Regionalism in the Global South: the ASEAN process and experience

Abstract：After the Second World War, the countries of the global South gradually embarked on the road of building regional organizations, and ASEAN, founded in 1967, is one of the important representatives. In the practice of regionalism, ASEAN has established the behavior mode of maintaining neutrality and non-alignment externally, coordinating positions and maintaining unity through internal consultation. Using this approach, ASEAN has successfully dealt with and resolved the Cambodian crisis, Myanmar's accession to the EU, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. On the one hand, ASEAN withstood the pressure of the global north countries and defended the unity and interests of Southeast Asia; On the other hand, ASEAN adheres to a common regional position as the core to deal with intra-regional issues, which strengthens ASEAN's regional collective consciousness and avoids the occurrence of "prisoner's dilemma". As a successful practice of regionalism, ASEAN has formed a unique and constantly developing "ASEAN way", established and consolidated the regional "centrality" status of ASEAN, and provided useful experience for the development of regional organizations in the global South.

At present, the global South, as an important force in the international political economy, has been favored and concerned by international organizations such as the United Nations and various world powers, especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the countries of the global South have become the object of competition among major powers. In 2023, the Munich Security Report singled out the growing recognition among great powers that the countries of the global South can become crucial "swing states" that could shift the balance between "system competitors" and thus determine the fate of the "rules-based" international order. Thus, in recent years, the global North has worked to integrate the countries of the global South into international and regional systems dominated by the North. In May 2023, India, Brazil, Vietnam, Comoros, chair of the African Union, Cook Islands, chair of the Pacific Islands Forum, Indonesia, chair of ASEAN and other southern countries were invited to attend the "G7" Hiroshima Summit. In September of the same year, the African Union was formally approved to join the "Group of Twenty" (G20). At the same time, the countries of the global South are also striving to build their own regional cooperation frameworks and dialogue platforms. For example, in 2023, India, one of the world's fastest growing emerging economies, hosted two Global Voices of the South Summits. In August of the same year, BRICS expanded to include the most representative emerging markets and developing countries in the world today, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and other Asian and African countries. In September, the "Group of 77 and China" summit focused on promoting coordination and cooperation among countries in the South, calling for changing the "current unfair international economic order" and "reforming the international financial structure to build a more inclusive and coordinated global economic governance pattern."

Globalization has not only increased international interconnectedness and interdependence, but also increased the vulnerability of countries and regions to external shocks, which is highlighted by the increasing power transfer and diffusion in the international system after the 2008 global financial crisis. To address these challenges, governments have used regionalism to integrate competitively into the global economy. Regionalism has played a vital role in the process of greatly increasing the strength and influence of the global South, fully demonstrating the autonomy and new characteristics of the global South. After the end of the Cold War, with the rapid development of globalization, the countries of the global South set up many regional organizations to promote regional and inter-regional integration. Among the many practices of regionalism in the global South, ASEAN is one of the most noteworthy cases.

First of all, through the "ASEAN Way" characterized by "sovereign equality, non-use of force and peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-interference in internal affairs, non-participation in unresolved bilateral conflicts of member states, quiet diplomacy and mutual respect and tolerance," ASEAN has developed a region that is difficult to integrate into the most successful and active region of regional cooperation in Asia, and formed its own regional cooperation norms. Asean is also known as the most enduring and successful regional organization in the developing world. "Asean Way" not only strengthens the common understanding of the global South, but also expands the practical form of regionalism in the global South, and promotes the development of open regionalism in the global South.

Second, ASEAN and its member states themselves are actively engaged in dialogue and collaboration with countries of the global South and with countries and organizations of the global North. Established in 1989, six of the 12 founding members of APEC are from ASEAN, with the ASEAN Secretariat as an observer and the secretariat of the organization located in Singapore. Since 2009, the rotating chair of ASEAN has been invited to the G20 summit every year. In 2022, Indonesia will assume the G20 presidency for the first time and host the G20 Leaders' Summit. In the same year, Indonesia also began to be invited to the "Group of Seven" summits. In 2023, several ASEAN countries were invited to participate in the first and second Voices of the Global South Summit.

In recent years, the academic circles have made fruitful achievements in the study of ASEAN as an important embodiment and practical mechanism of the development of Southeast Asian regionalism, but at present, the academic circles have not paid enough attention to the comparative study and experience summary of ASEAN in the global South regionalism. First, domestic scholars have not yet begun to examine the issue from the perspective of the global South. Second, although foreign studies have begun to discuss the issue of regionalism in the global South, they mainly focus on regional organizations such as the Southern Common Market (hereinafter referred to as "MERCOsur"), the Economic Community of West African States (hereinafter referred to as "ECOWAS") and the Southern African Development Community (hereinafter referred to as "SADC"). In existing research, SusanEngel, an associate professor at the University of Wollongong in Australia, reviewed the process of South-South cooperation in Southeast Asia, but ASEAN was not the main object of study, only around the role of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. KeiKoga, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, takes the perspective of great power politics and points out that many in the United States and its Allies and partners believe that international rules and norms based on liberal values should be defended in order to uphold existing international law, but because of different historical and cultural backgrounds, countries in the global South have different views on these values. This coincides with Southeast Asian countries' long-standing skepticism of the "political values" promoted by the United States. Asean has found its own way, with member states successfully cooperating and remaining united with extraregonal actors, while MERCOsur and SADC have been divided. These studies either focus on regionalism studies or focus on the characteristics of ASEAN itself, and lack the perspective of the global South, which regards ASEAN as a part of the development trend of regionalism in the global South, so as to clarify the unique contribution of ASEAN in the rise of the global South. The above shortcomings have been clearly pointed out by scholars that, while the academic community fully pays attention to the importance of regional processes, relevant analyses tend to focus on economic and political integration within the region and pay less attention to the larger historical and geopolitical context behind regional processes, especially in the study of comparative regionalism. From the perspective of the global South, this paper explores the experience and enlightenment of ASEAN regionalism from the perspective of vertical comparative historical research and horizontal political and economic analysis of regionalism at both global and regional levels.

I. Regionalism in the Global South and the birth of ASEAN

The origins of regionalism in the global South can be traced back to the colonial period. During this period, national and regional borders in the South began to form a relatively clear division, and regional consciousness began to emerge and became intertwined with the development of nationalist movements against colonial rule. For example, as early as 1826, Bolivar, the leader of the Latin American War of Independence, convened the Panamanian Congress to promote the "Pan-American Movement" and promote unity and cooperation among the countries of Spanish America. However, it was only after the end of the Second World War that a large number of processes of regionalist cooperation began to emerge. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 marked the hope of mankind, after the devastation of two world wars, to usher in a new era of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end, the Charter of the United Nations has designed a series of mechanisms, among which Chapter VIII clearly and affirms the role of regional arrangements or institutions in the management and maintenance of international peace and security.

In the Cold War period, regionalism ushered in the first wave of development in the 20th century with the ups and downs of the Cold War, the collapse of the Western colonial empire, and the development of national independence and decolonization in Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to incomplete statistics, from 1945 to 1991, 179 regional organizations were established in the southern region. In addition to the rapid increase in numbers, the types, functions, membership and coverage of these regional organizations have all undergone unprecedented changes. The regionalism of the global South during the Cold War period gradually began to get rid of the discourse patterns imposed by the former sugrains or great powers, and formed a regional integration path rooted in the history, culture and social reality of the southern regions.

At the beginning of the Cold War, most countries in the South had just gained national independence and were faced with the historic task of building a modern state, or were still in the process of anti-colonialism and struggle for national independence. Compared with European integration, decolonization and nation-building have shown more vitality in their own development, giving these newly independent countries more desire and motivation to unite. In the bipolar pattern of the Cold War, the confrontation between the two camps caused antagonism and estrangement. "In addition to the hegemonic mode, the United States also adopted the hub-and-spoke strategy to communicate with its Asian Allies, which seriously damaged the relations among Asian countries", making the Asian regional integration in the whole Cold War period a distant prospect. The above factors led to four main forms of southern regionalism during the Cold War: the first type was anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-hegemony, and tried to consolidate the newly acquired national independence and national sovereignty through the construction of regional organizations. For example, the League of Arab States (1945), the Organization of Central American States (1951), the Organization of African Unity (1963), the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (1969); The second category is regional organizations dominated by colonial countries, whose main goal is to strengthen the control of colonial and semi-colonial national liberation movements. For example, the South Pacific Commission (1947), the French Community (1958); The third category is dominated by Western countries. For example, treaty regional organizations such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954) and the Central Treaty Organization (1955) sought to contain communism in their regions through military alliances; The fourth category is a variety of functional regional organizations independently promoted by the countries of the global South with the main goal of enhancing the level of regional integration and accelerating the overall development of the region. For example, ASEAN was established in 1967 with the aim of establishing Southeast Asia as a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality." In 1969, five South American countries formed the Andean Community to promote the elimination of tariff barriers among member countries and the creation of a common market.

In the practice of regionalism in the global South after the end of World War II, Southeast Asian countries showed positive enthusiasm from the beginning. At the initiative and promotion of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, two "Asian Relations Conferences" were held in New Delhi in 1945 and 1949, attended by Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. With the efforts of India, Indonesia, Myanmar and other countries, the Bandung Conference was held in 1955, which was the first international conference held by Asia as a main body in international politics, and the first conference in history without the participation of European and American countries. With the exception of Malaya, all the countries of Southeast Asia attended the conference.

The Bandung Conference sought to deal with the relations with the major powers and the coalitions led by the major powers through the establishment of norms such as non-alignment, coexistence, dialogue and compromise. The ten principles of peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation adopted by the Conference, although similar to the Charter of the United Nations, put more emphasis on the unique demands of the newly independent states against imperialism, hegemonism and chauvinism of the major powers. Among them, the sixth of the Ten Bandung Principles stipulates that "the arrangement of collective defense shall not be used to serve the special interests of any major power", which is called the "most important aspect" of the conference. AmitavAcharya, a professor at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University, believes the "ban" is far-reaching. First, this formulation, known as the Bandung ban, responded to superpower interventionism by urging newly independent states not to participate in Cold War collective defense treaties, expanding the meaning of non-intervention beyond relevant European and Latin American formulations; Second, the process by which the principles were established and introduced not only provided a lasting foundation for Asian multilateralism, but also helped to expand and consolidate non-intervention norms globally. It was through the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement that this norm was greatly strengthened as the sovereign rule of the Third World. Traditional non-intervention is enriched, and traditional European non-interventionist exceptionalism (intervention in the name of maintaining a balance of power or balance of power) has no place in the Third World sovereignty system. Moreover, the preservation of the principle of consensus in the Spirit of Bandung and the Ten Principles preserves the core of the shared norms of the "Asian Way" for subsequent inter-regional and local regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.

The norm against regional collective defense formed the Asian regionalism of the post-Bandung Conference, and the Bandung Ban of 1955 was subsequently expanded into a more general norm against regional collective defense, which has continued to influence the nature and purpose of subsequent Asian regional organizations. Founded in 1961, malaya, the Philippines and Thailand in southeast Asia alliance (AssociationofSoutheastAsia, ASA), says it "with any external force or power group has no any relation, and also not for any other country". According to some scholars, the document reflects a realization among ASEAN countries that "close ties with U.S. foreign policy, especially on anti-communist and China issues, will harm any chance of ASEAN expanding into a larger and more genuine regional bloc." During this period, Southeast Asian countries carefully balanced their relations with non-regional powers in an attempt at regionalism. On August 8, 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed the declaration of Bangkok, announced the formation of new regional organization of the association of south-east Asian nations (ASEAN) AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations,. When ASEAN was established, it continued the neutral and non-aligned stance of the 1961 Alliance. Regarding the deployment of military bases by the United States and the United Kingdom in some ASEAN member States, the Bangkok Declaration specifically states that "all foreign bases shall be temporary and shall be retained only with the express consent of the countries concerned, and shall not be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of the countries in the region or to impair the orderly process of their national development." Therefore, as for the reasons for the smooth establishment of ASEAN, some studies believe that the key is that the establishment process is not influenced by the West, and keep distance from the West, which is crucial for the survival and credibility of ASEAN as a non-aligned regional organization.

The neutral and non-aligned attitude displayed by ASEAN at the beginning of its establishment is not only related to the awakening of the autonomy of Southeast Asian countries and the development of Asian regionalism, but also closely related to the failure of regional organizations dominated by Western countries and the change of international power balance. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization established by the United States was not only joined by two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines and Thailand, but also explicitly rejected and opposed by India, Indonesia, Myanmar and Ceylon, and failed to achieve the goal of anti-communist collective defense. The failure of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization has prompted Thailand, the Philippines and others to search for an organization or form that can effectively ensure security in Southeast Asia. According to Achaya, the main reason for the group's weakness and eventual demise has to do with its lack of regional representation and participation. The foreignness of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization has prompted Thailand and the Philippines to become more conscious of their sovereignty and Asian identity. When other ideas of regionalism emerged, they quickly abandoned the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization and resolutely turned to ASEAN. This explains ASEAN's appeal and ultimate success because it is an indigenous and more representative form of regionalism.

After the Second World War, the British and French colonial empires gradually disintegrated, especially after the Dien Bien Phu Battle in 1954 and the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, the power of Britain and France declined sharply. Following France's withdrawal from the Indochina region, in the late 1960s, the United Kingdom announced a "strategic retrenchment" and gradually withdrew most of its troops from the area east of the Suez Canal, including Malaysia and Singapore. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States began to implement the "Nixon doctrine", withdrawing troops from Vietnam and carrying out strategic shrinkage. "The declining willingness and ability of the Western powers, the UK and the US, to maintain their security umbrella in South-East Asia has further encouraged the quest for regional co-operation and identity." And as Britain, France and the United States retreated in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union tried to fill the vacuum. In June 1969, the Soviet Union proposed an "Asian collective security system" in an attempt to expand its influence and presence in the region. In response to the sudden changes and challenges in the geopolitical environment brought about by the shifting offensive and defensive forces of the Eastern and Western blocs, the first ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in October 1971 issued the Declaration on the Neutralization of Southeast Asia, confirming the correctness and validity of the Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation issued by the Bandung Conference in 1955, and echoing and endorsing the efforts of Latin America and Africa to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones.

U.S. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and the start of the normalization of Sino-US relations further triggered changes in the regional environment and the international environment, especially in Southeast Asia. From 1974 to 1975, ASEAN countries Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand established diplomatic relations with China. In 1975, China formally recognized ASEAN and supported the latter's vision of a neutralized Southeast Asia. After the normalization of relations between China and the three ASEAN countries, both China and the Soviet Union actively fought for the support of ASEAN countries, especially in the Indochina region. In the face of new changes in the situation, in 1976, ASEAN held its first summit in history and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration on ASEAN Coherence, which defined the purposes and principles of ASEAN. Both documents reaffirmed the need to continue to adhere to and abide by the principles and spirit of the "Ten Principles of Bandung", the "Bangkok Declaration" and the "Kuala Lumpur Declaration", reflecting the continuity of Southeast Asian regionalism and the cumulative effect of practice. These two documents mark the beginning of ASEAN's transformation from a loose alliance to a binding and unifying regional organization.

However, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 posed a major challenge to ASEAN's newly established "ASEAN norms," and Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union reopened the door for non-regional powers to intervene in the region. That same year, Vietnam also tried to enlist Southeast Asian countries to form a new regional organization to compete with ASEAN. In the face of the unprecedented crisis, there are many differences within ASEAN. However, in the end, through continuous consultation and repeated running-in, ASEAN gradually combined national interests with regional interests and formed a relatively consistent policy. Externally, ASEAN, China, Japan, the United States, European countries and the United Nations have played a key role in resolving the Cambodian crisis through consultation and cooperation.

Southeast Asian regionalism has further practiced and tested the "ASEAN way" in the process of ASEAN's settlement of the Cambodia issue, and ASEAN's decision-making, operation mechanism, coordination function and consciousness with major powers, international status and construction of regional identity have been greatly improved. For ASEAN's development process, the Cambodia issue is not only a test agent, but also a booster. "It confirms that if Southeast Asian countries are united, act wisely and come up with some strategies to maintain their autonomy in the region, then ASEAN can have the right to decide," Wang Gungwu said. The end of the Cold War, the settlement of the Cambodian issue, and the normalization of relations between China and all Southeast Asian countries occurred almost simultaneously, providing a stronger impetus for the development and rise of ASEAN.

2.Asean expansion and Global Northern intervention

The end of the Cold War led to fundamental structural changes in the international system, the disappearance of East-West confrontation provided new space for regional integration processes, and countries began to consider addressing new economic challenges and opportunities through regional cooperation. Southeast Asian regionalism entered a new era, and 1991 became a watershed in the history of ASEAN.

When ASEAN was established in 1967, it declared that the organization was "open to all Southeast Asian countries." However, after the end of the Second World War, the Cold War in Southeast Asia has been in a state of hot war, especially proxy war, resulting in the delayed realization of this concept. The most direct impact and manifestation of the end of the Cold War on Southeast Asia was the settlement of the Cambodian question in 1991. The resolution of this crisis is one of the fundamental preconditions for the rise of ASEAN, and its impact is mainly reflected in two aspects.

First, the process of resolving the Cambodian issue itself had a profound impact on the growth of ASEAN as the main body leading the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era. In the process of resolving the crisis, the ASEAN countries overcame their internal differences and contradictions, engaged in the "ASEAN way" with Asian wisdom, and successfully used their membership in the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Commonwealth, as well as dialogue relations with the United States, the European Community, Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand to obtain international support for their comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian conflict For the first time, ASEAN has been able to resolve major crises and conflicts in the region, and ASEAN diplomacy has gained high prestige and wide recognition on the international stage.

Second, Southeast Asia has thus entered an unprecedented and more lasting era of "long peace". The peaceful settlement of the Cambodian question was itself the result of the end of the Cold War, the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States, and improved relations between China, ASEAN countries, and Vietnam. Since Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989, relations between Vietnam and ASEAN countries have also begun to normalize, with frequent high-level visits between the two sides. This process of change and interaction has made Vietnamese policymakers more aware of the convergence of domestic and foreign policy goals, and has played an important role in Vietnam's quest to join ASEAN as soon as possible. At the same time, the rapid development of economic globalization after the Cold War and the rapid advancement of the economic integration process between Europe and North America make ASEAN realize that Southeast Asia is facing the pressure of economic collectivization competition. In 1992, ASEAN proposed the idea of establishing an "ASEAN Free Trade Area", and in 1994, it proposed the idea of building a "greater ASEAN" to "cope with the formation of a large and powerful economic bloc among developed countries".

In the above context, with the end of the Cold War, ASEAN started the expansion process in the post-Cold War era. In 1995, Vietnam was admitted as the seventh member of ASEAN. Vietnam's accession signaled that ideological and political system differences were no longer fundamental obstacles to ASEAN's development and construction, and "pragmatic regionalism seemed to replace socialist internationalism", paving the way for Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia to join ASEAN later. In 1997, Laos and Myanmar joined ASEAN, and Cambodia delayed its accession to ASEAN until 1999 due to Hun Sen's coup d 'etat that year and national elections the following year. The expansion of ASEAN in the last decade of the 20th century marked the geographic space of ASEAN has overcome historical and ideological obstacles, and for the first time realized the unity and integration of the entire Southeast Asian region.

However, the expansion and transformation of the old ASEAN to the modern new ASEAN has been interfered with and resisted by the northern countries of the world to varying degrees, among which the Myanmar issue is the most typical. On the issue of Myanmar's accession to ASEAN, Western countries led by Europe and the United States put pressure on ASEAN to ban or postpone Myanmar's accession to ASEAN on the grounds of the existence of democracy and human rights problems in Myanmar. On January 8, 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Ryuttaro Hashimoto met with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and expressed concern and concern about the situation of Aung SAN Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy of Myanmar, and the human rights situation in Myanmar in response to the latter's interpretation of the concept of "ten ASEAN countries". Hashimoto said in a public statement on ASEAN's acceptance of Myanmar that Japan "appreciates" joining ASEAN as an incentive for Myanmar to behave in line with international norms, but stressed that ASEAN membership should not be a "smoke screen for domestic oppression in Myanmar." "We hope that ASEAN can contribute to the improvement of Myanmar's domestic situation when dealing with the membership issue."

In 1996, when Myanmar was granted observer status and formally applied to join ASEAN, the United States sent two envoys to Japan and the five founding members of ASEAN to try to put pressure on Myanmar in a coordinated position. In April 1997, U.S. State Department spokesman NicholasBurns declared that the United States believed ASEAN members should reject Burma's application because of its "very poor" human rights record. "We are trying to use our influence to show that Myanmar should get a tough message that it is not welcome." In May, U.S. Secretary of State MadeleineK.Albright sent a letter to all ASEAN leaders asking for Myanmar's membership to be delayed. On July 28, faced with the fact that Myanmar had successfully joined ASEAN, Albright, at the expanded meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers, while ostensibly expressing respect for ASEAN's admission of Myanmar, warned that "we are not asking ASEAN to judge a new member; We simply ask that you accept the judgment of the people of Burma that the status quo in their country is dangerous and wrong." In 1996-1997, the United States also increased sanctions against Myanmar in response to the situation, including prohibiting the issuance of visas to Myanmar government officials and their immediate family members, freezing their assets, prohibiting American citizens from making new investments in Myanmar, and declaring the United States a national emergency in Myanmar.

Compared with the diplomatic pressure and intimidation of the United States, the EU's intervention on the Myanmar issue has a greater impact and influence on ASEAN, and European regionalism is playing games and confronting Southeast Asian regionalism. In October 1996, the EU spoke out against Myanmar becoming a full member of ASEAN, calling on all ASEAN member states to reject Myanmar's membership and warning that it would damage EU-ASEAN relations if Myanmar became a full member. On 30 June 1997, the European Union "strongly condemned Myanmar's accession to ASEAN and further recognition by the international community despite its human rights violations". The EU began sanctions against Myanmar in 1990 and escalated them in 1996-1997, including the expulsion of military attaches from all Myanmar embassies in the EU region, the withdrawal of EU military attaches or military representatives in Myanmar, the imposition of visa bans on officials of the Burmese military government, the suspension of high-level bilateral contacts and bilateral aid to Myanmar, and the cancellation of the GSP for Myanmar products.

Following Myanmar's accession to ASEAN, the EU has strongly resisted interregional dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN since the end of 1997. One is to exclude Myanmar from the meeting by refusing to issue visas to Burmese officials to attend meetings in the EU region. In 1998 and 1999, for example, both Britain and Germany denied visas to Myanmar delegates, preventing Myanmar from attending the Asia-Europe Meeting that year. The second is to refuse to attend EU-ASEAN interregional meetings attended by Myanmar representatives or to downgrade EU officials attending. In November 1997, the EU refused to participate in the EU-ASEAN summit. Myanmar was able to participate for the first time in the EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Vientiane in December 2000, but some EU member states sent only low-level delegations.

On the issue of Myanmar's accession to the Union, ASEAN overcame internal differences, adhered to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, stubbornly resisted the intervention and pressure of the global North countries, and defended ASEAN's "centrality" and unity. In this regard, RobertCribb, a professor at the Australian National University, believes that the original intention of the establishment of ASEAN was to exclude the intervention of major powers in Southeast Asia, and the Western intervention is on the grounds of internal affairs, which violates the basic principle of non-interference in ASEAN's internal affairs. Asean member states are also regularly criticized by the West for their democratic shortcomings and various human rights abuses, and it would be "a dangerous and unacceptable precedent" to acknowledge Western interference in Myanmar's case for membership. Therefore, Western countries' opposition and intervention made ASEAN countries think that deciding whether to accept Myanmar was a matter of honor and principle, and ASEAN felt "bullied" and persecuted by Western countries. In the case of Southeast Asian regionalism, the intervention of the global North has had three effects. First, Western pressure has reinforced Southeast Asians' self-identification with the ASEAN identity: "This is our region, our world, and we know what to do." Second, intervention is counterproductive. Western sanctions on Myanmar and pressure on ASEAN, on the contrary, became the stimulus conditions for Myanmar to speed up membership, and finally joined faster than Laos and Cambodia, ASEAN tried to appease the "Western community's condemnation." Third, the ASEAN approach and norms have been further established. The establishment of ASEAN identity originates from its socialization process, not only from the principles of state relations established at the beginning of its establishment, but also from the test, amendment and consolidation of later practice.

After Myanmar's accession to ASEAN, EU countries continued to boycott Myanmar's participation in bilateral regional dialogue and cooperation. The European Union has refused to grant membership to three new members, including Myanmar, which ASEAN interprets as "political imperialism" by Europeans who once colonized Southeast Asia. In the face of the EU's resistance, ASEAN remained united and confronted the countries of the global North, stopping or postponing dialogue and cooperation between the two sides. From 1997 to 2000, ASEAN-EU ministerial meetings and Joint Cooperation Committee meetings were cancelled several times due to the Myanmar issue, and interregional cooperation programmes were postponed, especially negotiations on the ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement failed. In September 2005, ASEAN ministers refused to attend the ASEM finance ministers' meeting in Rotterdam when the Dutch host refused to grant visas to Myanmar delegates. Asean believes that the EU is applying double standards and is a "hypocrite". For, while the EU criticizes ASEAN's policy of "constructive engagement" with Burma, the EU itself is pursuing a similar policy of "constructive engagement" with other authoritarian regimes.

In Southeast Asia's colonial and post-colonial experience, adherence to the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in regional affairs was not an accident, but a result of the founding members of ASEAN's explicit desire to protect and consolidate the independence of newly formed states, which faced internal strife and external threats of intervention. As a result, the EU's attempts to spread the key values and fundamental principles that guide its integration in EU-ASEAN interregional relations, and to emphasize the transferability of European values, have aroused the aversion of ASEAN countries to the EU's approach and its uncompromising position. They are deeply concerned that if the principles and values of the EU are simply transplanted into their countries, it will create instability. In pursuit of equal interregional partnership and interregionalism, Southeast Asian countries did not succumb to the intervention of the global North. At ASEAN's insistence, the EU was forced to back down in 2004, agreeing to the participation of three new ASEAN members, including Myanmar, in the ASEM summit in Hanoi that year, "but with the expectation that the Myanmar government would participate in ASEM at a lower level than the head of State/government level".

In the process of the development of regionalism in the global South, on the one hand, the countries of the South are actually faced with the interference, control and influence of the countries of the global North, especially the former sugrains or regional powers, to varying degrees. The South Pacific Commission, established in 1947, was initially controlled entirely by the British, French, Dutch, American, Australian and New Zealand powers, and was forbidden to discuss political issues. Until the 1960s, with the struggle and efforts of the island countries in the region, this situation was gradually changed. The Organization of American States, established in 1948, has long been dominated by the United States and interfered in the internal affairs of member states, leading to the withdrawal or expulsion of Cuba, Honduras, Venezuela and Nicaragua. In addition, when dealing with the membership of some southern regional organizations, the membership of some southern regional organizations often changes due to the internal affairs of the member countries, which leads to the instability of regional organizations. For example, 13 members of the 55-member African Union have been suspended for domestic political reasons, especially military coups. In January 2010, Honduras announced its withdrawal from the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), citing the involvement of some of its members in the 2009 coup.

In contrast, in the process of expansion and transformation in the post-Cold War era, ASEAN united in its connection with non-regional powers, international organizations and other regional organizations, adhered to ASEAN's "centrality", opposed external interference and pressure, and maintained the independence and autonomy of the regionalism process in Southeast Asia. Asean is committed to non-interference in internal affairs, bridging differences and maintaining internal unity and regional integrity. During this period, ASEAN encountered the intervention of the global northern countries in Cambodia, East Timor and other issues, but the Myanmar issue is the most typical, lasting and the biggest impact. Since Myanmar's accession to ASEAN, there have been voices and pressures from time to time advocating the expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN, whether it is a northern country outside the region or a member state within the region. However, ASEAN has always adhered to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, insisted on treating the Myanmar issue as an internal issue, and refused to abandon Myanmar. Even after a new wave of crises brought about by the return of Myanmar's military to power in 2021, ASEAN has stressed that Myanmar is a "member of the family" and that "Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN." At the same time, ASEAN member states will not change their ASEAN identity due to domestic political changes and differences among member states. Asean regionalism has been strengthened and maintained through the ASEAN Way.

3.The Prisoner's Dilemma of regionalism in the Global South and the experience of ASEAN

In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War led to the rise of new regionalism. In the past, the confrontation between countries and regional division caused by the bipolarity pattern and the confrontation between the Eastern and Western camps disappeared, which gave the development of new regionalism an unprecedented market driving force. During this period, regional organizations were established in all regions of the South, and almost all developing countries joined at least one organization to escape their marginalization in the global market. In the development process of new regionalism, developing regions aim to achieve integration in order to enhance their economic competitiveness in the global market and promote relations with extraregional economic partners. To date, European integration has been the most mature and successful, but the European integration process is more the exception than the rule, and it is fundamentally different from regional integration processes in developing regions. The economies of the global South are less developed, more diversified and less interdependent with their regional neighbours. Therefore, they are more dependent on the trade and investment of developed countries and regions such as Europe, North America and East Asia. Intra-regional trade and investment cannot become the driving force of regional integration in the global South, so the extra-regional interests of member countries are naturally more important.

The issue of solidarity and cohesion of member states has always been the primary issue facing the survival or dissolution of all regional organizations. In general, regional integration in the global South can continue when all member states reap the rewards of economic cooperation through improved extraregional economic relations. On the contrary, if individual member states enjoy extraregonal economic privileges, they may secure their privileges and interests at the expense of regional cooperation, "defecting" to the regional organizations in which they belong, and bringing regional integration to a standstill. The foreign economic relations of regional organizations will shape the cooperation and game among member countries and affect the progress of regional integration in the global south. Especially in a major crisis in the region, the best option for individual member states is sometimes not the best option for the collective. If the dominant regional powers choose to act alone, defect from the organization, safeguard their own interests, and give up cooperation with other members to jointly face risks, regionalism will fall into a "prisoner's dilemma" and development will stall.

Mercosur in South America is a typical representative of the development of new Southern regionalism in the world. In March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay formed Mercosur. As a major power and "natural leader" in the region, Brazil plays a central role in the organization. In the 1990s, MERCOsur successfully established a customs union, investment and trade increased rapidly, and launched trade negotiations with the European Union and North American countries. In the 20th century, the organization was regarded as a model for the successful development of new regionalism in southern countries, and regional integration "achieved great success" and developed into the fourth largest economic bloc in the world. However, South American economies were hit hard by the double whammy of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and Russia's debt default in 1998. In the face of the crisis, Brazil chose to stay out of the way and abandon its regional partners. In January 1999, Brazil unilaterally implemented a floating exchange rate without consultation with other MERCOsur members, and lifted itself out of the economic crisis by significantly devaluing its currency to boost exports. Formally, Brazil's devaluation did not violate MERCOsur's rules, because monetary policy was not a MerCOsur regional issue. But Brazil's beggar-thy-neighbor policies dealt a fatal blow to Argentina's economy, which plunged into a severe financial crisis that produced one of the largest defaults in history and sparked a trade war between the two countries. Brazil's "treachery" at the expense of its neighbors helped it reverse the economic crisis, but "at the cost of the collapse of the MERCOsur market and a decline in intraregonal trade." Subsequently, Brazil once again turned away from regional cooperation, signed a bilateral strategic partnership with the European Union, initiated the formation of the Union of South American Nations, and sought cooperation beyond MERCOsur, resulting in the loss of trust among MERCOsur member states and the stagnation of regional integration. Brazil's "prisoner's dilemma" in Mercosur has transformed the regional organization from a successful example of regional integration into a global example of the failure of regionalism.

Africa also has a long tradition of regionalism, with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in August 1992, regarded as one of the most successful African regional organizations after ECOWAS. In 1994, South Africa joined the organization and became the leading country. Starting in 1996, SADC initiated negotiations on the construction of a free trade area, with South Africa playing a leading role in the region, culminating in the successful completion of the free trade area on schedule in 2008. However, in the process of deepening the integration of SADC, namely the establishment of customs union, South Africa reappeared the phenomenon of "prisoner's dilemma". The EU has long been the most important trading partner in Southern Africa, so it has an important influence on the integration construction of SADC. In order to support the economic and social transformation of South Africa after apartheid, in 1999, the EU signed the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "UNCTAD Agreement"), which provided special privileges and preferential access to the European market for South African products, and liberalized 95% of the products imported by the EU from South Africa within 10 years and 86% of the products imported by South Africa from the EU within 12 years Products are liberalized. Different from the construction of the SADC free trade area, the customs union requires member countries to coordinate and unify their foreign trade policies, while South Africa has enjoyed preferential trade privileges to the EU because of the UNCTAD Agreement. Finally, South Africa "has no intention of compromising" the trade privileges it has acquired with the EU for the sake of SADC's common position on the EU. Similarly, during the SADC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations, South Africa, in order to preserve its own preferential trade relationship with the EU, "did not play a regional leadership role to bring all SADC member states into a negotiating group, but rather halfheartedly joined the negotiations very late". Sadc's 14 member states were divided into four separate negotiating groupings (the Eastern and Southern African Group, the Central African Group, the East African Community, and the rest of the SADC Group) with different tariff schedules, with the end result that each country negotiated different obligations and trade commitments with the EU, undermining regional cohesion.

In the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, two regional powers, Brazil and South Africa, successfully promoted regional cooperation through their regional leadership. However, when the interests outside the region were threatened, the two countries turned away from regional cooperation, leading to the stagnation of regional economic integration. Thus, in developing regions, the erratic behavior of regional powers in cooperation and divergence is a serious problem, which can lead to unstable economic integration processes.

Like other regional organizations in the South, ASEAN also faces the problem of unity and separation within the region, especially when the expanding ASEAN encounters crises. The 1997 Asian financial crisis is widely regarded as an important turning point in the development of regionalism in Asia, both in terms of institution building and regional identity. Asean's experience fully confirms this assertion. The crisis has hit ASEAN and its member economies hard. Asean's performance during the crisis was widely criticised for its inability to co-ordinate a response among its members. The people of Southeast Asian countries are disappointed with it, criticizing it as a "helpless", "unable to act decisively", "bogged down in bureaucracy" and "unable to cope with current practical problems and challenges". In response, ASEAN has done a lot of soul-searching and summing up.

The Asian financial crisis was a turning point in ASEAN's historical development process and became a driver for its development, but ASEAN did not fall into the same "prisoner's dilemma", mainly for four reasons.

First, ASEAN recognizes that this crisis, unlike previous ones, is a region-wide phenomenon that requires a regional solution. Asean countries are more interconnected than previously thought, and investors see ASEAN as a whole; Asean countries cannot deal with the crisis by themselves, and regional strategies are urgently needed. This ASEAN consensus laid the groundwork for a later search for a regional solution to the crisis.

Second, driven by the crisis, ASEAN has carried out institutional reform from both internal and external aspects: In terms of external relations, ASEAN first launched the "10+3" mechanism with China, Japan and the ROK. This approach suggests that as the political and economic environment changes, the changing functional needs of regional institutions will become a factor influencing the evolution of regionalism. Subsequently, on the basis of "10+3", ASEAN has established a series of dialogue and cooperation mechanisms with countries outside the region, among which the East Asia cooperation mechanisms led by ASEAN include "10+X", ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement and other mechanisms. In East Asia economic cooperation, ASEAN has always carried out external cooperation as a whole, and SADC has not been divided into small groups of different countries. In this way, solidarity and cooperation within ASEAN have stabilized the "10+3" extra-regional cooperation. The latter's success, in turn, has benefited ASEAN members. Therefore, the two levels of regionalism in Southeast Asia and East Asia reinforce and stabilize each other. In addition, in the process of dialogue and cooperation with major powers outside the region, ASEAN member states are united, resist the interference and differentiation of the global North, and ensure the "centrality" of ASEAN through leading cooperation. In the ARF, the Western powers have repeatedly pressed ASEAN on the future agenda, process and control of the forum, and ASEAN has insisted on advancing the agenda in its own standards and ways, in particular rejecting the claims of the United States and Japan to give the Forum greater leadership and capabilities. In order to prevent non-regional powers from "acting against the host" in the framework of regional cooperation led by ASEAN, it set three conditions for the participation of ASEAN summit: one is that it has joined or intends to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the second is ASEAN's comprehensive dialogue partnership status, and the third is that it has substantive relations with ASEAN. Asean promotes the regional process of the Treaty through dialogue relations, not only grasps the balance of affinity and disaffinity among each group of relations, but also dominates the normative basis of regional multilateral processes, and builds a network of relations conducive to maintaining peace and promoting cooperation.

In terms of internal construction, ASEAN has launched deeper integration construction and reform. In 2002, the six ASEAN countries first launched the ASEAN Free Trade Area, and in 2003, they decided to launch the establishment of the three ASEAN Communities to "enable ASEAN to have one goal, one identity and one voice to jointly meet future challenges." In 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted to define ASEAN's legal status and institutional framework. In the process of integration construction, ASEAN adheres to the "ASEAN Way", implements the principle of consensus decision-making, respects sovereignty and territorial integrity and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and other Westphalian system norms. The "ASEAN Way" of cooperation emphasizes flexible application of principles and avoids excessive institutionalization and bureaucracy. Although ASEAN is often criticized as a "talking shop" for its loose organization, low level of institutionalization, and weak execution, "this minimalist interpretation of the system and the absence of supranational governance are actually not flaws in the system, but features of design." In particular, the principle of consensus makes cooperation between different regions possible in the first place." Compared with the European Union, the organization and institutionalization of ASEAN lag behind, resulting in a low process and performance of integration construction, but the success of ASEAN lies in its fundamental situation of Southeast Asian countries in the political, economic, cultural, religious and other aspects of the major differences, to find the "ASEAN way", the largest common divisor to bond ten countries, to avoid the "prisoner's dilemma".

Compared with the division and the "prisoner's dilemma" in other southern regions, ASEAN is relatively united and stable to promote internal integration and external high-frequency cooperation, precisely because of the "negative solidarity" function of the "ASEAN Way". In the case of disagreement, though, "negative unity" "does not direct the will toward a common goal, but simply allows things to evolve around the will in an orderly manner." Because genuine rights are thus limited, conflicts do not arise; Hostility was ruled out, but there was no positive unity, no consensus." The "negative solidarity" produced by the ASEAN approach is perhaps the most fitting footnote to the assertion that national resilience requires regional resilience. This resilience of the ASEAN way led it to seek a breakthrough in the 1997 crisis, both internally and externally, which ultimately turned the crisis into an opportunity.

Third, the role of regional power Indonesia. Different from the experience of the Southern Communist Party of China and SADC, although Indonesia, the "natural leader" or "informal leader" of ASEAN, is often criticized for its lack of leadership, Indonesia has always united with other member states and played a stabilizing and even leading role, whether in previous economic crises or in response to competition from major powers outside the region. For example, in 2019, Western countries led by the United States successively launched or activated various versions of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", and ASEAN, which has been in the leading position of regional cooperation for a long time, faces the risk of being marginalized, resulting in differences in positions within ASEAN, and the unity of ASEAN is facing destruction and challenges. In response to this major internal and external change, Indonesia led the launch of the ASEAN version of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" to strengthen ASEAN unity and maintain ASEAN's "centrality". At the time of ASEAN's founding, Singapore's first foreign minister cautioned that "we must now think at two levels." We have to think not only about our national interests, but also our regional interests: this is a new way of thinking." In regional cooperation, the balance and choice between individual and collective interests of member states, especially the dominant powers, have a profound impact on the process and direction of regional integration. Fortunately, the regional powers of ASEAN do not face a prisoner's dilemma similar to that of Latin America and Africa. Therefore, some scholars pointed out that unlike the Argentine crisis in South America, the Asian financial crisis did not stop the regional integration of Southeast Asia. For within ASEAN, no regional power has turned its back on regional cooperation in pursuit of interests outside the region, as Brazil in SADC and South Africa in SADC did. On the contrary, Indonesia has played a positive role in the face of the crisis. For example, in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, with the support of Indonesia, ASEAN was able to successfully launch the "10+3" mechanism, and in 1990, Indonesia vetoed Malaysia's proposal to establish an East Asian economic bloc.

Fourth, compared with other southern regions, the development of ASEAN regionalism has a unique neighbor advantage. When the United States and the International Monetary Fund stood idly by during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China and Japan not only helped ASEAN out of trouble, but also actively supported ASEAN regional cooperation. Such stable extraregional support is usually less likely for developing regions because their most important trading partners are generally located far away and therefore have less interest in supporting these regions. Among the support and cooperation from neighboring regions, the Chinese factor is particularly important for the development of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Despite the late establishment of dialogue partnership between China and ASEAN, it has developed most rapidly, creating a number of firsts among ASEAN dialogue partners: the first to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the first to establish a strategic partnership with ASEAN, the first to identify a free trade area with ASEAN, the first to explicitly support the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and the first to explicitly support ASEAN in East Asia "Centrality" in regional cooperation. These cooperation and dialogues between China and ASEAN in the new century have profoundly influenced and changed bilateral relations. Since 2009, China has been the largest trading partner of ASEAN continuously, and since 2020, ASEAN has surpassed the EU to become China's largest trading partner, and the two sides have become each other's largest trading partner.

The above development trend has a very prominent "driving" effect on the development of ASEAN regionalism. The leading cooperation between China and ASEAN has an exemplary and compelling effect on other major countries outside the region. The increasingly close relationship between China and ASEAN and the growing influence in Southeast Asia have aroused the concern and anxiety of Western countries such as the United States and Japan. For example, in October 2003, China took the lead in joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia to establish a strategic partnership between China and ASEAN. In order to balance China's influence, Japan, which had been cold and cautious about the treaty, quickly announced its accession two months later. Similarly, in order to participate in the East Asia Summit and implement the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy," the United States was also forced to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2009. After entering the 21st century, ASEAN has been able to become the focus of numerous regionalist cooperation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific, one of the reasons is that China fully supports the rise of ASEAN, which is an advantage that other southern regionalists cannot have. In the practice of regional development in the global South, the rise of China and its strong support for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia are indispensable factors for the ASEAN way to show vitality and avoid the "prisoner's dilemma".

5.Conclusion

Both in real international relations and in the academic field, the global South is rising as never before. The Global South has demonstrated a level of political and economic power and independence that the "developing countries" and the "Third World" never had. Especially after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the West apparently noticed "why do so many countries in the global South support Russia and not Ukraine?" The 2023 Munich Security Report reminds the countries of the global North that it is not enough to successfully defend the "liberal order" by simply "nurturing a global coalition of liberal Democrats" - it is also necessary to build a larger coalition to actively defend the liberal order, "which requires due respect for the legitimate grievances of many countries in the" global South "with the existing order 's.

"Concepts are places of struggle," and the concept of the Global South "functions as a political tool to unite nations and provide a common language of struggle and resistance." This function of creating solidarity makes the concept of the global South most plausible." The Global South is also a continuation and renewal of the previous "Third World", "three continentalism" and post-colonial discourse in the new era, criticizing and resisting the injustice and oppression in the world political and economic order dominated by the "global North". The rise of the contemporary political consciousness of the South is very prominently reflected in the academic research and knowledge production of the global South in the international academic circle in the past decade. Since 2010, there have been more than a dozen new academic journals directly named "Global South" dedicated to global South issues, most of which are founded by academic institutions in Southern countries. For example, India, Philippines, Indonesia and other countries. The purpose and direction of these new journals have continued the concern of Third Worldism, and clearly demonstrated the self-consciousness of the Southern countries in pursuing a fair and just international order. The Aguipo Global South Journal, founded by the University of the Philippines at Cebu in 2022, seeks to advance the epistemology and social liberation of the people of the Global South through research, and encourages authors to contribute responses to current hegemonic (new) colonialism. Have ten years history of Indonesia Bandung: the global south journal (Bandung: Journal of the Global South) positioning, based in Africa, Asia and Latin America after the people's complex colonial landscape, to determine its own development and decolonization methods and strategies.

In response to this phenomenon in the academic world, the ThirdWorldQuarterly, which focuses on the study of the South, expressed its anti-imperialist and anti-colonial academic mission in outspoken terms, "The desire to restructure the global political economy and challenge the dominant mode of narrative of global relations has not only been resisted by hegemonic powers, but also rejected." For a world order long accustomed to hierarchy and trusteeship, the desire for a more just and equitable return of the world's sources of wealth, power, and knowledge seems too radical."

In addition to demonstrating the academic consciousness of the South in the field of research, the countries of the South have long been aware of the need to continue to struggle for unity and self-improvement through regional organizations in their actual development. "Africa's political and economic leaders have long agreed that only a massive joint effort can break the vicious cycle of poverty and violence. One of the key preconditions for achieving this is enhanced South-South cooperation, preferably in the form of regional cooperation." In the practice of regionalism in the global South, the most important experience of ASEAN is to successfully avoid the "prisoner's dilemma" and pursue the progress of regional integration on the basis of ensuring internal solidarity. Asean's experience and achievements have been widely recognized by the international community, and the United Nations regards ASEAN as an important regional partner.

Since 2000, the United Nations and ASEAN have held regular bilateral summits, and in 2006, the United Nations granted ASEAN observer status. Every two years since 2003, UN Member States have unanimously adopted a resolution welcoming cooperation between the UN and ASEAN. The United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs describes ASEAN as "emerging as an indispensable global partner and role model for action." Asean is playing an increasingly important role in ensuring peace and stability in Asia and beyond.

In 2017, on the occasion of ASEAN's 50th anniversary, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted A commemorative resolution "in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations" (A/71/L.76). The resolution, co-sponsored by 67 UN member states, marks the first time in UN history that a resolution has been adopted for the anniversary of a regional organization. Asean's 50 years of development history and achievements have been affirmed and recognized by the United Nations and many of its members. Moreover, the "ASEAN Way" is increasingly gaining the support and respect of major powers outside the region. In May 2023, the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, reaffirmed "our unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and solidarity".

As a regional organization composed of small and medium-sized countries, ASEAN's nearly 60 years of regionalism in the global South is unique, one of the most fundamental experience lies in its exploration and persistence of the "ASEAN way". From the general development law of regional organizations, expansion and deepening of integration mechanism are two basic directions. Compared with the rest of the South, ASEAN has succeeded on both counts. After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN first "achieved the rare victory of bringing the former enemy (Vietnam) into the same cooperation framework". Subsequently, on the issue of Myanmar and Cambodia joining ASEAN, ASEAN resisted the intervention of the global northern countries and successfully completed the unification and integration of ASEAN and Southeast Asia. In the internal and external construction of the regionalism mechanism, the "ASEAN Way" has gradually changed from weak institutionalization to institutionalization, from unanimity to consensus, from low binding force to strengthening regional binding force in some areas, from upholding the principle of absolute sovereignty and non-interference to breaking through the principle of non-interference to a limited extent, and carried out gradual reform on the basis of maintaining regional stability. Thus, ASEAN ensured the integrity, unity and inclusiveness of this diverse region to the greatest extent possible, and avoided the "prisoner's dilemma", the departure and division of member states through "negative solidarity" before the member states reached consensus and cooperation, and the once-eye-catching MERCOSUR and SADC just collapsed here. (Author: Fan Hongwei, Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University; Zhao Zherui, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University)