be multipolar, regardless of human will. Now Western countries are paying special attention to the "Global South", believing that the development of the "global South" countries is very important. Dominique Moisi, a famous French scholar of international affairs, believes that the world is forming a multipolar world consisting of the so-called "global West", "Global East" and "global South". What role will Europe play in this global landscape? In April 2023, on his way back from China, Macron eagerly emphasized that the world should not only have China and the United States, but also Europe, and Europe should become the "third pole" of the world.

The second question concerns the evolution of the international landscape. After the end of the Second World War, the world experienced more than 40 years of bipolar confrontation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolar confrontation, will the world, which has just enjoyed the peace benefit of the Cold War after more than three decades, return to the Cold War pattern of bloc confrontation? This issue also concerns a key player - Europe - and, more precisely, Europe's strategic choices. Since the escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2022, some people in Western countries have tied China to Russia, while Europe has become closer to the United States due to the Ukraine crisis. Clearly, Europe is a key factor. Europe and Russia are already in a state of all-out confrontation, while the United States has identified China as its main adversary. What position will Europe take on China? Does Europe's China strategy follow or distance itself from the US? The discussion of European integration is now really focused on the question of Europe's Strategic Autonomy.

European integration: Benefits and Challenges

As we all know, the European Union is a special international actor. It is neither a state nor an international organization in the usual sense, but something in between. The European Union, the single Market, the Eurozone and the Schengen area constitute the new face and identity of Europe. The EU is certainly not the same as Europe, but the EU is widely recognized as Europe, because the EU has become the most influential actor in the region today.

The EU participates extensively in international activities and strives to play an important role on the world stage. Take the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of 20 (G20). The G7 nominally includes seven countries - the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy - but in reality the G7 summit includes, in addition to the heads of state or government of the above countries, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. As the name suggests, the G20 consists of 20 members, but in reality, there are only 19 countries, the other one being the European Union.

Europe's new face and new identity are the result of more than 70 years of European integration since the end of the Second World War. European integration has brought many benefits to Europe, among which the biggest benefit is the long period of peace maintained in Europe after the Second World War, which is rare in European history. The main battlefields of World War I and World War II were in Europe, and the main battlefields of the Cold War were also in Europe. Although European integration has brought huge economic benefits to European countries, the original intention of European integration is to achieve political goals and security guarantees, and the main purpose is to make Europe achieve peace and no more wars.

The second benefit of European integration has been the emergence of the EU as the world's most influential economy through the creation of a single large market of hundreds of millions of people and an Eurozone that now has 20 members. In 2022, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 27 EU member states reached 13.33 trillion euros, the total value of exports of goods was 2.57 trillion euros, and the total value of imports of goods was 3 trillion euros. The Euro accounted for 20.5% of the global foreign exchange reserves, ranking second (after the US dollar), and the share of the Euro in the global foreign exchange settlement currency reached about 38%. The European Single Market has four circulation advantages: free movement of goods, free movement of capital, free movement of services and free movement of people. In the European Union, border checks between countries no longer exist. Iceland and Norway are not members of the European Union, but they are members of the Schengen Agreement. Since the borders between the Nordic countries are open, when Sweden, Denmark and Finland joined the EU, Iceland and Norway effectively opened their borders with other EU member states. In addition, the EU negotiates foreign trade on behalf of EU member states. In the case of China's accession negotiations to the World Trade Organization, China did not hold bilateral negotiations with each of the 15 member states of the European Union at the time, but only with the European Commission. The EU has a common trade policy and member states can no longer negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries.

The third benefit of European integration is that it provides lessons for international cooperation in other parts of the world. Although the demonstration effect of the EU has been questioned after a series of challenges such as the European sovereign debt crisis, refugee crisis and Brexit, Europe, as the region with the highest degree of integration in the world today, still has an important reference role for governance and cooperation in other regions of the world. European integration has two wheels: one is deepening and the other is expanding. While the degree of European integration continues to deepen, the number of countries participating in European integration is also increasing, from the six countries that founded the EU to today's 27 countries, and there are still many countries waiting to join the EU. In 2022, Ukraine and Moldova will become official candidates for membership of the EU. In the process, Europeans invented the concept of a "Super-state," building on the original concept of a "National State." After European countries joined the EU and the Eurozone, they transferred the traditional sovereignty of foreign trade policy making and currency issuance to the EU, a "supranational" institution. Unlike Europe's historical attempts to unify by force, European integration is an entirely peaceful, voluntary process.

In recent years, European integration has faced major challenges, and populism from within the EU has had the greatest impact. Judging from the development of Europe since the 2008 global financial crisis, it is impossible for European integration to continue to develop as before, and the difficulty it has encountered has significantly increased. The EU has experienced the European sovereign debt crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine crisis and the resulting energy crisis. In this context, populism is on the rise in Europe, and Brexit is a result of the peak of populism.

Populism is anti-globalization, anti-integration and anti-elite. This not only puts great pressure on economic globalization, but also poses the biggest challenge to European integration. In the process of European integration, "Eurosceptic" and even "anti-European" forces have always existed in some European countries, and there is integration and anti-integration, but for a long time, "Eurosceptic" and "anti-European" forces have not become the dominant force in any country. There have been times when one or more countries have raised red flags in one area or on one issue, but no country has proposed leaving the EU. Brexit is therefore a heavy blow to European integration. In addition to the emergence of forces in the United Kingdom calling for Brexit, the "Alternative" party was born in Germany after the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2017, the AfD entered the German Federal Parliament and became the largest opposition party in Germany. The dominant narrative constructed by the German social elite after the end of World War II was that Germany had no choice but to integrate into Europe, that is, to join the European integration process. However, the slogan of the "AfD" is: Germany has a choice, Germany can choose to leave the European Union. It is clear that the AfD has expressed an open opposition to European integration, a position not taken by any political force in Germany since the end of World War II.

French populism is also growing fast. In both the 2017 and 2022 French elections, the far-right populist National Alliance led by Marine Le Pen posed the biggest challenge to President Emmanuel Macron's Ennahda Party (previously known as La Republique en Marche or La Republique en Marche). If the "National Alliance" wins, its serious impact on European integration will be far greater than Brexit. France is the chief architect of European integration and, together with Germany, is seen as the engine of the EU. If France were to leave the Eurozone and the EU, the engine of European integration would stall. In 2022, the "National Alliance" led by Le Pen won 89 seats in the French National Assembly election, a 10-fold increase from 2017, and the French ruling party camp failed to obtain a majority of seats in the National Assembly. With the continuous expansion of the influence of the "National Alliance", France will face a greater test on EU issues in the future.

In other European countries, populist forces are also growing fast. Italy's Five Star Movement "Brother party" is a populist or far-right political party, its influence is growing. After the 2013 Italian general election, the "Five Star Movement" rose to become the largest party in the Italian House of Representatives. In 2018, the Five Star Movement and the League joined forces to form a government. After the 2022 general election, a coalition of center-right parties composed of Italy's "brother party" "League" and "Forza Italia" won the parliamentary election, of which the "Brother party" received the most votes, and its leader Giorgia Meloni became the first female prime minister in Italian history.

The populist forces in Europe have two main appeals: one is economic and the other is cultural. It could also be said that European populism is an "uprising of two kinds of people," one of whom is poor and the other of whom is white. Poor people hate the divide between rich and poor, and white people struggle with cultural identity. These two forces intertwine to develop today's populism. Far right populism emphasizes identity and culture, far left populism emphasizes the opposition between the poor and the rich. However, both far-right and far-left populism believe that the root of the problem lies in economic globalization and European integration, accusing economic globalization of going too far and European integration of going too far. The core demand of European populism is to re-enforce traditional national sovereignty.

With the rise of extreme populism, political forces in Europe have in fact engaged in a contest between mainstream and populist parties in Europe. This game and contest will have a process. At present, this game is an ongoing one, and the impact of populism in Europe will depend on this process, and the future development of populism in Europe and the future of Europe as a whole may depend on this process.

At present, the following issues deserve attention. First, the premise of regional integration is that countries voluntarily surrender sovereignty, but populist forces all advocate "national first." If all European countries emphasize "national priorities," how can they promote European integration? Populism is therefore the biggest challenge to the European integration process and a serious blow to it. Second, although populism has always been anti-elite and anti-establishment, and does not like traditional political parties, once populist parties come to power, how they will govern the country is worthy of in-depth observation and study. After Italy's "Five Star Movement" came to power in 2018, the contradictions between it and the EU were very large, but what was equally striking was that the populist party gave up or no longer insisted on withdrawing from the Eurozone and the EU. Moreover, Hungary's deeply populist Prime Minister Orban Vik-tor, who has been re-elected four times, is known for his vocal support for "Illiberal Democracy." In fact, he is openly challenging the so-called "Neoliberalism" that has dominated the West over the past few decades. Despite risking universal condemnation in the West, Mr Orban has never said that Hungary wants to leave the EU. This raises another question: What exactly will a populist party do when it comes to power?

In summary, it seems to be concluded that although the abandonment of integration, as in the United Kingdom, has not become mainstream in EU member states, it is an undeniable fact that the European integration process has encountered serious resistance with the rise of populism, the polarization of European political thought, and the increasing fragmentation of political parties.

European Strategic Autonomy: Goals and Practices

The analysis from the two aspects of goal and practice is helpful to grasp the European strategic autonomy more accurately. French President Emmanuel Macron is an active advocate and promoter of European strategic autonomy. What does he mean by European strategic autonomy? Francis Gavan, director of the Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Alina Polyakova, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis, believe that for Macron, strategic autonomy means that Europe has its own place in the world and has the ability to influence world affairs. Like his predecessor, Charles A. J. M. de Gaulle, Mr. Macron does not want Europe or France to become powerless spectators in A world increasingly defined by competition for influence between a rising China and the United States.

The EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy stems, above all, from its fear of being marginalized in the midst of major changes in the world. In recent years, European politicians have repeatedly stressed that the EU must strengthen its capacity to act if it is to avoid being reduced from a "player" to a "playing field" and from a "participant" to a "spectator" on the global competitive stage. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 marked the return of traditional security to the top of Europe's political agenda. At the same time, European countries are rediscovering their dependence on the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for their security. Traditionally neutral countries such as Sweden and Finland renounced their neutrality status and applied to join NATO. This further demonstrates that despite more than 70 years of European integration, the EU still lacks its own defense capabilities. In March 2022, Josep Borrell, the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, put it bluntly when explaining the EU's intention to introduce the Strategic Compass: "We live in an era of growing strategic competition among nations and complex security threats, with the resurgence of power politics. This is not the world we Europeans chose - it is the world we face. In an increasingly competitive world order, the EU must be prepared to defend our interests and values."

Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy is also driven by the perception that the United States, despite its close ties with Europe, will not change its "America first" policy, no matter who is in the White House, nor will its strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific region. The Trump administration has been in office for four years, and the United States pursues unilateralism. While constantly withdrawing from international multilateral mechanisms, its attitude toward NATO has also become significantly cooler. In this context, European countries, worried that the United States is unwilling to continue to play the role of European security providers, have actively begun to increase cooperation in the field of defense. After taking office in 2021, President Joseph R. Biden took a series of steps to improve relations with European Allies, but Mr. Biden continued to advocate "America First" on the economy. This can be seen very clearly through the Inflation Reduction Act approved by the United States in 2022. Eva Michaels, a research fellow at the Institute of International Studies in Barcelona, Spain, expressed exactly what many in the European strategic community think: "While NATO and the United States are currently dominant in providing security in Europe, the United States' long-term strategic focus is in the Indo-Pacific region, and the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November 2024 is likely to weaken NATO." It is time to fundamentally recalibrate the debate about strategic autonomy, learn lessons, and make the necessary changes.

The goal of Europe's push for strategic autonomy is to be able to defend its interests without relying on other powers. The traditional European idea of autonomy focuses on national defense and security. However, although the core of "strategic autonomy" advocated by the mainstream European strategic community is still military defense, it is no longer limited to this, but also includes autonomy in such fields as economy, energy, technology, industrial chain and so on. Whether Europe can achieve strategic autonomy depends on whether it can continue to promote the process of European integration in the future, and defense autonomy is the key to strategic autonomy. The following is important for the EU if it is to avoid becoming an empty talk about strengthening its defense autonomy.

First, co-operation between France and Germany is crucial. Solidarity between France and Germany is good for both countries; The EU can only move forward if France and Germany are united, and if the EU moves forward, the status of France and Germany will rise. However, France and Germany are at loggerheads over the construction of EU defense.

Second, European countries must be willing to increase defense spending on a sustained basis, which is not easy for European countries.

Third, the efficient use of national military spending is crucial to improving Europe's defense capabilities. Ian Bond, director of foreign policy at the Center for European Reform, believes that while defense spending in the European Union is low as a percentage of GDP, its total is five times that of Russia, and Germany and Poland combined spent more on defense than Russia in 2019. As a result, he argues, "Europe's problem is not only the amount it spends on defense, but also the inefficiency of its spending." On this point, Borrell, the EU's High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, is not shy. He acknowledged that only 9% of the EU's defense research and technology development is carried out in cooperation between member states, and about 80% of defense procurement is still carried out at the national level, resulting in costly duplication of capabilities and serious fragmentation and inefficiency. To address this issue, Borrell believes that the EU should focus its investment on defense capacity building, encouraging member states to jointly purchase equipment and technology developed at EU level.

Finally, the ability to manage relations with NATO, especially the United States, is another challenge for European defense autonomy. Almost all European countries are NATO members and are part of the alliance's defense system. Europe's economic system is the European Union architecture, and in defense there is the NATO framework. Therefore, the prerequisite for Europe to achieve strategic autonomy is to manage its relations with NATO and the United States well. To this end, France proposes that enhancing the defense autonomy of the EU does not mean that European countries want to leave NATO, but hopes to strengthen the power of Europe in the NATO system, so as to improve the status of European countries in NATO and become respected partners of the United States. It can be seen that the strategic independence advocated by the EU is not to make a clean break with the United States and form an isolated Europe, let alone rely on the EU's own strength, but to maintain the alliance with the United States and maintain cooperation with China and other countries.

China-EU Relations: Adjusting and Shaping

The relations between China and the EU have always been highly concerned by the international community. China-EU relations are not only of great significance to China and Europe, but also have a crucial impact on the evolution of the international pattern and world order.

Since China's reform and opening up, China-EU relations have been dominated by economic and trade cooperation. However, in recent years, two major changes have taken place in China-EU relations. First, with China's growing comprehensive strength and international influence, China's status in the external relations of the EU and its member states is constantly rising. China policy has attracted wide attention and heated discussions in all European countries. Second, due to the changes in the power of China and Europe and the influence of ideology, the US policy towards China and the Ukraine crisis, the negative impact of the EU's policy towards China has increased. At the same time, given the significant common interests between China and Europe, there is also a strong voice within the EU to adopt pragmatic policies towards China and not blindly follow the US. In this context, the EU member states' China policies have undergone obvious adjustments and changes, and their duplicity and contradictions are prominent.

First, France, Germany, Central and Eastern European countries and EU institutions all have different views, and European countries do not speak with one voice on China policy. France, for example, insists that Europe should achieve strategic autonomy and not "dance with the United States" in its China policy. As mentioned earlier, after his visit to China in April 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron publicly stated that "we do not want to enter into the logic of bloc confrontation" and pointed out that Europe should not "adapt to the rhythm of the United States" on the Taiwan issue. Only by achieving strategic autonomy, he argued, could Europe avoid becoming a "vassal" of other powers. But central and eastern European countries such as Poland and Lithuania want to keep pace with the United States in the context of the Ukraine crisis. These countries have tied China and Russia together since the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, leading to a lot of pressure on China-EU relations. Although European countries generally hope that China will actively promote peace talks in the Ukraine crisis and push for an early end to the conflict, many Europeans still try to link China-EU relations with China-Russia relations.

Second, although there are many EU member states and differences in their interests will persist for a long time, it is also important to note that EU member states have gradually reached some consensus on their China policy. First of all, despite China's opposition, the so-called "triple positioning" of China has been widely accepted by European countries. After the European Commission in 2019 defined China as a "partner, competitor, institutional competitor," the EU and its member states have continued to use this expression. In the past three years, China-EU relations have faced great challenges. It is precisely because the factors of competition, prevention and confrontation in Europe's China policy have grown, which has crowded out the space for cooperation. At present, the pragmatism of Europe's policy toward China has returned, and practical cooperation between China and the EU has been enhanced, but the characteristics of competitiveness, confrontation and turbulence will continue to exist. Another prominent consensus of the EU and its member states on China policy is not to decouple from the Chinese economy, but to "de-risk". The debate about "de-risking" in Europe continues. Although member states and institutions such as the European Commission have different understandings of how to handle the degree of "de-risk", "de-risk" has been established as a principle. On June 20, 2023, the European Commission published a proposal for a new economic security strategy that sets out specific measures for the EU to "de-risk", including screening of outbound investment and export controls.

In response to changes and adjustments in Europe's perceptions and policies toward China, China has stepped up its work with Europe and vigorously pushed for a positive shift in China-Eu relations.

On the one hand, China has maintained continuity in its policy towards Europe. China has always supported European integration and supported the EU in strengthening its strategic independence. At the same time, China attaches great importance to its relations with the EU and is committed to developing a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU and its member states. The following year, during his visit to the EU headquarters, he proposed that China and the EU should build four partnerships for peace, growth, reform and civilization.

In summary, Europe's importance to China is mainly reflected in the following three aspects. First of all, Europe is one of China's most important economic and trade partners. From 2004 to 2019, the EU has been China's largest trading partner, while China is the EU's second largest trading partner. The EU has been China's second largest trading partner since 2020, mainly due to Brexit. Second, the EU and its major member states are important partners for China's cooperation in international organizations and institutions. Finally, in the context of the intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States, Europe's strategic choice is crucial to China.

On the other hand, with the lifting of COVID-19 prevention and control measures, high-level exchanges between China and the EU have resumed rapidly, and cooperation and exchanges in various fields have been restarted. Later, European Council President Charles Michel, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro S. P. Castejon, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen paid official visits to China. At present, the international situation is complex and volatile. China and the EU should adhere to mutual respect, enhance political mutual trust, strengthen dialogue and cooperation, jointly safeguard world peace and stability, promote common development and prosperity, and jointly address global challenges. China is ready to work with the EU to keep to the general direction and main tone of the development of China-Eu relations, comprehensively restart exchanges at all levels and activate mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, so as to inject new impetus into the development of China-EU relations and world peace, stability and prosperity." In June 2023, Premier Li Qiang named Germany and France as his first countries to visit after taking office. With the resumption of high-level visits and various exchanges between China and the EU, China-EU relations are showing a positive and pragmatic trend of recovery.

It is expected that cooperation, competition and prevention will coexist in the future relations between the EU and China, and cooperation and competition will be intertwined in the relations between the two sides, and the importance and complexity of the relationship will rise simultaneously. On the one hand, China and the EU share broad common interests in the economic and trade fields and in addressing global challenges. Our relations will remain resilient and dynamic. On the other hand, the economic and trade frictions between China and Europe, differences in values, as well as external factors such as the evolving situation in Ukraine and the 2024 US presidential election, will have a greater impact on China-EU relations. (Author: Feng Zhongping Professor, School of International Political Economics at University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Director and Researcher, Institute of European Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)